Rethinking The Separation Of Powers

Exploring the evolution and resilience of systems for the separation of powers, this prescient book rethinks how different architectures can defend democracies against adverse shocks and help them adapt to change. Frank Vibert cuts across many fields of study to address the central problem in modern government of how to balance the reasoning of experts with that of electoral politics. Beginning from the original separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, Vibert explores modern alternatives to this system. In particular, he discusses consociationalism, based on the need for political consensus for major decisions, as well as rights-based approaches. Looking to the future, he identifies important areas for improvement in these systems, such as better defences against corruption and stronger representation for the marginalised as well as the need to address income and wealth differences. Ultimately, he shows that the separation of powers is a learning system that can adapt to the tasks of modern government, especially by combining the reasoning of experts with political strategy without reverting to technocracy. Rethinking the Separation of Powers is an essential read for students and scholars of political science, law, behavioural science, social psychology and philosophy. Addressing central problems in modern government, it will also be vital for researchers interested in strategies for effective policy-making.

Exploring the evolution and resilience of systems for the separation of powers, this prescient book rethinks how different architectures can defend democracies against adverse shocks and help them adapt to change. Frank Vibert cuts across many fields of study to address the central problem in modern government of how to balance the reasoning of experts with that of electoral politics.

To what extent should the doctrine of the separation of powers evolve in light of recent shifts in constitutional design and practice? Constitutions now often include newer forms of rights – such as socioeconomic and environmental rights – and are written with an explicitly transformative purpose. They also often reflect include new independent bodies such as human rights commissions and electoral tribunals whose position and function within the traditional structure is novel. The practice of the separation of powers has also changed, as the executive has tended to gain power and deliberative bodies like legislatures have often been thrown into a state of crisis. The chapters in this edited volume grapple with these shifts and the ways in which the doctrine of the separation of powers might respond to them. It also asks whether the shifts that are taking place are mostly a product of the constitutional systems of the global south, or instead reflect changes that run across most liberal democratic constitutional systems around the world.

Bondy, William. Separation of Governmental Powers in History, in Theory, and in the Constitutions. New York: Columbia College, 1896. Reprinted 1999 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. vi,[7]-185, [1] pp. LCCN 98-44994. ISBN 1-886363-65-X. Cloth. $65. * Examines theories relating to the powers of the court and the legislature and the separation and balance of the two. Originally published as v.5, no. 2 in Columbia's series, Studies in history, economics and public law.

The separation of powers is one of the most cherished principles of constitutional government in the Western tradition. Despite its prestigious status, however, it has always been controversial. It has been attacked for being inadequate to account for institutional realities; for being inapplicable to parliamentary systems; for lacking a convincing normative grounding and even for being harmful, inasmuch as it hampers both the immediate enforcement of popular will and efficient political leadership. Current political crises all over the world, especially the rise of populist democracies and authoritarian regimes, however, make the principle worth a closer, more positive examination. This book takes stock of the criticisms of the principle of separation of powers and attempts to offer a new normative account of it. It argues that the separation of powers cannot be restricted to governmental institutions, agencies and decision-making procedures. Rather, it must be derived from the very basics of government, from the very notions of political order and articulated government and from the distinct though related concepts of social and governmental power and of authority. Once these distinctions are made, institutional separations are easier to be established. Contrary to the classical and most contemporary conceptions of the principle, the present account argues for a relational and negative conception of the separation of powers. The legislative branch in conceived of as the one where political authority, political power and social power are all equally represented. The executive branch is best understood as excluding social power whereas the judicial branch is marked for its opposition to the influence of political power. This conception avoids the pitfalls of essentialism and functionalism and makes the principle applicable in a much wider international context.

Each branch of American government possesses inherent advantages and disadvantages in structure. In this book, the author relies on a separation-of-powers analysis that emphasizes the advantage of the legislature to draft precise words to fit intended situations, the judiciary’s advantage of being able to do justice in an individual case, and the executive’s homogeneity and flexibility, which best suits it to decisions of an ad hoc nature. Identifying these structural abilities, the author analyzes major public policy issues, including gun control, flag burning, abortion, civil rights, war powers, suing the President, legislative veto, the exclusionary rule, and affirmative action. Each issue is examined not from the point of view of determining the right outcome, but with the intention of identifying the branch of government most appropriate for making the decision.