Reconstituting Americas Defense

This book analyzes President Bush's new Regional Defense Strategy--the master plan that will guide the transformation of U.S. defense policy for the post-Cold War era. Most recent books on defense prescribe how U.S. policy ought to change or critique past policies without taking Bush's new strategy into account. This book takes a different approach, providing the first comprehensive assessment of the new Regional Defense Strategy, analyzing the consequences for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examining the political difficulties of transforming President Bush's vision into reality. It explains major changes in U.S. defense doctrine and strategy, force and command structure, future programming requirements, and the major question of how such a significant change was managed in the United States. Much is new and even radical about the Regional Defense Strategy. Bush has built it around the concept of reconstitution, under which the United States will scrap the forces needed to fight a large-scale conflict and rely on the ability to create new forces if such a conflict looms on the horizon. However, reconstitution will impose demanding requirements on U.S. intelligence and the defense industrial base. Congress will also have an important say over this proposal and the new national security strategy as a whole. So will U.S. allies in Europe and the Far East, some of whom are already moving to recast the strategy's proposals for basing U.S. forces abroad. The primary audience of this book is politico-military strategic planners and those interested in organizational theory, management of change in large organizations, and government policy.

The National Security Strategy has identified four elements critical to the future security of the country: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The purpose of this study is to focus on reconstitution which, in light of current and projected defense cuts, is vitally important in the event the nation must again face a global challenger. Unfortunately, over the long run, reconstitution is unlikely to be able to provide sufficient capabilities, within the timeframe promised, in order to either deter or defend; time is the issue. The reasons for this are two-fold: First, reconstitution bets on the availability of early warning followed by decisive political action, well in advance of any potential conflict. This assumption is necessary to provide the long leadtimes--literally years--required to produce modern high tech weapons of war. The problem is this assumption has no historical credibility; America has, politically, never been able or willing to prepare for war during peace. The United States' late entries into World Wars I and II were not flukes, since the political and economic structure of the country makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do otherwise, in the absence of direct enemy attacks. Second, reconstitution promises a robust industrial base with the capability to quickly produce and sustain large scale operations. Yet, even now, this base is fragmenting as thousands of contractors and subcontractors flee the defense business.

The National Security Strategy has identified four elements critical to the future security of the country: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The purpose of this study is to focus on reconstitution which, in light of current and projected defense cuts, is vitally important in the event the nation must again face a global challenger. Unfortunately, over the long run, reconstitution is unlikely to be able to provide sufficient capabilities, within the timeframe promised, in order to either deter or defend; time is the issue. The reasons for this are two-fold: First, reconstitution bets on the availability of early warning followed by decisive political action, well in advance of any potential conflict. This assumption is necessary to provide the long leadtimes--literally years--required to produce modern high tech weapons of war. The problem is this assumption has no historical credibility; America has, politically, never been able or willing to prepare for war during peace. The United States' late entries into World Wars I and II were not flukes, since the political and economic structure of the country makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do otherwise, in the absence of direct enemy attacks. Second, reconstitution promises a robust industrial base with the capability to quickly produce and sustain large scale operations. Yet, even now, this base is fragmenting as thousands of contractors and subcontractors flee the defense business.

Explanation of President Bush's new national security strategy and General Colin Powell's Base Force. Sources of strategy. Analysis of major unresolved issues, such as: unilateral U.S. capability for war at strategic, operational, and tactical levels; impact on DoD organizations and joint military operations, the industrial and manpower base. Chapter on changing requirements for the U.S. intelligence community. Chapter on impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Analysis of role in Congress in formulating the strategy and their response to date. Implications for maritime and nuclear forces. Regional assessment from perspective of Asia and Europe. Study concludes that the major stress points of new strategy are: industrial reconstitution, additional requirements for intelligence, and the role that will be played by allies and the Congress. Includes impact of August 1991 coup in Soviet Union and unilateral announced by President Bush at end of September 1991.

With the transition to lower U.S. military force levels, near-term reductions in defense procurement seem inevitable. Budget pressures will dictate not only that smaller quantities of individual weapon systems be acquired but also that many long-enduring production lines be shut down. In addition, production lines of new weapon systems may well be dismanfled soon after the initial production runs are complete. At the same time, the United States must maintain a capability to respond to regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests and to reconstitute its forces in the event of extended conflicts. Indeed, reconstitution is one of the four foundations of the new national military strategy enunciated by President George Bush in 1990. In this report, we examine one promising reconstitution option: activating the industrial base to produce major weapon systems whose production lines have been shut down. This report examines the following major production-restart issues: cost and schedule relative to those of new programs, measures to ameliorate the problems of restart, criteria for selecting restart candidates, and alternative reconstitution strategies. The specific questions we set out to answer and the conclusions we reached are as follows.

With the decline of the Soviet threat abroad and the prolonged recession and mounting budget deficits at home, the United States is in the process of slashing its defense budget. Military planners have responded by formulating a new U.S. defense strategy. This new strategy relies upon the maintenance of a high-quality 'base force' to react to more probable and immediate types of conflict, while relaying upon the 'reconstitution' of forces in the event of an impending major conflict. Focusing on the airframe manufacturers of attack and fighter aircraft, this paper analyzes variations of three potential government policies for weapons development and production to determine which would best enhance the nation's ability to rapidly reconstitute a high-technology force should the need arise. The most viable of these policies are graded according to a list of reconstitution criteria. This grading estimates how the various policies affect such things as industry responsiveness, total cost, probable political support, and the tradeoff between present and future military capacities. The first potential policy analyzed is the presently favored 'hands-off, ' or 'free-market' approach to the restructuring of the defense industry, which is leading the major contractors to team together to bid on future projects.

The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.

This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

Since 2004, the US Army has started a revolution of reorganization and doctrine development throughout its Combat, Combat Support and especially Combat Service Support "logistics" organizations, known as "Transformation." In the logistics or "Sustainment" arena, the Army's concept towards supporting other units has changed from the old "out-stockpile" the enemy concept towards a system used by modern civilian distributors - "Just-In-Time" sustainment, leaving planning and synchronizing throughput of commodities and support to the customer with little margin of error. To successfully accomplish this, Sustainment planners must thoroughly understand the Military Decision Making Process or "MDMP" for short. Conducting a Sustainment oriented MDMP is essential in integrating the Sustainment War Fighting Functional Area into the unit's plan and for ensuring a synchronized and supportable course of action. Successful integration is a result of having the right personnel, available tools, correct MDMP methodology, and synchronized timeline throughout the process. If this guide can assist logistics' planners in accomplishing this process, then it has accomplished its intent and mission.

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