Political Determinants Of Corporate Governance

In a painstaking analysis, Roe (law, Harvard Law School) examines the impact of a nation's strong social policies on the corporate governance, suggesting that stronger social policies can cause an American style of diffuse ownership among shareholders to fail. The link between social policies and corporate governance is examined statistically for a large number of countries, and in case studies for seven: Italy, Germany, Sweden, the UK, France, Japan, and the US. Product markets, securities markets, and the ability of corporate and economic structures to induce a political backlash are discussed. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Corporate law and governance are at the forefront of regulatory activities worldwide, and subject to increasing public attention in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Comprehensively referencing the key debates, the Handbook provides a much-needed framework for understanding the aims and methods of legal research in the field.

This book investigates the key factors shaping corporate governance in China and presents a sophisticated study of corporate governance in China from a comparative and historical perspective. Drawing on extensive corporate governance literature, this book articulates why path dependence theory is the most effective framework for interpreting the development path of Chinese corporate governance. Chenxia Shi reviews the historical role of government in commercial development and regulation in dynastic China and in early corporate law-making, followed by an account of China’s legal and economic development over the last three decades. This historical inquiry identifies government control as the key feature of economic and market regulation in China. In particular, this book canvasses the evolution of governance of State-Owned Enterprises and listed companies, major corporate governance problems, regulatory challenges posed by China’s increasing participation in economic globalization, and enforcement difficulties particularly in relation to investor protection, directors’ duties and accountability. Ultimately, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance in China demonstrates that corporate governance in China is largely determined by political imperatives and those political imperatives have been shaped and re-shaped in a historical process.

Corporate governance mechanisms can be seen as market and hierarchical institutions completing incomplete financial contracts. Since 'governance' is a rather vague concept, a variety of such mechanisms have been tried in various national settings, where they compete with and substitute for each other within the respective legal settings in a quest for a more efficient regime of financial intermediation. This objective implies a statistical endogeneity problem in much of the relevant empirical research in corporate governance, which has triggered a search for truly exogenous variables to explain the success of various national regimes. After 'legal origin' and 'institutions' have been advanced as possible answers, a central purpose of the paper is to offer the 'political regime' as another largely exogenous variable that shapes the legal order of a country, including its corporate governance regime. Political regimes are defined as constraints to the rent-seeking ambitions of politicians. The essay links stereotypical polar cases of political regimes both abstractly as well as through cases with corporate governance practices and financial sector structures in different countries. Modern corporate governance research has recognized that definition and enforcement of a country's legal order are fundamental pillars of a society's corporate governance regime and financial sector structure which ultimately contribute significantly to economic growth. This paper wishes to extend the causality chain backwards to political institutions as an explanatory variable to internationally observed variance in corporate governance and financial sector regime structures as well as economic performance.

A thought-provoking and evocative account that considers both the policies we think of as "health policyand those that we don't, The Political Determinants of Health provides a novel, multidisciplinary framework for addressing the systemic barriers preventing the United States from becoming the healthiest nation in the world.

For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.

The business corporation is one of the greatest organizational inventions, but it creates risks both for shareholders and for third parties. To mitigate these risks, legislators, judges, and corporate lawyers have tried to learn from foreign experiences and adapt their regulatory regimes to them. In the last three decades, this approach has led to a stream of corporate and capital market law reforms unseen before. Corporate governance, the system by which companies are directed and controlled, is today a key topic for legislation, practice, and academia all over the world. Corporate scandals and financial crises have repeatedly highlighted the need to better understand the economic, social, political, and legal determinants of corporate governance in individual countries. Comparative Corporate Governance furthers this goal by bringing together current scholarship in law and economics with the expertise of local corporate governance specialists from twenty-three countries.