Patrons Clients And Empire

Patrons, Clients, and Empire challenges the stereotypes of despotic imperial power in Asian, African, and Pacific colonies by analysing the relationship between rulers and rulers on both sides of the imperial equation. It seeks an answer to the question: how were European officials able to govern so many societies for so long? Rejecting the usual explanations of 'collaboration' and indirect rule', this study looks to pre-imperial structures in the indigenous hierarchies which supplied patrimonial models of chieftaincy for territorial government. For nawabs, chiefs, emirs, sultans, and their officials and followers there were dynastic and economic advantages in accepting the terms of European over-rule, as well as the threat of deposition. For European officials, few in numbers and with limited military and financial resources, there were ready-made systems of local government that could be co-opted, reformed, or left relatively untouched. Both sides played politics as patrons and clients within a dual system of administration based on a mixture of force and self-interest. Surveying a wide variety of cases and employing a patron-client model, this study embraces pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial politics in new states. It covers the chronology of early European dependency on local rulers; the reasons for reversal of status among chiefs and administrators; the longer period of political bargaining over access to local resources in terms of land, labour, and taxes; and the ultimate fate of indigenous rulers in the period of party politics leading to independence.

The first major study of patronage in the early Empire.

The Roman Empire may be properly described as a consortium of cities (and not as set of proto national states). From the late Republic and into the Principate, the Roman elite managed the empire through insititutional and personal ties to the communities of the Empire. Especially in the Latin West the emperors encouraged the adoption of the Latin language and urban amenities, and were generous in the award of citizenship. This process, and ‘Romanization’ is a reasonable label, was facilitated by civic patronage. The literary evidence provides a basis for understanding this transformation from subject to citizen and for constructing a higher allegiance to the idea of Rome. We gain a more complete understanding of the process by considering the legal and monumental/epigraphical evidence that guided and encouraged such benefaction and exchange. This book uses all three forms of evidence to provide a deeper understanding of how patrocinium publicum served as a formal vehicle for securing the goodwill of the citizens and subjects of Rome.

This book is the author’s response to the initial wave of democracy euphoria in South-East Europe, and the obvious regress of it after the “last catch” accession of Bulgaria and Romania (2007) into the European Union family. A core deficit in this respect is the lack of sustainable patronage, relevant to modern societal existence. 1 The bitter fruits of some “dilemma of simultaneity” (Elster 1990), which might have failed to precisely predict the impossibility of transformation in Eastern - rope, has hit the target, as related to the breeds of “impatient capitalisms” that - vour the region. Rising institutional asymmetries, the neglected “rule of law”, the lack of procurement procedures and public control over governmental expenditures as well as illegal schemes of privatisation, tax collecting and the unfair allocation of public funds have shaped mimicries of reforms in crucial spheres of social life. Corruptive patterns of patronages have very much spoiled the outputs of a most p- truded and teasing transition. This undermines significant societal progress. System abuse of civic rights, conflict of interests, nepotisms, political partisanship, int- weaving of institutions with organized criminality threaten to deviate the region from the general aims of democratic existence and modern societal advance.

This is a wide-ranging comparative study of relationships between the indigenous leadership of traditional states and colonizing Europeans from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. It challenges stereotypes of despotic imperial power in Asian, African, and Pacific colonies and seeks to answer the fundamental question: how were European officials able to govern so many societies over such a long period of time? Colin Newbury examines the politics of pre-colonial state structures, their subversion by merchants and administrators, and the use made of indigenous leaders, and assesses the legacy of these colonial hierarchies.

Focusing on the period from 1840 to 1889, one of the leading historians on Brazil explores the specific ways in which granting protection, official positions, and other favors in exchange for political and personal loyalty worked to benefit the interests of wealthy Brazilians.

Palace intrigues and clientelism drove politics at the viceregal court of colonial Mexico. By carefully reconstructing social networks in the court of Viceroy Duke of Alburquerque (1702-1710), Christoph Rosenm ller reveals that the Duke presided over one of the most corrupt viceregal terms in Mexican history. Alburquerque was appointed by Spain's King Philip V at a time when expanding state power was beginning to meet with opposition in colonial Mexico. The Duke and his retainers, though seemingly working for the crown, actually built close alliances with locals to thwart the reform efforts emanating from Spain. Alburquerque collaborated with contraband traders and opposed the secularization of Indian parishes. He persecuted several local craftsmen and merchants, some of whom died after languishing in jail, accusing them of treason to bolster his own credentials as a loyal official. In the end, however, the dominant clique at the royal court in Madrid sought revenge. Alburquerque was forced to pay an unheard-of indemnity of 700,000 silver pesos to regain the king's favour. Dealing with a topic and period largely ignored by historiography, Rosenm ller exposes the vast patronage power of the viceroy at the historical watershed between the expiring Habsburg dynasty and the incoming Bourbon rulers. His analysis reveals that precursors of the Bourbon reforms and the struggle for Mexican independence were already at play in the early eighteenth century.

Patronage has long been an important topic of interest to ancient historians. It remains unclear what patronage entailed, however, and how it worked. Is it a universal phenomenon embracing all, or most, relationships between unequals? Or is it an especially Roman practice? In previous discussions of patronage, one crucial body of evidence has been under-exploited: inscriptions from the Greek East that borrow the Latin term 'patron' and use it to honour their Roman officials. The fact that the Greeks borrow the term patron suggests that there was something uniquely Roman about the patron-client relationship. Moreover, this epigraphic evidence implies that patronage was not only a part of Rome's history, but had a history of its own. The rise and fall of city patrons in the Greek East is linked to the fundamental changes that took place during the fall of the Republic and the transition to the Principate. Senatorial patrons appear in the Greek inscriptions of the Roman province of Asia towards the end of the second century BC and are widely attested in the region and elsewhere for the following century. In the early principate, however, they become less common and soon more or less disappear. Eilers's discursive treatment of the origins, nature, and decline of this type of patronage, and its place in Roman practice as a whole, is supplemented by a reference catalogue of Roman patrons of Greek communities.