Operational Risk Management Increasing Mission Effectiveness Through Improved Planning And Execution Of Joint Operations

Joint doctrine is deficient in identifying a specific method of assessing and managing risk when applying the test of acceptability to joint operation plans. This deficiency should be remedied with the adoption of Operational Risk Management (ORM), an existing process which would provide operational commanders a tool for making smarter risk decisions. Improved planning and execution of joint combat and non-combat operations would result in increased mission effectiveness and better progress toward the desired strategic end-state. ORM is an analytical process to improve risk assessment and better manage operational risk. ORM is composed of five steps: identifying hazards, making risk assessments, making risk decisions, implementing controls, and supervising effectiveness. The ORM process is performed on a time-critical, deliberate, or in-depth level depending on the time available. Four principles which guide the employment of ORM are to accept risk when benefits outweigh the cost, accept no unnecessary risk, anticipate and manage risk by planning, and make risk decisions at the right level. Commanders manage risk wisely to conserve combat power for bold execution of joint operations plans. The paper concludes that Operational Risk Management should be formally adopted into the deliberate and crisis action joint planning processes. Through training, ORM can become ingrained and intuitive to military commanders at the operational level. Better management of operational risk will improve mission effectiveness of joint forces while supporting national foreign policy and strategy in operations around the globe.

To achieve a more responsive and more readily deployable fleet of surface combatants, the Navy adopted the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in 2003 to replace its traditional ship maintenance and readiness cycle. The goal of the FRP is to have non-deployed ships achieve a high level of readiness earlier and to maintain high readiness longer so that they can deploy on short notice. However, a challenge of implementing the FRP is establishing the processes and procedures, as well as a ready industrial base, to facilitate maintenance planning and execution to meet the now unpredictable FRP surge requirements and maintenance demands. By concentrating specifically on the DDG-51 class of destroyers, the authors of this report look at the effects the FRP has had thus far and determine whether maintenance resources are meeting maintenance demands and whether related industry resources have been coordinated effectively. Overall, the authors determine that the initiative appears to have promising effects but that more time will be needed to assess maintenance supply and demand apart from the increase of funding tied to military operations post-September 11, 2001.

Uncertainty and risk are inherent in the nature of military action. The success of any joint military operation is based upon a willingness to balance risk with opportunity in taking bold, decisive action necessary to triumph in war. At the same time, commanders have a fundamental responsibility to safeguard personnel and material resources, and to accept the level of controlled risk necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Operational Risk Management (ORM) is the process that assists the military commander in reducing or offsetting risk and helps him think through his options when faced with force employment and the requirement for risk control for mission success. By systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, the commander can evaluate all the elements that affect the employment of forces and assets. While ORM terminology is discussed in joint operational doctrine and planning publications, there exists no clear application and integration in developing the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) through the Course of Action (COA) process. This paper will illustrate how ORM fits into the existing Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process to assist leadership in identifying the optimum COA for mission success. Included in the ORM application is a quantifiable evaluation process that prioritizes the threat, vulnerability, and criticality for joint commanders to apply limited resources to enhance operational capability. No longer will the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) have to rely exclusively on his intuition and experience in calculating the increased levels of risk he can accept for mission success.

The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System provides a strong framework for integrating service, functional, and other perspectives in the planning process. This is a positive aspect that is likely to lead to broad consideration of alternatives that provides an excellent mechanism to optimize plans for joint operations. In execution, however, the use of joint task force (JTF) headquarters to manage operations favors giving the dominant service control of the execution of joint operations or the creation of ad hoc staffs that do poorly to integrate the full spectrum of forces into effective joint operations. To remedy this, we must create strong, standing joint task force headquarters (SJTF HQ) within each geographic unified command. These SJTF HQ should have assigned commanders and well-trained, integrated joint staffs that are readily available to assume control of mission execution on short notice. Furthermore, to facilitate rapid and efficient command and control, these SJTF HQ should be able to operate without being required to establish subordinate functional or service component commands.

This publication provides doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of airspace control during joint operations across the full range of military operations. It also discusses airspace control across the phases of military operations, emphasizing transitions from, and back to, civilian controlled airspace. This joint publication prescribes doctrine for joint airspace control in the operational area. The prescribed doctrine is broadly stated to fit a wide range of situations requiring military control of airspace. It outlines fundamental principles, relationships, and broad operational-level guidelines, and is intended to provide the basic framework upon which to build an airspace control system (ACS) for an operational area. The joint force commander (JFC) normally designates a joint force air component commander (JFACC) as commander for joint air operations. The JFC also normally designates an area air defense commander (AADC) and an airspace control authority (ACA). When the JFC designates a JFACC, the JFC also normally designates the JFACC as the AADC and ACA. The ACA plans, coordinates, and develops airspace control procedures and operates the ACS. The JFC may designate a separate ACA and/or AADC, in which case, close coordination is essential for unity of effort. The ACA develops a specific airspace control plan (ACP) that is approved by the JFC. The ACP should be closely integrated with the JFC-approved area air defense plan (AADP) developed by the AADC. Joint airspace control increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with minimum restraint upon airspace users, and includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Effective airspace control reduces the risk of fratricide, enhances air defense, and permits flexibility. Airspace control operations may begin prior to (and continue after) combat operations and may transition through degrees of civil and military authority. The JFC defines the relationship between the ACA and component commanders. Airspace control is essential to operational effectiveness in accomplishing JFC objectives across the range of military operations. Airspace is a crucial part of the operational environment used by all components. A high concentration of friendly surface, subsurface, and airlaunched weapon systems must share this airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power. The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance effectiveness of the joint force and increase the safety of joint air operations. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

The process of JMETL development involves the examination of the missions of a combatant commander, subordinate joint force commander, and functional or Service component commanders in order to establish required warfighting capabilities consisting of joint tasks, conditions, and standards. This handbook is intended to assist the combatant commands describe required capabilities in a form useful in the planning, execution and assessment phases of the joint training system. Further, it should aid resource providers and the Joint Staff in examining and coordinating joint training requirements among a number of combatant commands with diverse missions. The next phase of the joint training system begins with the development of a joint training plan delineating how combatant commanders allocate their joint training resources to meet JMETL requirements.