Optimal Pricing And Seat Allocation In The Airline Industry Under The Market Competition

This is the first comprehensive introduction to the concepts, theories, and applications of pricing and revenue optimization. From the initial success of "yield management" in the commercial airline industry down to more recent successes of markdown management and dynamic pricing, the application of mathematical analysis to optimize pricing has become increasingly important across many different industries. But, since pricing and revenue optimization has involved the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques, the topic has remained largely inaccessible to students and the typical manager. With methods proven in the MBA courses taught by the author at Columbia and Stanford Business Schools, this book presents the basic concepts of pricing and revenue optimization in a form accessible to MBA students, MS students, and advanced undergraduates. In addition, managers will find the practical approach to the issue of pricing and revenue optimization invaluable. Solutions to the end-of-chapter exercises are available to instructors who are using this book in their courses. For access to the solutions manual, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT: The airline industry is facing unprecedented challenges in generating sufficient revenues to stay in business. Airlines must capture the greatest revenue yield from every flight by leaving no seats unsold and not over filling the cabin with discount fares. To succeed in doing the above airlines must be able to accurately forecast each of their market segments, manage product andprice availability to maximize revenue and react quickly to competitive changes in the market place. Thus seat inventory control and ticket pricing form the two major tools of revenue management. The focus of this paper is to consolidate the ideas of seats inventory control and pricing in order to maximize the revenues generated by an airline network. A continuous time yield management model for a network with multiple legs, multiple fare classes and dynamic price changes for all fare classes is considered.

Excerpt from Competition and Price Dispersion, in the U. S. Airline Industry Abstract: We study dispersion in the prices that an airline charges to different customers on the same route. Such variation in airline fares is substantial: on average the expected absolute difference in fares between two of an airline's passengers on a route is thirty-six percent of the airline's average ticket price on the route. The pattern of price disperison that we find does not seem to be explained solely by cost differences. Dispersion is higher on more competitive routes, possibly reflecting a pattern of discrimination against customers who are less willing to switch to alternative flights or airlines. We argue that the data support an explanation based on theories of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Revenue management (RM) has emerged as one of the most important new business practices in recent times. This book is the first comprehensive reference book to be published in the field of RM. It unifies the field, drawing from industry sources as well as relevant research from disparate disciplines, as well as documenting industry practices and implementation details. Successful hardcover version published in April 2004.

Provokes the reader to think critically about the emergence of corporate styles of governance, management and leadership in higher education institutions (HEIs) and ways in which the demands of public management and the knowledge economy has shaped and re-shaped scholarly work and identity.

Since the 1980s, the airline industry has seen two major changes: Deregulation, which led to an increase in competition, and the development of revenue management systems. Paradoxically the revenue management models used have not incorporated many competitive considerations. In this thesis we study the interactions between existing airline revenue management systems in competitive markets. We use the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS) for simulations. After a review of the past research on such interactions, we develop our own model and use simulations to identify and measure the extent to which revenue management systems of competing airlines affect each other. The model introduced highlights the importance of spill-of-demand between airlines. We show that with current revenue management practice, a legacy carrier should be less sensitive than a low-cost carrier to revenue management competitive interactions. As compared to an equivalent monopoly, an airline oligopoly tends to allocate more seats to high-fare passengers and fewer seats to low-fare passengers. With steady demand distributions, an airline's expected revenues are a decreasing function of the seat capacity allocated by its competitors to high-fare passengers. Existing revenue management systems react to competitor moves automatically only if a change in the seat allocation rule by an airline occurs over a large enough number of successive departures to be detected by forecasters. We then suggest how to improve revenue management based on the interactions identified. With steady demands, if a competitor increases (respectively decreases) its seat allocation for high-fare passengers, the best response to optimize revenues on the short-term is to decrease (respectively increase) seat allocation for high-fare passengers. We also show that the use of EMSRb-optimization by competitors results in a near-optimum competitive equilibrium, and a near-optimum cooperative equilibrium if airlines do not share revenues. Rarely can competitive interactions justify an airline to override the EMSRb seat-allocation rule to optimize revenues. Last, we introduce LOCO-based Forecast Multiplication, a heuristic forecast adjustment made in response to the current seat availability of the competitors that can increase an airline's revenues substantially.

Major institutional, regulatory, and structural changes have occurred in international air transport during the past two decades. Many countries have deregulated their domestic airline industries and open skies continental blocs have formed in Europe and North America A movement is now underway to create a liberalized continental bloc in Australasia. International air transport has been substantially liberalized due to the diminishing role of lATA as an industry cartel, and via a series of liberalized bilateral agreements signed between many countries, including the u.s. and UK Increased liberalization and continentalization have induced major airlines to create global service networks through inter-carrier alliances. And all these changes are intensifYing competition between major carriers in both domestic and international markets. The increased competition and economic recession in the early 1990s led many airlines to massive fmancial losses, forcing them to undertake major restructuring to improve efficiency and reduce costs. Although it is important for an airline to map out proper strategies in the globalizing airline industry, the ultimate ability of a carrier to swvive and prosper in increasingly competitive markets greatly depends on its productivity and cost competitiveness.