Reducing Tensions Between Russia And Nato

“[Vladimir] Putin’s aggression makes the possibility of a war in Europe between nuclear-armed adversaries frighteningly real,” writes Kimberly Marten in a new Council Special Report on tensions between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). She outlines how U.S. policymakers can deter Russian aggression with robust support for NATO, while reassuring Russia of NATO’s defensive intentions through clear words and actions based in international law.

Kimberly Marten outlines how U.S. policymakers can deter Russian aggression with robust support for NATO, while reassuring Russia of NATO's defensive intentions through clear words and actions based in international law.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.

The rapid rise in Russia's power over the course of the last ten years has been matched by a stunning lack of international diplomacy on the part of its president, Vladimir Putin. One consequence of this, when combined with Europe's rapidly shifting geopolitics, is that the West is on a possible path toward nuclear war. Former deputy commander of NATO General Sir Richard Shirreff speaks out about this very real peril in this call to arms, a novel that is a barely disguised version of the truth. In chilling prose, it warns allied powers and the world at large that we risk catastrophic nuclear conflict if we fail to contain Russia's increasingly hostile actions. In a detailed plotline that draws upon Shirreff's years of experience in tactical military strategy, Shirreff lays out the most probable course of action Russia will take to expand its influence, predicting that it will begin with an invasion of the Baltic states. And with GOP presidential candidate Donald Trump recently declaring that he might not come to the aid of these NATO member nations were he to become president, the threat of an all-consuming global conflict is clearer than ever. This critical, chilling fictional look at our current geopolitical landscape, written by a top NATO commander, is both timely and necessary-a must-read for any fan of realistic military thrillers as well as all concerned citizens.

The spectre of war with Russia looms large in the imagination of European and American policymakers in 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has reawakened thinking in terms of risks and ‘escalation’. Since both Russia and NATO-states US, UK and France have nuclear arsenals, the nuclear threat has also returned to the forefront. Clearly, Putin’s Russia is engaging in brinkmanship and one-sided escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, and thus the risk of escalation must therefore be taken seriously. Keeping citizens and territory safe is the task of NATO and its member-state governments. At the same time, European and American accommodation and acceptance of Russian aggression and threats are a recipe for further escalation from the Russian side and a problematic international precedent to set. Thus, NATO as a whole, and NATO-states individually, must keep a balanced position: do not cave to unacceptable threats, as accommodation is a recipe for further escalation from the Russian side.

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in the process of implementing posture enhancements to increase capabilities on its eastern flank, and the escalation in tensions between Russia and NATO since 2014 has led analysts to propose measures that are even more extensive. However, Russia's likely reactions to such posture enhancements remain understudied. In this report, we develop a framework that analysts can use to assess likely Russian reactions to ongoing and proposed NATO posture enhancements in Europe. We develop this framework by assessing Russian strategic writing, the broader international relations literature, and the history of post-Cold War interactions between Russia and NATO. Our analysis suggests that Russian reactions will depend on 11 key factors that capture the strategic context, the Russian domestic context, and the characteristics of the proposed posture enhancements. We then illustrate how this framework can be applied in practice by assessing Russia's potential reactions to both planned and proposed enhancements. These assessments highlight the importance of clear analysis of Russian perceptions of NATO's intentions and commitment, domestic threats to the Russian regime, and the cost sensitivity of the Russian leadership"--Publisher's description.

In the South China Sea, navies and air forces use codes for unplanned encounters as communication tools. These instruments lower the risk of the unintended use of force by introducing elements of reassurance into an environment characterized by conflicting strategic objectives and fundamental differences of interest. The report argues that the same characteristics apply to NATO-Russian relations in the Euro-Atlantic area. The adoption of a code for unplanned encounters there would not directly influence conflicts of interest, but it could reintroduce positive aspects to relations and reduce the risk that unintended incidents result in the use of force.

In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NATO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots and re-calibrate itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. At the same time, cooperation between Russia and the West has not collapsed altogether coordinate on issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme. Clearly, tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations cannot be ruled out. The contributions to this volume, the result of an international conference jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, analyze the dramatic shift in Europe’s strategic context and explore the question of whether Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating on issues of mutual concern.

This Council Special Report, commissioned by CFR's Center for Preventive Action, takes all these issues into account and examines the many challenges facing Ukraine. The report comprehensively analyzes the country's difficulties, related to both domestic conditions -- for example, fractious politics and deeply divided public opinion -- and foreign policy -- for example, issues related to the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian and European dependence on Russia's natural gas. The report then recommends ways for the United States to encourage Ukraine on a path of stability and integration with the West. It proposes measures to bolster high-level dialogue between Washington and Kiev, foster effective governance in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine's susceptibility to Russian pressure. On the crucial NATO question, the report urges the United States to support continued Ukrainian integration with the alliance, though it recommends waiting to back concrete steps toward membership until Kiev achieves consensus on this point. One need not agree with this judgment to find Pifer's analysis of value. Averting Crisis in Ukraine takes a clear-eyed look at the issues that could cause instability -- or worse -- in Ukraine. But it also recommends practical steps that could increase the prospect that Ukraine will enjoy a prosperous, democratic, and independent future.

From the former secretary of defense, a strikingly candid, vivid account of serving Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When Robert M. Gates received a call from the White House, he thought he’d long left Washington politics behind: After working for six presidents in both the CIA and the National Security Council, he was happily serving as president of Texas A&M University. But when he was asked to help a nation mired in two wars and to aid the troops doing the fighting, he answered what he felt was the call of duty.