Rebuilding And Reforming The Iraqi Security Sector

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In Jan. 2007, the Pres. announced ¿The New Way Forward¿ to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi gov¿t. to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. This report discusses progress in meeting key goals in ¿The New Way Forward¿: (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces and help the Iraqi gov¿t.; (3) enact key legislation; (4) spend capital budgets; and (5) provide essential services. Also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

The U.S. is spending billions of dollars to reconstruct Iraq while combating an insurgency that has targeted military & contractor personnel & the Iraqi people. This environment created a need for those rebuilding Iraq to obtain security services. This report evaluated the extent to which: (1) U.S. agencies & contractors acquired security services from private providers; (2) the U.S. military & private security providers developed a working relationship; & (3) U.S. agencies assessed the costs of using private security providers on reconstruction contracts. Includes recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense & State & the Admin., U.S. Agency for International Development. (USAID). Charts & tables.

From May 2003 to June 28, 2004 (when it handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) worked to field Iraqi security forces and to develop security sector institutions. This book-all of whose authors were advisors to the CPA-breaks out the various elements of Iraq's security sector, including the defense, interior, and justice sectors, and assesses the CPA's successes and failures.

The most critical, and most often neglected, focus of security sector reform (SSR) is the bureaucratic agency responsible for the police and other internal security forces. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and earlier peace and stability operations, the United States went directly to the task of training indigenous police, giving little thought to the interior ministry, the institution to which the police would report.

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

The Coalition Provisional Authority's record at rebuilding Iraqi security forces and building security sector institutions was mixed. Among the problems was an emphasis on meeting short-term Iraqi security needs at the expense of long-term institution-building. In the future, progress must be measured by institutional capacity-building as much as by number of security forces fielded. In the current security environment, it will be up to the United States and its international partners to make sure that vital long-term goals stay on the Iraqi agenda.

"Security sector reform (SSR) is widely recognised as key to conflict prevention, peace-building, sustainable development and democratisation. SSR has gained most practical relevance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction of so-called failed states' and states emerging from violent internal or inter-state conflict. As this volume shows, almost all states need to reform their security sectors to a greater or lesser extent, according to the specific security, political and socio-economic contexts, as well as in response to the new security challenges resulting from globalisation and post-9/11 developments. Contributions from academics and practitioners elaborate on both the conceptual underpinnings and the practical realities of security sector reform and - a crucial aspect of post-conflict peace-building - security sector reconstruction. "

In Jan. 2007, the Pres. announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi gov¿t. foster conditions for national reconciliation. In ¿The New Way Forward,¿ the Admin. articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support this strategy, the U.S. increased its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations. This testimony discusses: (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and economic goals of ¿The New Way Forward¿; and (2) past and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy. Illus.