Phenomenology And Embodiment

At the dawn of the modern era, philosophers reinterpreted their subject as the study of consciousness, pushing the body to the margins of philosophy. With the arrival of Husserlian thought in the late nineteenth century, the body was once again understood to be part of the transcendental field. And yet, despite the enormous influence of Husserl’s phenomenology, the role of "embodiment" in the broader philosophical landscape remains largely unresolved. In his ambitious debut book, Phenomenology and Embodiment, Joona Taipale tackles the Husserlian concept—also engaging the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Henry—with a comprehensive and systematic phenomenological investigation into the role of embodiment in the constitution of self-awareness, intersubjectivity, and objective reality. In doing so, he contributes a detailed clarification of the fundamental constitutive role of embodiment in the basic relations of subjectivity.

The 17 original essays of this volume explore the relevance of the phenomenological approach to contemporary debates concerning the role of embodiment in our cognitive, emotional and practical life. The papers demonstrate the theoretical vitality and critical potential of the phenomenological tradition both through critically engagement with other disciplines (medical anthropology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, the cognitive sciences) and through the articulation of novel interpretations of classical works in the tradition, in particular the works of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. The concrete phenomena analyzed in this book include: chronic pain, anorexia, melancholia and depression.

Theoretical foundation for nursing as a science/ Ragnar Fjelland and Eva Gjengedal -- Is a science of caring possible?/Margaret J. Dunlop -- A Heideggerian phenomenological perspective on the concept of person/ Victoria W. Leonard -- Hermeneutic phenomenology:a methodology for family health and health promotion study in nursing/ Karen A. Plager -- Toward a new medical ethics: implications for ethics in nursing/ David C. Thomasma -- The tradition and skill of interpretive phenomenology in studying health, illness and caring practices/ Patricia Benner -- MARTIN, a computer software program: on listening to what the text says/ Nancy L. Diekelmann, Robert Schuster,and Sui-Lun Lam -- Beyond normalizing: the role of narrative in understanding teenage mothers' transition to mothering/ Lee Smithbattle -- Patients' caring practices with schizophrenic offspring/ Catherine A. Chesla -- Parenting in public: parental participation and involvement in the care of their hospitalized child/ Philip Darbyshire -- A clinical ethnography of stroke recovery/ Nancy D. Doolittle -- Moral dimensions of living with a chronic illness: autonomy, responsibility, and limits of control/ Patricia Benner, Susan Janson-Bjerklie, Sandra Ferketich and Gay Becker -- The ethical context of nursing care of dying patients in critical care/ Peggy L. Wros -- The ethics of ambiguity and concealment around cancer: interpretations through a local Italian world/ Deborah R. Gordon -- Narrative methodology in disaster studies: rescuers of Cyprus/ Cynthia M. Stuhlmiller.

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism.

Drawing upon both Husserl's published works and posthumous material, Husserl's Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.

This book addresses an epidemic that has developed on a global scale, and, which under the heading of “addiction,” presents a new narrative about the travails of the human predicament. The book introduces phenomenological motifs, such as desire, embodiment, and temporality, to uncover the existential roots of addiction, and develops Martin Heidegger’s insights into technology to uncover the challenge of becoming a self within the impulsiveness and depersonalization of our digital age. By charting a new path of philosophical inquiry, the book allows a pervasive, cultural phenomenon, ordinarily reserved to psychology, to speak as a referendum about the danger which technology poses to us on a daily basis. In this regard, addiction ceases to be merely a clinical malady, and instead becomes a “signpost” to exposing a hidden danger posed by the assimilation of our culture within a technological framework.

Philosophers consider race and racism from the perspective of lived, bodily experience. Broadening the philosophical conversation about race and racism, Living Alterities considers how people’s racial embodiment affects their day-to-day lived experiences, the lived experiences of individuals marked by race interacting with and responding to others marked by race, and the tensions that arise between different spheres of a single person’s identity. Drawing on phenomenology and the work of thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Iris Marion Young, the essays address the embodiment experiences of African Americans, Muslims, Asian Americans, Latinas, Jews, and white Americans. The volume’s focus on specific situations, temporalities, and encounters provides important context for understanding how race operates in people’s lives in ordinary settings like classrooms, dorm rooms, borderlands, elevators, and families.

Geographies of Embodiment provides a critical discussion of the literatures on the body and embodiment, and humanism and post-humanism, and develops arguments about "otherness" and "encounter" which have become key ideas in urban studies, and studies of the city. It situates these arguments in a wider political context, looking at power-relations through case studies at urban, national and transnational scales. These arguments are situated across disciplinary boundaries, at the borderline between between philosophy and social science that is associated to critical phenomenology, and reaches across Human Geography, Sociology, Philosophy, Anthropology, Cultural Studies and Urban Studies.

The Habits of Racism examines some of the complex questions raised by the phenomenon and experience of racism. Helen Ngo draws on the resources of Merleau-Ponty to show how the conceptual reworking of habit as bodily orientation helps to identify the subtle but more fundamental workings of racism--to catch its insidious, gestural expressions, as well as its habitual modes of racialized perception. Racism, as Ngo argues, is equally expressed through bodily habits, which, once reformulated, raises important ethical questions regarding the responsibility for one’s racist habits. Ngo also considers what the lived experience of racism and racialization teaches us about the nature of embodied and socially-situated being, arguing that racialized embodiment problematizes and extends existing accounts of embodied experience, and calls into question dominant philosophical paradigms of the “self” as coherent, fluid, and synchronous. Drawing on thinkers such as Fanon, she argues that the racialized body is “in front of itself” and “uncanny” (in the Heideggerian senses of “strange” and “not-at-home”), while exploring the phenomenological and existential implications of this disorientation and displacement. Finally, she returns to the visual register to take up the question of objectification in the racist gaze, critically examining the subject-object ontology presupposed by Sartre’s account of “the gaze” (le regard). Recalling that all embodied being is always already relational and co-constituting, Ngo draws on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the intertwining to argue that a phenomenology of racialized embodiment reveals to us the ontological violence of racism—not a merely violation of one’s subjectivity as commonly claimed, but also a violation of one’s intersubjectivity. The original arguments in The Habits of Racism will be of particular value to students and scholars interested in critical philosophy of race, phenomenology, and social and political philosophy, and may also be of interest to those working in feminist philosophy, queer studies, and disability studies.