Procyclical Fiscal Policy Shocks Rules And Institutions A View From Mars

This paper assesses the roles of shocks, rules, and institutions as possible sources of procyclicality in fiscal policy. By employing parametric and nonparametric techniques, I reach the following four main conclusions. First, policymakers' reactions to the business cycle is different depending on the state of the economy-fiscal policy is "acyclical" during economic bad times, while it is largely procyclical during good times. Second, fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility laws tend to reduce the deficit bias on average, and seem to enhance, rather than to weaken, countercyclical policy. However, the evidence also suggests that fiscal frameworks do not exert independent effects when the quality of institutions is accounted for. Third, strong institutions are associated to a lower deficit bias, but their effect on procyclicality is different in good and bad times, and it is subject to decreasing returns. Fourth, unlike developed countries, fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical even during (moderate) recessions; in "good times," however, fiscal policy is actually more procyclical in developed economies.

Conventional wisdom dictates that a fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical. However, contrary to this conventional views, recent research has demonstrated that fiscal policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries. In this book, we attempt to propose a new interpretation of this procyclicality after reviewing theoretical and empirical evolution of the research. In particular, by incorporating the political effort behavior of private agents into a weak government model, we explore how income fluctuations affect the optimal budget deficits in a political economy. If the government can control the political behavior, normally, the optimal budget deficit should rise in a recession as a first-best case; however, interestingly, a recession does not necessarily prompt an increase in the budget deficits in a second-best political economy. The response of the budget deficits to income fluctuations mainly depends on the efficiency of political effort, which may correspond to the degree of democracy and bureaucratic efficiency of the governments. We test the prediction of the pro-cyclical fiscal policy and find it applicable for democratic countries with semi-efficient governments including Japan.

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.

The effects of fiscal policy measures, both taxes and public spending, adopted by developing countries in response to the 2009 global crisis are still uncertain. This book discusses them using an analytical framework that allows for distilling possible implications on growth and social welfare.

This paper studies the cyclical behavior of public spending on health and education in 150 countries during 1987 - 2007. It finds that spending on education and health is procyclical in developing countries and acyclical in developed countries. In addition, education and health expenditures follow an asymmetric pattern in developing countries; they are procyclical during periods of positive output gap and acyclical during periods of negative output gap. Furthermore, the degree of cyclicality is higher the lower the level of economic development.

Fiscal discipline is essential to improve and sustain economic performance, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce vulnerabilities. Discipline is especially important if countries, industrial as well as developing, are to successfully meet the challenges, and reap the benefits, of economic and financial globalization. Lack of fiscal discipline generally stems from the injudicious use of policy discretion. The benefits of discretion are seen in terms of the ability of policymakers to respond to unexpected shocks and in allowing elected political representatives to fulfill their mandates. But discretion can be misused, resulting in persistent deficits and procyclical policies, rising debt levels, and, over time, a loss in policy credibility. The authors first explore the role of discretion in fiscal policy, and the extent, consequences, and causes of procyclicality, particularly in good times. They then examine how a variety of institutional approaches—fiscal rules, fiscal responsibility laws, and fiscal agencies—can help improve fiscal discipline. While each of these approaches can play a useful role, the authors suggest that a strategy combining them is likely to be particularly beneficial. Although such a strategy requires political commitment and effective fiscal management, at the same time, the strategy itself can bolster political commitment by highlighting the restraints on government and raising the costs of failing to respect them.

Over the last 30 years, Economic Policy has strived to produce policy relevant and rigorous analyses of the economic challenges of the time. A number of articles have been highly influential, shaping thinking among academic economists and policymakers. This volume brings together key historic articles that still resonate today. It provides academics with important research markers, and also provides students (and their teachers) with a 'reader' that demonstrates how the field of economics progresses by responding to challenges of the time. It will also inspire a new generation of students and academics with a recollection of how some of today's most influential economists made early contributions.

This paper examines the fiscal responses of oil-producing countries (OPCs) to the oil boom through 2005 and the role of special fiscal institutions (SFIs)—oil funds, fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility legislation (FRL), and budgetary oil prices—in fiscal management in OPCs, and draws some general lessons.

Few papers have attempted to assess the role of “capacity,” especially in the area of macroeconomic statistics. Consequently, we make an attempt to advance this literature through the construction of a “statistical capacity building index,” and then test its explanatory power on the cyclicality of government spending. Using panel data from 62 developing countries, we find evidence that improvements in this index are associated with less procyclicality of government spending over the period 1990–2012; with the significance of this relationship dependent upon the quality of administrative and technical capacity of budgetary institutions.