R D And The Incentives From Merger And Acquisition Activity

We provide a model and empirical tests showing how an active acquisition market affects firm incentives to innovate and conduct R&D. Our model shows that small firms optimally may decide to innovate more when they can sell out to larger firms. Large firms may find it disadvantageous to engage in an "R&D race" with small firms, as they can obtain access to innovation through acquisition. Our model and evidence show that the R&D responsiveness of firms increases with demand, competition and industry merger and acquisition activity. All of these effects are stronger for smaller firms than for larger firms.

We provide a model and empirical tests showing how an active acquisition market affects firm incentives to innovate and conduct R&D. Our model shows that small firms optimally may decide to innovate more when they can sell out to larger firms. Large firms may find it disadvantageous to engage in an "R&D race" with small firms, as they can obtain access to innovation through acquisition. Our model and evidence show that the R&D responsiveness of firms increases with demand, competition and industry merger and acquisition activity. All of these effects are stronger for smaller firms than for larger firms.

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.

Finally! A comprehensive volume on the management of corporate acquisitions that summarizes contemporary research, and that moves what we know about acquisition management a step further. The book encompasses innovative works from several countries, related to a variety of issues; managerial motives, the role of acquisitions in competitive strategy, as well as organizational and political processes. Unlike several other works on acquisitions, this book emphasizes the most critical issue faced by managers today; how to manage successfully already acquired companies and operations. Both researchers, managers and students of strategy and organization will find this book an important supplement.

Technology in the Modern Corporation: A Strategic Perspective examines the role of technology in corporate planning and all that this relationship implies to corporate organization and strategy. Organized into 13 chapters, this book first discusses the management of corporate entrepreneurship; technological innovation and interdependence; and the rise and character of modern technology strategy. Subsequent chapters describe corporate research and development; corporate strategies for managing emerging technologies; approaches for the strategic management of technology; innovation and corporate strategy; and executive succession, strategic reorientations, and organization evolution.

The process of identifying and evaluating a target firm, completing a deal after its negotiation and announcement, and then integrating a target firm after legal combination is a multi-year process with uncertain returns to acquiring firms. Research on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is progressing rapidly yet it remains fragmented across multiple research perspectives that largely examine different acquisition phases separately and coincide with a focus on different research variables. As a result, research fragmentation means that a researcher in one area may be unaware of research from related areas that is likely relevant. This contributes to research silos with M&A research displaying different traditions, starting points, and assumptions. Mergers and Acquisitions: A Research Overview summarizes the frontier in M&A research and provides insights into where it can be expanded. It undertakes the needed integration and reconciliation of research in order to derive practical knowledge for managing acquisitions from beginning to end, providing a summary of what is known and its implications for future research. This concise overview reconciles and integrates the state of the art in our understanding of mergers and acquisitions, providing an essential first stopping point in the research journey of students and scholars working in this area.

Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.

Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.