Prospects For Us Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation Under Bush And Putin

As the Obama administration took office, Russo-American relations were generally acknowledged to be at an impasse. Arms control issues feature prominently in that conflicted agenda. The Bush administration allowed the bilateral civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather than go forward for confirmation. Russian spokesmen make clear their belief that American concessions on key elements of arms control issues like missile defenses in Europe are a touchstone for the relationship and a condition of any further progress towards genuine dialogue. Since the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, both sides have further hardened positions. Arms control and disarmament issues are quintessentially political as well as military issues that are among the most critical components of the bilateral relationship and regional security in both Europe and Asia. For these reasons, neither the political nor the military aspect can be divorced from the other.--P. v.

At a time when many are considering how the United States will fight the Russians, this monograph explores, instead, the history of U.S.-Russian cooperation in the post-Cold War era and analyzes the acceptability of U.S.-Russian cooperation, the substance of U.S.-Russian cooperation, and the elements of U.S.-Russian cooperation for the year 2017 and beyond. The author begins by recounting the many examples of cooperation during the Cold War and continues with a summary of cooperation during the administrations of George H.W. Bush through Barack H. Obama. He proceeds to answer three questions related to the prospects of future cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation: Should the United States cooperate with Russia? On what should the United States and Russia cooperate? What principles should guide United States cooperation with Russia? Through his analysis, the author finds that despite the often tumultuous and increasingly adversarial relationship, cooperation has remained a consistent feature of U.S.-Russian relations. Moreover, he identifies a number of characteristics of Russian behavior and foreign policy, some in evidence during the tsarist period, which continue to influence the United States' dealings with Russia today. As the author describes, U.S.-Russian cooperation since the end of the Cold War has steadily deteriorated to the point at which some now characterize the relationship as being even worse than it was during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the author concludes that both countries will continue to seek ways to cooperate, but after forging a new relationship during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era and striving to preserve a troubled relationship during the third, the United States now must reinvent the relationship amid a significantly changed operating environment. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Forging a New Relationship: U.S.-Russia Cooperation during the Administrations of George H. W. Bush through George W. Bush (1989-2009) 3. Preserving a Troubled Relationship: U.S.-Russia Cooperation during the Administration of Barack H. Obama (2009-2017). 4. Reinventing the Relationship: Prospects for Future Cooperation with the Russian Federation 5. Conclusion Examining U.S.-Russia cooperation during the administration of President George H. W. Bush is important for three reasons. First, President Bush presided over the end of the Cold War and set the initial tone for post-Cold War relations. Thus, the George H. W. Bush Administration provides a logical starting point for assessing U.S.-Russia cooperation in the post-Soviet era. Second, the success of early efforts to cooperate on a range of issues reveals useful principles to consider for any cooperative regime with the Russians. Third, many key leaders of the current and recent Russian Government such as Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Primakov, and Sergei Lavrov-while junior-were nevertheless present during the Bush Administration and their understanding- despite would-be "resets"-includes this history. These early efforts at cooperation must have influenced in some measure, their own experiences with, and opinions toward, cooperating with the United States.

Despite their Cold War rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union frequently engaged in joint efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Leaders in Washington and Moscow recognized that nuclear proliferation would serve neither country’s interests even when they did not see eye-to-eye in many other areas. They likewise understood why collaboration in mitigating this nuclear danger would serve both their own interests and those of the international community. This volume examines seven little known examples of US-Soviet cooperation for non-proliferation, including preventing South Africa from conducting a nuclear test, developing international safeguards and export control guidelines, and negotiating a draft convention banning radiological weapons. It uses declassified and recently-digitized archival material to explore in-depth the motivations for and modalities for cooperation under often adverse political circumstances. Given the current disintegration of Russian and US relations, including in the nuclear sphere, this history is especially worthy of review. Accordingly, the volume’s final chapter is devoted to discussing how non-proliferation lessons from the past can be applied today in areas most in need of US-Russian cooperation.

Many might argue that this is a singularly inauspicious time to assess the prospects for U.S.- Russian security cooperation. Arguably, the prospects for bilateral cooperation lay buried under the wheels of Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008. As Vice-President Richard Cheney has said to Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili, "Russian aggression must not go unanswered," and that "its continuation would have serious consequences for its relations with the United States." Undoubtedly this invasion will have repercussions across the broad bilateral agenda, most of all insofar as regional security in the Caucasus is concerned. But ultimately, given their power, standing, and nuclear capability, dialogue and cooperation will be resumed at some point in the future. Therefore, an analysis of the prospects for and conditions favoring such cooperation is an urgent and important task that cries out for clarification precisely because current U.S.-Russian relations are so difficult. Russia, despite claims made for and against its importance, remains, by any objective standard, a key player in world affairs. It possesses this standing by virtue of its geographical location, Eurasia, its proximity to multiple centers of international tension and rivalry, its possession of a large conventional and nuclear force, its energy assets, and its seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Beyond those attributes, it is an important barometer of trends in world politics, e.g., the course of democratization in the world. Furthermore, if Russia were so disposed, it could be the abettor and/ or supporter of a host of negative trends in the world today. Indeed, some American elites might argue that it already is doing so. Even so, if U.S. policymakers and analysts see Russia more as a spoiler than as a constructive partner (whether rightly or wrongly), the fact remains that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was an active supporter of threats to world order such as international terrorism, and carried on a global arms race with the West. We negotiated productively with it on issues like arms control and proliferation. Today, no matter how bad Russo-American or East- West relations may be, no such threats are present or immediately discernible on the horizon. Therefore the chapters in this volume represent both a tribute to a vision of political order based upon such cooperation and a call to action to revitalize that cooperation. The vision is one that emerged out of the end of the Cold War and was based, as Jacob Kipp's chapter indicates, on the aspiration that a new era of Russo-American cooperation was dawning. In that new era, it was hoped that the two superpowers of the time would establish some kind of ill-defined, but no less real condominium in world politics based on their joint cooperation. In any event, this cooperation failed to take shape for multiple reasons and causes emanating out of both states' political choices. Nevertheless, some important elements of this vision have been salvaged and continue to this day. Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin recently signed a framework agreement outlining areas of cooperation, for example: counterterrorism, arms control, and proliferation. Both sides routinely declare (what they do may be quite different, however) that they are not enemies and see no reason for war between them. Arms control negotiations continue, and, despite much hostile rhetoric, observers have discerned the growth of practical East-West cooperation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

A penetrating look into the extreme plutocracy Vladimir Putin has created and its implications for Russia’s future This insightful study explores how the economic system Vladimir Putin has developed in Russia works to consolidate control over the country. By appointing his close associates as heads of state enterprises and by giving control of the FSB and the judiciary to his friends from the KGB, he has enriched his business friends from Saint Petersburg with preferential government deals. Thus, Putin has created a super wealthy and loyal plutocracy that owes its existence to authoritarianism. Much of this wealth has been hidden in offshore havens in the United States and the United Kingdom, where companies with anonymous owners and black money transfers are allowed to thrive. Though beneficial to a select few, this system has left Russia’s economy in untenable stagnation, which Putin has tried to mask through military might.

A landmark book that completely transforms our understanding of the crisis of liberalism, from two pre-eminent intellectuals Why did the West, after winning the Cold War, lose its political balance? In the early 1990s, hopes for the eastward spread of liberal democracy were high. And yet the transformation of Eastern European countries gave rise to a bitter repudiation of liberalism itself, not only there but also back in the heartland of the West. In this brilliant work of political psychology, Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes argue that the supposed end of history turned out to be only the beginning of an Age of Imitation. Reckoning with the history of the last thirty years, they show that the most powerful force behind the wave of populist xenophobia that began in Eastern Europe stems from resentment at the post-1989 imperative to become Westernized. Through this prism, the Trump revolution represents an ironic fulfillment of the promise that the nations exiting from communist rule would come to resemble the United States. In a strange twist, Trump has elevated Putin's Russia and Orbán's Hungary into models for the United States. Written by two pre-eminent intellectuals bridging the East/West divide, The Light that Failed is a landmark book that sheds light on the extraordinary history of our Age of Imitation.

Hearing on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. Witnesses include: Senators Thad Cochran, Carl Levin, Ted Stevens, Susan M. Collins, and Richard J. Durbin; Amb. Max M. Kampelman, Vice Chairman, U.S. Institute of Peace; Dr. Keith B. Payne, Pres., National Institute for Public Policy; and Dr. Andrei Kortunov, Pres., Moscow Public Science Foundation.

Sanctions are considered by many to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. Most Russia-related sanctions have been in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to human rights abuses, election interference and cyberattacks, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions to deter further objectionable activities. Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Ukraine-related sanctions are mainly based on four executive orders (EOs) the President introduced in 2014. In addition, Congress passed and the President signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272). In 2017, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II). This legislation codifies Ukraine-related and cyberrelated EOs, strengthens existing Russia-related sanctions authorities, and identifies several new targets for sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Additional sanctions on Russia may be forthcoming. On August 6, 2018, the United States determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law. In response, the United States launched an initial round of sanctions on Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; P.L. 102-182, Title III). The law requires a second, more severe round of sanctions in the absence of Russia's reliable commitment to no longer use such weapons. The United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. The EU, in addition, continues to consider its response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom. Debates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that their imposition is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect. In the 115th Congress, several bills have been introduced to increase the use of sanctions in response to Russia's malign activities. The 116th Congress is likely to continue to debate the role of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.