Plural And Conflicting Values

Plural values and conflicting values are often held to be conceptually problematic, threatening the very possibility of ethics, or at least of rational ethics. Arguing against this view, this treatise shows that plurality and conflict are commonplace features of everyday choice and action.

Plural values and conflicting values are often held to be conceptually problematic, threatening the very possibility of ethics, or at least of rational ethics. This book rejects this view. The author first demonstrates why it is so important to understand the issues raised by plural and conflicting values. This includes a full discussion of Aristotle's treatment of the issues. He then goes on to show that plurality and conflict are commonplace and generally unproblematic features of our everyday choice and action, and that they do allow for a sound and rational ethic.

There cannot be a complete prescription for a good society and any set of values that are projected as a blueprint for a society will require revision, amendment and compromise, as well as limitations and extensions in their application to social and political reality. Limits to both the speed and the scope of social change must be justified in light of the large number of values, including many tacit values, that are operational or necessary for the functioning of any society. This paper explores, in particular, the tradeoff between the four values of individual freedom, consent of the governed, free markets, and economic development as well as tradeoffs between equality and justice. The limits of philosophy are drawn when such conceptual analysis seeks to arrive at resolutions of the conflict among plural values. The recurrent thesis has been that the priority among values held at the time and under the circumstances of decision-making, as well as the empirical facts available to decision-makers, provide the reasons for a decision among conflicting values.

This book addresses ethical conflicts arising from saving the lives of patients who need a transplant while treating living and dead donors, organ sellers, animals, and embryos with proper moral regard. Our challenge is to develop a better world in the light of debatable values and uncertain consequences.

Moral diversity is a fundamental reality of today’s world, but moral theorists have difficulty responding to it. Some take it as evidence for skepticism – the view that there are no moral truths. Others, associating moral reasoning with the search for overarching principles and unifying values, see it as the result of error. In the former case, moral reasoning is useless, since values express individual preferences; in the latter, our reasoning process is dramatically at odds with our lived experience. Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World takes a different approach, proposing an alternative way of thinking about moral reasoning and progress by showing how diversity and disagreement are compatible with theorizing and justification. Patricia Marino demonstrates that, instead of being evidence for skepticism and error, moral disagreements often arise because we value things pluralistically. This means that although people share multiple values such as fairness, honesty, loyalty, and benevolence, we interpret and prioritize those values in various ways. Given this pluralistic evaluation process, preferences for unified single-principle theories are not justified. Focusing on finding moral compromises, prioritizing conflicting values, and judging consistently from one case to another, Marino elaborates her ideas in terms of real-life dilemmas, arguing that the moral complexity and conflict we so often encounter can be part of fruitful and logical moral reflection. Aiming to draw new connections and bridge the gap between theoretical ethics and applied ethics, Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World offers a sophisticated set of philosophical arguments on moral reasoning and pluralism with real world applications.

Value pluralism is the idea, most prominently endorsed by Isaiah Berlin, that fundamental human values are universal, plural, conflicting, and incommensurable with one another. Incommensurability is the key component of pluralism, undermining familiar monist philosophies such as utilitarianism. But if values are incommensurable, how do we decide between them when they conflict? George Crowder assesses a range of responses to this problem proposed by Berlin and developed by his successors. Three broad approaches are especially important: universalism, contextualism, and conceptualism. Crowder argues that the conceptual approach is the most fruitful, yielding norms of value diversity, personal autonomy, and inclusive democracy. Historical context must also be taken into account. Together these approaches indicate a liberal politics of redistribution, multiculturalism, and constitutionalism, and a public policy in which basic values are carefully balanced. The Problem of Value Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and Beyond is a uniquely comprehensive survey of the political theory of value pluralism and also an original contribution by a leading voice in the pluralist literature. Scholars and researchers interested in the work of Berlin, liberalism, value pluralism, and related ideas will find this a stimulating and valuable source.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

After 25 centuries, Aristotle's influence on our society's moral thinking remains profound even when subterranean. Typical members of our society can often be made to see that their moral thought and action are, in crucial ways, unwittingly Aristotelian. No one in contemporary philosophical ethics can afford to ignore Aristotle. Much of the finest work in recent moral philosophy has been overtly and professedly Aristotelian in inspiration. And many writers who would officiallydistance themselves from Aristotle and his contemporary followers are nonetheless indebted to him, sometimes in ways that they do not realise.Values and Virtues provides a platform for some notable writers in the area to present and discuss their new ideas about Aristotelian ethics in a way that will advance the academic debate and engage the interest of a broad range of philosophical readers.

People organize to protect and fight for what they hold most dear. Using auto-ethnography from over a decade of interfaith Broad-based Community Organizing (BBCO) experiences, Listening to the Spirit makes a case for the political role of sacred values in BBCO, especially as they show up in two organizing practices: the "listening campaign" and the "relational meeting." Aaron Stauffer argues that by centering sacred values in democratic politics, these organizing practices can be seen as religious practices, and that BBCO can build deeper solidarity through sacred values and relational power. Stauffer offers a social ethical, social practical account of religion and grounds democracy in our diverse religious values.