Optimal Debt Maturity Under Emu

We characterize the optimal debt-maturity management problem of a government in a small open economy. The government issues a continuum of finite-maturity bonds in the presence of liquidity frictions. We find that the solution can be decentralized: the optimal issuance of a bond of a given maturity is proportional to the difference between its market price and its domestic valuation, the latter defined as the price computed using the government’s discount factor. We show how the steady-state debt distribution decreases with maturity. These results hold when extending the model to incorporate aggregate risk or strategic default.

We characterize the optimal debt-maturity management problem in the presence of liquidity costs. A government issues an arbitrary number of finite-maturity bonds and faces income and interest-rate risk, which can tempt it to default. Optimal issuances are spread out across maturities and are given by the ratio of a value gap over a liquidity coefficient that measures the price impact. The value gap is the proportional difference between the bond prices obtained by discounting with the international interest rates and with the domestic discount factor. This characterization allows us to quantify the contribution of different economic forces--impatience, yield-curve riding, expenditure smoothing, self-insurance, credit risk, and default incentives--in shaping the optimal debt maturity distribution. In an application, we estimate the liquidity coefficients using Spanish debt auction data and exploit the framework to evaluate Spanish debt management practices.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) encompasses the legislative text and political resolutions regulating fiscal policy and public finances in EMU. The contributions in this volume analyse the institutional, legal, theoretical and empirical aspects of the SGP, examine its development and evaluate its main implications. The authors include academic economists, who provide insightful analysis, and policy makers who have contributed to the shaping of the pact and have a direct responsibility for its implementation. This book is the definitive source of reference on the SGP for academics, policy makes and economists.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

Noting that the aftermath of the global financial crisis has left many advanced economies with very high sovereign debt ratios and some emerging markets with high debt, this report considers whether there are ways to expand fiscal space that do not involve countries paying down debt or promising to do so in the future, to make fiscal consolidation more growth-friendly. It explains that policymakers argue that their fiscal space is limited and that it would be difficult to take advantage of the opportunity of low interest rates to undertake fiscal expansion, and it considers a ways to raise fiscal space that does not require contractionary fiscal policy and whether there is a way to make fiscal consolidation more growth-friendly to produce larger gains in fiscal space. It argues that debt management policies may provide an answer to expanding fiscal space for a given path of primary fiscal balances by reducing the risk that a sovereign may default in bad states and generate a payoff in terms of reduced to real borrowing costs. It describes two debt management policies: issuance of GDP-linked debt and issuance of longer maturity bonds, as opposed to short-term debt. It focuses on the effect of these debt management policies on real borrowing costs and default risk for the sovereign and details the literature on GDP-linked debt and the maturity structure and how the report fills gaps in the literature; how uncertainty affects fiscal space and how debt management can play a role in increasing it, with estimates and simulations of potential gains in fiscal space flowing from debt management; and the sensitivity of the findings to underlying assumptions and policy implications.

Leading scholars and policy makers examine the challenges that are facing economic policies in the EMU today.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.