Provincial Governance In Iraq

Assessments of the United States–led effort to create a democratically governed Iraq following the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 have generally been negative. However, these criticisms have, for the most part, ignored the progress Iraq made on putting in place basic public administration practices and political processes that better serve its citizens, particularly at the subnational level. This paper reviews the experience of the Local Governance Program in strengthening the capacities of subnational councils and provincial offices to develop legislation and to plan and budget for capital investments. The discussion reveals how contestation over the legal interpretations of decentralization constrained the autonomy of provincial actors, and how mastery of administrative tools and methods enabled them to maneuver more effectively within evolving provincial governance structures. This experience offers several lessons for international stabilization and reconstruction operations: constitution-making in divided societies paves over differences with ambiguities in order to reach agreement, which pushes the unresolved conflicts into political, legislative, and administrative arenas; decentralization debates are ultimately about the distribution of political power and control and cannot be addressed solely as technical and administrative governance questions; and basic public administration capacity is critical to meeting citizens’ expectations for services, security, and economic opportunity. A final observation is that international governance improvement templates can only be effective if they recognize that technical interventions must account for politics and the incentives facing local actors.

"The decentralization of authority that the Coalition Provisional Authority initiated following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime had the effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services. The consequences of this devolution in the decision-making required the U.S. and other donors to establish programs aimed at developing local capacities. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program is key among these. PRT's provide the best opportunity for U.S. government experts to provide grassroots support in the development of nationwide governance capacity in Iraq"--Introduction.

The U.S. government continues to advance capacity-development programs in Iraq's ministries and provinces. For the past four decades, Iraq was a statist economy with a highly centralized administration. Baghdad drove budgeting and service delivery through ministries that funded the provinces. The decentralization of authority that the Coalition Provisional Authority initiated following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime had the effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services. The consequences of this devolution in decision-making required the United States and other donors to establish programs aimed at developing local capacities. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program is key among these. PRTs provide the best opportunity for U.S. government experts to provide grassroots support in the development of nationwide governance capacity in Iraq. National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44 provided the policy and organizational framework for U.S. civilian-military organizations to implement nationbuilding programs. The PRTs comprise personnel from the Departments of State (DoS), Justice, and Agriculture; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Local Governance Program contractor, RTI International; the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate element, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I); the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (GRD); and Iraqi-born expatriates (often holding U.S. citizenship).

Overall frequency of violence in Iraq is down to levels not seen since 2003, yet insurgents are still able to conduct high profile attacks in several major cities. These attacks have not caused a modification of the announcement by Pres. Obama that all U.S. combat brigades would be withdrawn by 8/31/10. Contents of this report: (1) Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment; (2) Post-9/11: Regime Change and War; (3) Post-Saddam Transition and Governance; (4) Econ. Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance; (5) Security Challenges and Responses; (6) Iraq Study Group Report, Legis. Proposals, and Options for the Obama Admin.; (7) Stepped Up Internat. and Regional Diplomacy; (8) Reorg. the Political Structure, and ¿Federalism; (9) Econ. Measures. Map.

This handbook is a country specific guide for Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq in the post surge environment. The government of Iraq is successfully transitioning from combating an insurgency and rebuilding its infrastructure to a strong sovereign state that no longer requires U.S. government assistance. Key to this success is the provincial reconstruction team (PRT). PRTs were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure and build the capacity necessary for the Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the Iraqi people. As the PRT effort draws to a close and transitions its efforts to provincial governments, it remains vital that new personnel are familiar with the concepts, structure, and management of PRTs and the lessons learned and best practices established by their predecessors.This handbook focuses on Iraq PRTs. The information contained in this handbook comes from multiple sources inside and outside the U.S. government, with the understanding that the manner in which PRTs operate has changed and evolved over time.

The government of Iraq is successfully transitioning from combating an insurgency and rebuilding its infrastructure to a strong sovereign state that no longer requires U.S. government assistance. Key to this success is the provincial reconstruction team (PRT). PRTs were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure and build the capacity necessary for the Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the Iraqi people. As the PRT effort draws to a close and transitions its efforts to provincial governments, it remains vital that new personnel are familiar with the concepts, structure, and management of PRTs and the lessons learned and best practices established by their predecessors. This handbook focuses on Iraq PRTs. The information contained in this handbook comes from multiple sources inside and outside the U.S. government, with the understanding that the manner in which PRTs operate has changed and evolved over time. The intent of this publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication is not a doctrinal product. The information is written by U.S. government employees for those individuals who will serve in a stability and reconstruction environment. Special thanks to all the individuals who assisted in the collection and presentation of this information. In particular, thanks to the interagency contributors from Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Agency for International Development for providing invaluable assistance in gathering information to share with PRT practitioners in training and in the field. Finally, thanks to members of CALL's collection teams and theater observers for providing updated field input.