Radical Reform In Soviet Defence Policy

This book examines reform of the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. It explores the legacy of the Soviet era, explaining why - at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union - radical reform was long overdue in the wake of changing military technology, new economic and political realities, and the emergence of new threats and challenges. It discusses the problems encountered by Gorbachev in his attempts to promote military reform in the late 1980s, and goes on to analyse in detail the mixed fortunes of the policies of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. It describes how the onset of war in Chechnya in 1994 provided clear evidence of the weaknesses of the Russian military in modern conflicts, and shows that although the Chechnya debacle did provide some impetus for reforms in the armed forces in 1997-98, the momentum was not continued under the Putin government. It argues that Putin’s policies of bolstering central control over all aspects of decision making has left untouched many key problems facing the Russian military, including infighting between different force structures, lack of transparency and independent scrutiny over defence spending, and absence of consensus on the main threats to Russia and optimum force posture. Moreover, it argues that in his attempts to concentrate all means of control to a corrupt and inefficient Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has deprived himself of all alternative channels of independent scrutiny, control and oversight, thus exacerbating the problems that continue to plague the Russian military.

The Russian government has demonstrated a serious intention to address the issue of defense reform and modernize the military. Russia's defense reform is being implemented now, though it is far from being complete. The pace of the reforms and the sequence of measures needing to be taken have been adjusted to the fast-moving political and economic environment. The present stage of the reform process is a transitional phase to radical systemic changes in defense posture planned for 2011-15. It also reflects the political dynamics of the forthcoming elections in Russia. The key new developments are: * Setting clear parameters and timing for radical Command and Control (C&C) transformation, including abandoning the Military Districts, transferring control to the operational commands and strategic "directions" (i.e., strategic areas) in 2010-15:* Establishing a joint headquarters for special purpose forces;* Reforming military intelligence;* Adjusting Russia's new nuclear posture;* Reforming the defense industry and opening doors for private investments; and,* Establishing new forms of civil control over the military (increasing presidential influence).Russia's political establishment, in setting a goal of reforming the defense system by introducing transparency, accountability, and civilian control over the military, is concentrating its efforts on sustaining and modernizing nuclear strategic forces and creating robust counterterrorist special-purpose forces. These are judged to be the initial and essential tools for responding to both global and regional/local security challenges. Training is increasing, changes are being introduced to command and control and mobilization policy across the defense and security sectors, and new weapons systems are coming on line. Modernization of Russia's defense and security establishment is considered to be one of the primary national development programs. The business community is expected to join the government's efforts in funding this process, especially the procurement programs. This monograph attempts to describe the framework and current patterns of Russia's defense reform.

In the early days of Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union, an international group of U.S. and Japanese authorities probed the issues and forces that shaped a mammoth struggle within the Soviet Union. This book examines Gorbachev's reforms--the extent of their dramatic changes and the sobering evidence of their limits. The contributors' assessments range from wonder at the new atmosphere and expressive possibilities, to recognition of the reforms' reversibility, increasing difficulty, and the long road ahead. This is a fascinating contemporary review of factors that led to the demise of the Soviet Union only a few years later."Perestroika," the transformation of Soviet society and economic relations, epitomized Gorbachev's remedy for the ailing Soviet economy, which developed into a redefinition of Soviet socialism. Gorbachev emphasized that the success of reform depended not only on the technology and money, but also to succeed the reforms must overcome Stalin's legacy of bureaucratic centralism and enlist the creative energies of the Soviet people.This volume explains why the strength and nature of the reform coalition and anti-reform opposition, the limits and prospects of reform, and the compatibility of decentralizing reforms within the centralized one-party Soviet system and the implications of reforms for Soviet relations with the rest of the world.

"This paper is the text of a presentation before the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, Economics and Trade, on September 19, 1987. It examines the interrelationship between the two aspects of Mikhail Gorbachev's domestic economic program: modernization and reform. The author argues, first, that economic reform and its social-political twin, democratization, are derivative values. While this does not diminish their potential significance for Soviet society, it does complicate any assessment of probable outcomes of high-level conflict over the restructuring. Second, the author suggests, the interrelationship between modernization and reform has profound implications for Soviet military and foreign policy."--Rand abstracts.

The Russian government has demonstrated a serious intention to address the issue of defense reform and modernize the military. Russia's defense reform is being implemented now, though it is far from being complete. The pace of the reforms and the sequence of measures needing to be taken have been adjusted to the fast-moving political and economic environment. The present stage of the reform process is a transitional phase to radical systemic changes in defense posture planned for 2011-15. It also reflects the political dynamics of the forthcoming elections in Russia. The key new developments are: Setting clear parameters and timing for radical Command and Control (C & C) transformation; Establishing a joint headquarters for special purpose forces; Reforming military intelligence; Adjusting Russia's new nuclear posture; Reforming the defense industry and opening doors for private investments; and, Establishing new forms of civil control over the military (increasing presidential influence). Russia's political establishment, in setting a goal of reforming the defense system by introducing transparency, accountability, and civilian control over the military, is concentrating its efforts on sustaining and modernizing nuclear strategic forces and creating robust counterterrorist special-purpose forces. These are judged to be the initial and essential tools for responding to both global and regional/local security challenges. Training is increasing, changes are being introduced to command and control and mobilization policy across the defense and security sectors, and new weapons systems are coming on line. Modernization of Russia's defense and security establishment is considered to be one of the primary national development programs. The business community is expected to join the government's efforts in funding this process, especially the procurement programs. This monograph attempts to describe the framework and current patterns of Russia's defense reform.

During the fifty years' existence of the Soviet Union, its leaders have sought to turn growing military power to political advantage. Although there has been no radical change of direction in Soviet defense preparations or in strategic philosophy, the present government has undertaken a substantial buildup in strategic delivery forces and ABM defenses. The possibility of involvement in 'local' wars is admitted, but how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in committing forces and resources remains a critical question. The perennial problems that attend the relations of Soviet leaders with their own military remain: maintaining political control over the armed forces in times of crisis; meshing industrial and military planning; and balancing their traditional reluctance to grant the military an influential voice in policy formulation against their growing need for the military's professional expertise.