Rescue Mission Report

In May 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Special Operations Review Group to conduct a broad examination of the planning, organization, coordination, direction, and control of the Iranian hostage rescue mission, as a basis for recommending improvement in these areas for the future. The Review Group consisted of six senior military officers three who had retired after distinguished careers, and three still on active duty. The broad military experience of the group gave it an appropriate perspective from which to conduct an appraisal. Details on the participants, the Terms of Reference they operated under, and their approach to the subject are contained in this document. The Review Group has made its final report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Copies have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, as have the related, early recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. A highly classified report also has been transmitted to appropriate committees in the Congress. Because it is important that as much detail as possible be made available to the American public, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has conducted a declassification review to produce this version. The issues and findings have been retained in as close a form as possible to the original, classified version. In particular, the Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations remain virtually the same as in the original.

Operation Eagle Claw was tactically feasible, operationally vacant, and strategically risky. This paper examines the failed hostage rescue mission conducted by the U.S. in Iran during April of 1980. The following text will recreate the rescue mission in its historical context while identifying factors across the three levels of war which contributed to its outcome. The three levels of war referred to in this discussion are the tactical, operational and strategic levels. This study concludes that (1) The fall of the Shah unearthed a gap in U.S. military influence in the Middle East which could not rapidly be overcome; (2) the hostage rescue mission, although tied directly to the strategic objective of returning the 53 American hostages, provided little influence in terms of salvaging U.S. honor and interests in the Middle East. In reality, it is probable that mission failure protracted eventual diplomatic resolution of the crisis; (3) the hostage rescue mission, a limited objective and high risk raid, should only have been executed in the event that hostages lives were directly threatened; and (4) since 1961, sixty-six separate hostage, kidnapping, or hijacking incidents have occurred involving U.S. diplomats, servicemen, and private citizens. The frequency of these actions equate to 1.6 per year over the past 41 years. This data demonstrates the relevancy of the subject and the frequency of its occurrence.

Presented in paperback in two volumes because of its massive content, with a total of over a thousand pages of text and images, this unique and comprehensive book provides encyclopedic coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis during the Carter administration and the 1980 failed military rescue mission with declassified Department of Defense documents, intelligence reports, histories and reports. These reports provide important new information on this controversy. There is extensive coverage of military activities, including the planning and execution of the hostage rescue mission called Operation Eagle Claw, which resulted in the Desert One tragedy on April 25, 1980. There is also new information on planning for Operation Snowbird later in 1980.Volume One Contents: Part 1: Overview * Part 2: Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report (The Holloway Report) * Part 3: Robert Ode Hostage Diary * Part 4: Statements by Defense Secretary Brown and JSC Chairman Jones * Part 5: Crisis in Iran - Operation Eagle Claw * Part 6: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission - A Case Study * Part 7: Two White Houses - The Iran Hostage Crisis * Part 8: Choosing Peace: Jimmy Carter and the Iran Hostage Crisis * Part 9: A Classic Case of Deception - CIA Goes Hollywood, The Argo Cover Story * Part 10: Broken Stiletto - Command and Control of the Joint Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One * Part 11: Desert One: The Hostage Rescue Mission * Part 12: Operation Eagle Claw - Lessons Learned * Part 13: Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change * Part 14: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt * Part 15: Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt - A Case Study * Part 16: Skipping the Interagency Process Can Mean Courting Disaster: The Case of Desert One * Part 17: Explaining Iran's Foreign Policy, 1979-2009 * Part 18: USSOCOM Mission * Part 19: From Son Tay to Desert One: Lessons Unlearned * Part 20: Airborne Raids - A Potent Weapon in Countering Transnational TerrorismVolume Two Contents: Part 21: Command and Control of Special Operations Forces Missions in the U.S. Northern Command Area of Responsibility * Part 22: Excerpt about Desert One from The Praetorian STARShip: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon * Part 23: Original DocumentsOn November 4, 1979, more than 3,000 Iranian militant students stormed the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran. 66 Americans were seized and held hostage, precipitating a confrontation with the United States. The result of this crisis would change the course of a presidency, and affect the relations between the two nations. In military history one can stand out as a splendid example or a disastrous reminder. On April 24, 1980, highly-trained members of the four armed services made a valiant attempt to rescue the 44 diplomats and servicemembers held hostage in the Islamic republic of Iran. What the vast majority of Americans did not know was that planning for an armed rescue attempt began almost immediately after the embassy was overrun. The code name for the overall operation was Rice Bowl, while the operational portion was known as Eagle Claw. The operation was complex and faced several limiting factors, among which were the relative isolation of Tehran and the available courses of action which involved an increased risk of equipment failure. One critical piece of the operation was a refueling and overnight stay at a mid-desert site named Desert One. When the operation finally launched on the night of April 24, 1980, equipment failures and unpredictable dust storms caused the on-scene commanders to abort the mission. As the rescue force prepared to evacuate Desert One, an H-53 helicopter collided with a C-130.

Presented in paperback in two volumes because of its massive content, with a total of over a thousand pages of text and images, this unique and comprehensive book provides encyclopedic coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis during the Carter administration and the 1980 failed military rescue mission with declassified Department of Defense documents, intelligence reports, histories and reports. These reports provide important new information on this controversy. There is extensive coverage of military activities, including the planning and execution of the hostage rescue mission called Operation Eagle Claw, which resulted in the Desert One tragedy on April 25, 1980. There is also new information on planning for Operation Snowbird later in 1980.Volume One Contents: Part 1: Overview * Part 2: Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report (The Holloway Report) * Part 3: Robert Ode Hostage Diary * Part 4: Statements by Defense Secretary Brown and JSC Chairman Jones * Part 5: Crisis in Iran - Operation Eagle Claw * Part 6: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission - A Case Study * Part 7: Two White Houses - The Iran Hostage Crisis * Part 8: Choosing Peace: Jimmy Carter and the Iran Hostage Crisis * Part 9: A Classic Case of Deception - CIA Goes Hollywood, The Argo Cover Story * Part 10: Broken Stiletto - Command and Control of the Joint Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One * Part 11: Desert One: The Hostage Rescue Mission * Part 12: Operation Eagle Claw - Lessons Learned * Part 13: Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change * Part 14: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt * Part 15: Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt - A Case Study * Part 16: Skipping the Interagency Process Can Mean Courting Disaster: The Case of Desert One * Part 17: Explaining Iran's Foreign Policy, 1979-2009 * Part 18: USSOCOM Mission * Part 19: From Son Tay to Desert One: Lessons Unlearned * Part 20: Airborne Raids - A Potent Weapon in Countering Transnational TerrorismVolume Two Contents: Part 21: Command and Control of Special Operations Forces Missions in the U.S. Northern Command Area of Responsibility * Part 22: Excerpt about Desert One from The Praetorian STARShip: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon * Part 23: Original DocumentsOn November 4, 1979, more than 3,000 Iranian militant students stormed the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran. 66 Americans were seized and held hostage, precipitating a confrontation with the United States. The result of this crisis would change the course of a presidency, and affect the relations between the two nations. In military history one can stand out as a splendid example or a disastrous reminder. On April 24, 1980, highly-trained members of the four armed services made a valiant attempt to rescue the 44 diplomats and servicemembers held hostage in the Islamic republic of Iran. What the vast majority of Americans did not know was that planning for an armed rescue attempt began almost immediately after the embassy was overrun. The code name for the overall operation was Rice Bowl, while the operational portion was known as Eagle Claw. The operation was complex and faced several limiting factors, among which were the relative isolation of Tehran and the available courses of action which involved an increased risk of equipment failure. One critical piece of the operation was a refueling and overnight stay at a mid-desert site named Desert One. When the operation finally launched on the night of April 24, 1980, equipment failures and unpredictable dust storms caused the on-scene commanders to abort the mission. As the rescue force prepared to evacuate Desert One, an H-53 helicopter collided with a C-130.

See report I'll never forget that momentous morning 25 April, 1980, when I picked up the newspaper and found headlines about the failed mission to rescue American hostages Iran was holding. I'll never forget my feelings of remorse over the loss of lives, embarrassment over the failure of the mission, and outrage over our national humiliation. I wondered at length about the decision-making and planning processes that led to execution of such a difficult mission. I also wondered why the mission failed. History isn't kind to failure. If the raid had succeeded, Jimmy Carter probably would have been reelected, and he would have been hailed as a great decision- maker. instead, critics have castigated him for designing a flawed plan and making a poor decision. The reasons for the President's decision to execute the hostage rescue operation were extraordinarily complex. President Carter made this decision with a multitude of diverse and strong pressures bearing heavily on him. The environment in which Carter made the decision was volatile and shifting, domestically, internationally, politically, and personally. Also, some participants within his decision-making group had strong differences of opinion, which contributed to pressure on the President. We can understand President Carter's decision to execute the hostage rescue operation by using an analytical collage. A collage makes sense because this, and other crisis decisions, are very complex. My collage consists of key aspects of the decision-maker's environment, aspects of Allison's bureaucratic model of analysis, backgrounds and mind-sets of principal participants, and a multitude of influences emanating from the nature of the crisis. Other approaches could easily include Allison's rational actor and organizational models; however, owing to space constraints, I chose to limit discussion to my collage.

One of the highest-ranking officers on the ground in Iran reveals the untold story of the Iran hostage rescue mission that took place in 1980. In this riveting account, Col. Kyle takes readers from the initial brainstorming sessions and training camps to desert rehearsals to the desert refueling site where he decided to abort. (May)