Perspectives On Military Intelligence From The First World War To Mali

With a foreword by Michael Kowalski, Chairman of the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association Many intelligence practitioners feel that the statutory footing on which intelligence agencies have been placed forms an impediment to confronting unprecedented contemporary challenges. On the basis of case studies spanning the period from the First World War to the present, this book argues that while the intelligence community in the era of globalization has indeed come to face new and complex challenges that require adaptation, operating in demanding and changing environments is not new at all. This book questions the conventional wisdom of 9/11 or the end of the Cold War as caesurae. It also argues that the ability to adapt, innovate, question and learn from past experience is crucial for the success of intelligence organizations, rather than ever-expanding funding. Agencies’ ability to reflect, adapt and learn from experience determines their subsequent capability to deliver. One key development resulting from globalization is the marked increase in cooperation between intelligence agencies of different countries on the one hand, and between investigative agencies and intelligence agencies on the other. This has led to concerns over human rights and privacy and to increased calls for accountability and improved oversight as the increase in cooperation between organizations operating globally also provides scope for the circumvention of domestic restrictions. This book proposes an instrument to assess the effectiveness of existing accountability arrangements and offers new insights into the role of (military) intelligence in a number of crises, e.g., the 1962 Cold War confrontation over Western New Guinea, and the functioning of intelligence in peacekeeping operations ranging from Srebrenica to Mali. Thematically comprehensive, it offers a mixture of historical, legal, operational, and policy aspects, analyzed through the lens of institutional learning, bringing together academic and practitioners’ perspectives. The focus lies not only on the familiar Anglo-Saxon experience but also on cases from India, the Netherlands, South East Asia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and Mali. The book is aimed at both scholars and practitioners studying and/or working in the field of civil and military intelligence, and those involved in international relations and international humanitarian law/human rights law. It brings together contributions from authors who spoke at the Conference to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, organized by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA), and from a number of authors who were specifically invited to participate. About the editors: Floribert Baudet is Associate Professor of Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda; Eleni Braat is Assistant Professor at the Department of History and Art History at Utrecht University; Jeoffrey van Woensel is a military historian who works at the Veteraneninstituut in Doorn; and Aad Wever is an independent scholar who formerly worked at Saxion University of Applied Sciences in Enschede and Ferris State University, MI, USA, and who is now retired. Specific to this book: • Offers a mixture of historical, legal, operational, and policy aspects, analyzed through the lens of institutional learning• Brings together academic and practitioners’ perspectives• Focusses not only on the familiar Anglo-Saxon experience but also presents cases from India, the Netherlands, South East Asia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and Mali

Every nation that goes to war has to create images of their enemy. Through intelligence gathering and propaganda, these images are created and used to drive public support and keep soldiers fighting. At the same time, decision-makers must be provided with clear and incisive information on the opposition at hand. Frequently, these aims are mutually conflicting. Carefully balanced and used with circumspection, these images can lead to victory - but they can also drive armies to disaster and entire nations to atrocity. In this sweeping and fascinating survey - now revised and updated in light of recent developments in the war against terrorism - Kjeld Hald Galster, author of Crucial Coalition and Danish Troops in the Williamite Army in Ireland, explores how intelligence is collected and interpreted. Drawing from examples ranging from the Napoleonic Wars to the 2003 War in Iraq to the death of Osama bin Laden, he examines how military intelligence is used to create the face of the foe - and what makes it a tremendous success...or a disastrous failure.

Ask an American intelligence officer to tell you when the country started doing modern intelligence and you will probably hear something about the Office of Strategic Services in World War II or the National Security Act of 1947 and the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency. What you almost certainly will not hear is anything about World War I. In World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence, Mark Stout establishes that, in fact, World War I led to the realization that intelligence was indispensable in both wartime and peacetime. After a lengthy gestation that started in the late nineteenth century, modern American intelligence emerged during World War I, laying the foundations for the establishment of a self-conscious profession of intelligence. Virtually everything that followed was maturation, reorganization, reinvigoration, or reinvention. World War I ushered in a period of rapid changes. Never again would the War Department be without an intelligence component. Never again would a senior American commander lead a force to war without intelligence personnel on their staff. Never again would the United States government be without a signals intelligence agency or aerial reconnaissance capability. Stout examines the breadth of American intelligence in the war, not just in France, not just at home, but around the world and across the army, navy, and State Department, and demonstrates how these far-flung efforts endured after the Armistice in 1918. For the first time, there came to be a group of intelligence practitioners who viewed themselves as different from other soldiers, sailors, and diplomats. Upon entering World War II, the United States had a solid foundation from which to expand to meet the needs of another global hot war and the Cold War that followed.

It is commonplace within and outside the intelligence community to acknowledge the predominant role of technology in the collection, dissemination, and even analysis of information. Whit roots traceable to events in the late 1800s, this technological phenomenon loomed ever larger in the twentieth century. The increasing reliance on photographic, signals, and electronic intelligence has been viewed with varying degrees of celebration and concern by scholars and intelligence professionals. This volume contains the essays and commentaries originally presented at the Thirteenth Military Symposium held to address this topic at the United States Air Force Academy from October 12 to 14, 1998. The Participants in the conference attempted to provide a preliminary evaluation of the transformations that have occurred within the military intelligence community as a consequence of the Second World War. Not only did that conflict accelerate advances in technical means of collection, it also led to an international willingness to share intelligence on an unprecedented scale. The years 1939-1945 therefore witnessed a true "revolution" in intelligence collection and cooperation. That war also caused an interrelated growth in organizational size, efficiency, and sophistication that helped gain the craft of intelligence an acceptance in operational circles that it had not previously enjoyed.

This book provides an introduction to nineteen popular multiple intelligences. Part One discusses general intelligence, psychological testing, naturalistic intelligence, social intelligence, emotional intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, and cultural intelligence. Part Two tackles machine intelligence, the development of artificial intelligence, computational intelligence, and digital intelligence, or the ability for humans to adapt to a digital environment. Finally, Part Three discusses the role of intelligence in business development, using technology to augment intelligence, abstract thinking, swarm and animal intelligence, military intelligence, and musical intelligence. A Primer on Multiple Intelligences is a must-read for graduate students or scholars considering researching cognition, perception, motivation, and artificial intelligence. It will also be of use to those in social psychology, computer science, and pedagogy. It is as a valuable resource for anyone interested in learning more about the multifaceted study of intelligence.

This book examines India’s foreign intelligence culture and strategic surprises in the 20th century. The work looks at whether there is a distinct way in which India ‘thinks about’ and ‘does’ intelligence, and, by extension, whether this affects the prospects of it being surprised. Drawing on a combination of archival data, secondary source information and interviews with members of the Indian security and intelligence community, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian intelligence culture from the ancient period to colonial times and, subsequently, the post-colonial era. This evolutionary culture has played a significant role in explaining the India’s foreign intelligence failure during the occurrences of strategic surprises, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil War, while it successfully prepared for surprise attacks like Operation Chenghiz Khan by Pakistan in 1971. The result is that the book argues that the strategic culture of a nation and its interplay with intelligence organisations and operations is important to understanding the conditions for intelligence failures and strategic surprises. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.

This book examines the strategies pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) to foster resilience in the Middle East, Maghreb and Sahel regions, ranging from military operations to humanitarian assistance. Thanks to its constructive ambiguity, resilience can bring together policy communities and connect sponsors of reform with local societies, but also bridge rifts between and within the EU and NATO. However, existing resilience-based policies are fraught with policy, theoretical and normative dilemmas. This volume examines these dilemmas by including international relations, European politics and area studies scholars, as well as practitioners from armed forces, international organisations, humanitarian NGOs and think tanks.