Russian Energy Policy And Military Power

This is an examination of how the political design for restoring Russia's 'greatness' has been shaped by the increase of its profile as a key energy supplier and the continuing decline of its military might.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union left Russia without efficient military power and with a tumbled-down defense industry that are critically important to support its resurfaced superpower ambitions. This obstacle could be overcome by substituting military power with the economic one through domination as the leading energy supplier. Establishment of governmental control over the energy sector became a key element of the Russian domestic policy that would convert the energy resources into the instrument of the state's power. All major energy transportation routes between Russian energy producers and European consumers are in possession of the former Soviet republics. Russia has become heavily dependent on these countries as energy transit intermediaries. To ensure consistency of the energy supply flow and to lessen Russia's reliance on the transit states, Russia is seeking ways to diversify energy transportation routes to Europe. Russia is willing to pay a significantly higher cost for a complex construction of new pipelines that bypass intermediaries. The establishment of Russian monopolistic control over energy flow to Europe might be converted into a regional political dominance. Threatening the possibility of abrupt energy disruption and price manipulation could become an efficient tool of state power to achieve Russia's political objectives.

This book examines the interplay between energy policy and security policy under Vladimir Putin, and his drive to re-establish Russia’s ‘greatness’. Assessing the internal contradictions of this policy, the book argues that Russia’s desire to strengthen its role of ‘energy security’ provider is undermined by its inability to secure growth in production of oil and gas. Further, the pressing demand to channel more resources into the military-industrial complex clashes with the growing need to invest in the energy complex, and the priority granted to strategic forces deprives the conventional forces of strike power and strategic mobility. In conclusion, the author anticipates how these contradictions could be resolved, and suggests three short scenarios for Russia’s continuing transition in the next decade. This book will be of interest to students of Russian politics, European politics and international security.

The challenges in Russia’s energy sector are changing. On the demand side, Europe is seeking to limit its dependence on Russian oil and gas, with the result that China and other Asian countries are likely to eventually become growing export markets for Russian energy. On the supply side, oil and gas fields in West Siberia are diminishing and in future Russia’s energy will have to come more from East Siberia and the Arctic, which will necessitate new infrastructure development and the employment of advanced technologies, which may increase Russia’s dependence on commercial partners from outside Russia. This book explores the challenges facing Russia’s energy sector and the resulting security implications. It includes a discussion of how far the Russian state is likely to continue to monopolise the energy sector, and how far competition from private and foreign companies might be allowed.

The slow re-emergence of Russia as a world power despite its weak military force is of critical significance for the strategic interests of the United States in Europe. Since the Cold War, Russia has been perceived as a broken nation that no longer represents a threat to the North Atlantic Alliance. This monograph emphasizes that Russia overcame this major vulnerability by developing the capacity to use unilateral economic sanctions in the form of gas pricing and gas disruptions against many European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. It agrees with many scholars and politicians alike who fear that Russia will leverage its monopoly of natural gas to gain political concessions. The author suggests it is only a matter of time until Russia will use natural gas as an instrument of coercion to disrupt NATO's decisionmaking process. A key aim of this monograph is to explain why the rapid global transition from oil to natural gas will redefine the way policymakers and strategic security scholars look at the scarcity of natural gas in Europe. What is unique about this monograph is that it analyzes the oil and gas markets separately and illustrates, with examples, why in Europe natural gas is a more potent instrument of coercion than oil. Despite these revelations, only 1 month after the German Government announced its plans to abandon nuclear power by 2022, in July 2011 German Chancellor Angela Merkel disclosed that Germany will need to import more Russian natural gas to make up for the loss of over 10 gigawatts of generation capacity. Almost simultaneously, Germany's largest energy utilities group, RWE, and the Russian state-controlled gas giv vi ant, Gazprom, have agreed to form a strategic partnership. The author argues that situations like these create a delicate state of affairs that will ultimately undermine the de facto power of NATO in the contemporary security environment, particularly vis-�vis Russia, unless the dependency on Russian natural gas is promptly addressed.

This book offers a nuanced and detailed examination of two of the most important current debates about contemporary Russia's international activity: is Moscow acting strategically or opportunistically, and should this be understood in regional or global terms? The book addresses core themes of Russian activity - military, energy and economic - but it offers an unusual multi-disciplinary analysis to these themes. Monaghan incorporates both regional and thematic specialist expertise to give a fresh perspective to each of these core themes. Underpinned by detailed analyses of the revolution in Russian geospatial capabilities and the establishment of a strategic planning foundation, the book includes chapters on military and maritime strategies, energy security and economic diversification and influence. This serves to highlight the connections between military and economic interests that shape and drive Russian strategy.

Russia is the world's foremost energy superpower, rivaling Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer and accounting for a quarter of the world's exports of natural gas. Russia's energy reserves account for half of the world's probable oil reserves and a third of the world's proven natural gas reserves. Whereas military might and nuclear weapons formed the core of Soviet cold war power, since 1991 the Russian state has viewed its monopolistic control of Russia's energy resources as the core of its power now and for the future. Since 2005, the international news has been filled with Russia's repeated demonstrations of its readiness to use price, transit fees, and supply of gas and oil exports as punitive policy instruments against recalcitrant states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, striking in turn the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Lithuania. Orban reveals for the first time in Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism Russia's readiness to wield the same energy weapon against her neighbors on the west, all of them former Soviet satellite states but now EU and NATO member nations: the three Baltic nations and the five East European nations of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. Orban shows how the Kremlin since 1991 has systematically used Russian energy companies as players in a concerted neo-mercantilist, energy-based foreign policy designed to further Russia's neo-imperial ambitions among America's key allies in Central East Europe. Her unprecedented analysis is key to predicting Russia's strategic response to American negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic to host the US missile shield. She also reveals the economic and diplomatic modus operandi by which Russia will increasingly apply its energy clout to shape and coerce the foreign policies of the West European members of the EU, as Russia's contribution to EU gas consumption increases from a quarter today to three-quarters by 2020. Orban proves that Russia's neo-mercantilist energy strategy in East Europe is not at all dependent on the person of Putin, but began under Yeltsin and continues under Medvedev, the former chairman of Gazprom.

After a period of relative weakness and isolation during most of the 1990s, Russia is again appearing as a major security player in world politics. This book provides a comprehensive assessment of Russia's current security situation, addressing such questions as: What kind of player is Russia in the field of security? What is the essence of its security policy? What are the sources, capabilities and priorities of its security policy? What are the prospects for the future? One important conclusion to emerge is that, while Russian foreign policy under Putin has become more pragmatic and responsive to both problems and opportunities, the growing lack of checks and balances in domestic politics makes political integration with the West difficult and gives the president great freedom in applying Russia's growing power abroad.