Proof Theoretic Semantics Sep Entry

This manuscript is the first version of the entry "Proof-Theoretic Semantics" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which was submitted in 2011. For the version which finally appeared in 2012 it was reduced to one third of its length, which means that there is significant unpublished content in this original version.

This volume is the first ever collection devoted to the field of proof-theoretic semantics. Contributions address topics including the systematics of introduction and elimination rules and proofs of normalization, the categorial characterization of deductions, the relation between Heyting's and Gentzen's approaches to meaning, knowability paradoxes, proof-theoretic foundations of set theory, Dummett's justification of logical laws, Kreisel's theory of constructions, paradoxical reasoning, and the defence of model theory. The field of proof-theoretic semantics has existed for almost 50 years, but the term itself was proposed by Schroeder-Heister in the 1980s. Proof-theoretic semantics explains the meaning of linguistic expressions in general and of logical constants in particular in terms of the notion of proof. This volume emerges from presentations at the Second International Conference on Proof-Theoretic Semantics in Tübingen in 2013, where contributing authors were asked to provide a self-contained description and analysis of a significant research question in this area. The contributions are representative of the field and should be of interest to logicians, philosophers, and mathematicians alike.

This volume is dedicated to Prof. Dag Prawitz and his outstanding contributions to philosophical and mathematical logic. Prawitz's eminent contributions to structural proof theory, or general proof theory, as he calls it, and inference-based meaning theories have been extremely influential in the development of modern proof theory and anti-realistic semantics. In particular, Prawitz is the main author on natural deduction in addition to Gerhard Gentzen, who defined natural deduction in his PhD thesis published in 1934. The book opens with an introductory paper that surveys Prawitz's numerous contributions to proof theory and proof-theoretic semantics and puts his work into a somewhat broader perspective, both historically and systematically. Chapters include either in-depth studies of certain aspects of Dag Prawitz's work or address open research problems that are concerned with core issues in structural proof theory and range from philosophical essays to papers of a mathematical nature. Investigations into the necessity of thought and the theory of grounds and computational justifications as well as an examination of Prawitz's conception of the validity of inferences in the light of three “dogmas of proof-theoretic semantics” are included. More formal papers deal with the constructive behaviour of fragments of classical logic and fragments of the modal logic S4 among other topics. In addition, there are chapters about inversion principles, normalization of p roofs, and the notion of proof-theoretic harmony and other areas of a more mathematical persuasion. Dag Prawitz also writes a chapter in which he explains his current views on the epistemic dimension of proofs and addresses the question why some inferences succeed in conferring evidence on their conclusions when applied to premises for which one already possesses evidence.

This book is a monograph on the topic of Proof-Theoretic Semantics, a theory of meaning constituting an alternative to the more traditional Model-Theoretic Semantics. The latter regards meaning as truth-conditions (in arbitrary models), the former regards meaning as canonical derivability conditions in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof-system. In the first part of the book, the Proof-Theoretic Semantics for logic is presented. It surveys the way a natural-deduction system can serve as meaning-conferring, and in particular analyses various criteria such a system has to meet in order to qualify as meaning-conferring. A central criterion is harmony, a balance between introduction-rules and elimination-rules. The theory is applied to various logics, e.g., relevance logic, and various proof systems such as multi-conclusion natural-deduction and bilateralism. The presentation is inspired by recent work by the author, and also surveys recent developments. In part two, the theory is applied to fragments of natural language, both extensional and intensional, a development based on the author's recent work. For example, conservativity of determiners, once set up in a proof-theoretic framework, becomes a provable property of all (regular) determiners. It is shown that meaning need not carry the heavy ontological load characteristic of Model-Theoretic Semantics of complex natural language constructs. Nissim Francez is an emeritus professor of computer science at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology. At a certain point in his career he moved from research related to concurrent and distributed programming and program verification to research in computational linguistics, mainly formal semantics of natural language. In recent years, he has worked on Proof-Theoretic Semantics, in particular for natural language.

This book, Foundations of Constructive Analysis, founded the field of constructive analysis because it proved most of the important theorems in real analysis by constructive methods. The author, Errett Albert Bishop, born July 10, 1928, was an American mathematician known for his work on analysis. In the later part of his life Bishop was seen as the leading mathematician in the area of Constructive mathematics. From 1965 until his death, he was professor at the University of California at San Diego.

An Introduction to Proof Theory provides an accessible introduction to the theory of proofs, with details of proofs worked out and examples and exercises to aid the reader's understanding. It also serves as a companion to reading the original pathbreaking articles by Gerhard Gentzen. The first half covers topics in structural proof theory, including the Gödel-Gentzen translation of classical into intuitionistic logic (and arithmetic), natural deduction and the normalization theorems (for both NJ and NK), the sequent calculus, including cut-elimination and mid-sequent theorems, and various applications of these results. The second half examines ordinal proof theory, specifically Gentzen's consistency proof for first-order Peano Arithmetic. The theory of ordinal notations and other elements of ordinal theory are developed from scratch, and no knowledge of set theory is presumed. The proof methods needed to establish proof-theoretic results, especially proof by induction, are introduced in stages throughout the text. Mancosu, Galvan, and Zach's introduction will provide a solid foundation for those looking to understand this central area of mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics.