Operational Deception Us Joint Doctrine And The Persian Gulf War

This monograph examines U.S. Joint doctrine for operational deception (Joint Pub 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception). The monograph provides information to operational planners on deception concepts that are unique to Joint doctrine and how these concepts can be used when planning operational deception. The monograph provides historical examples of operational deception by briefly examining deception operations in the Napoleonic Era, WWI, WWII, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The monograph compares unique Joint deception concepts with the deception operations performed by USCENTOOM in the Persian Gulf War. The monograph also compares Joint doctrine for operational deception with the earlier doctrines of the four U.S. Services. The monograph concludes that USCENTCOM's operational deception in the Persian Gulf War is in concordance with subsequent Joint doctrine. Based on historical examples, the monograph makes recommendations for planners to consider when planning for and conducting operational deception. The monograph suggests changes to Services' doctrine for military deception.

This book discusses military deception techniques and history. "Military deception" is an umbrella term that includes both denial and deception. Denial hides the real and deception shows the fake. Denial and deception are operations; propaganda and disinformation are the products. Joint doctrine says that military deception, as applied by a joint force commander (JFC), targets an adversary's decision-making process. Ultimately, the intent is to shape the adversary's behavior in the JFC's favor or to cause an adversary to form an inaccurate impression of the battlespace. Consequently, planning for deception operations depends on intelligence and security for success. Obviously, a commander wants to conceal deception efforts from the enemy, but often he'll conceal all or some of his efforts from his own troops to prevent confusion and/or compromise of the plan. During the early years of Soviet involvement in World War II, mishandling of information by soldiers and planners resulted in the compromise of many maskirovka (or deception) operations. As a result, the Soviets implemented aggressive security measures to protect their deception plans. Specifically, Soviet commanders restricted the number of planners and documents involved in the deception operations and communicated to subordinates only what they needed to know, when they needed to know it. The general enjoyed his breakfast while reading his morning paper and listening to the international news channel. Hearing the Balkans mentioned-his area of responsibility-he looked up as a foreign correspondent began to comment on the aftermath of an Allied bombing mission from the day before. The gruesome details suddenly made the general's scrambled eggs a bit less appealing. The graphic pictures showed what appeared to be the remnants of an orphanage. There in the rubble lay a bloodstained, tattered doll. Those images left him wondering about the carnage that lay beneath the collapsed brick and mortar. Had his staff miscalculated and inadvertently struck an orphanage? A similar misstep had occurred a few weeks ago when another bombing mission resulted in civilian casualties in a marketplace. As the general bemoaned the potential ramifications of accidentally bombing an orphanage, a memory surfaced. Years of flying high-performance aircraft had sharpened his senses, and something about the scene seemed familiar. Could that be the same bloodstained doll he had seen in photographs of the earlier marketplace mishap? The general had been briefed on the enemy's rather low-tech yet successful use of deception. Was he, along with the rest of the world, a target of military deception? As he pondered this, his pager went off. This fictitious example illustrates both how easy it is to manipulate the media in deception operations and how a thorough understanding of deception can help prevent a military leader from falling victim to it. The U.S. military is transforming itself with technological advancements in warfighting capability. Weapon systems, force structure and training have all improved. The amount and kind of information available to the warfighter is also improving. But even a technologically advanced nation like the United States is susceptible to deception. Analysis of friendly and enemy deception techniques in Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE shows the main U.S. vulnerabilities to include its insatiable appetite for "news," the lack of deception-detection expertise in the military, and the tendency to believe that technological advancements make a nation deception-proof. Therefore, the key to mitigating the U.S. vulnerabilities to deception lies in educating the media about the military and common deception practices, giving the military intensive deception-detection training, and abandoning the notion that technological advancement inoculates against deception.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were superb examples of the application of military power in support of national policy. Vital U.S. and international interests were protected, and the goals of the international coalition were achieved. This book examines operations executed in the Persian Gulf War from two unique perspectives. First, the author participated in the majority of events described. Second, the author considers not only the U.S. viewpoint but also describes how some of Saddam Hussein's actions were analyzed as they pertained to various situations. The purpose of this book is to provide a better understanding of the unique application of operational art in what some have termed the last campaign of the cold war. The author concludes that one of the major lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was that wholesale changes in the doctrine, education, and training that contributed significantly to the operational success are not required.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were superb examples of the application of military power in support of national policy. Vital U.S. and international interests were protected, and the goals of the international coalition were achieved. This report examines operations executed in the Persian Gulf War from two unique perspectives. First, the author participated in the majority of events described. Second, the author considers not only the U.S. viewpoint but also describes how some of Saddam Hussein's actions were analyzed as they pertained to various situations. The purpose of this study is to provide a better under3tanding of the unique application of operational art in what some have termed the last campaign of the cold war. The author concludes that one of the major lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was that wholesale changes in the doctrine, education, and training that contributed significantly to the operational success are not required.

Bridging the divide between theory and practice, Deception: Counterdeception and Counterintelligence provides a thorough overview of the principles of deception and its uses in intelligence operations.

Successive generations of military commanders universally recognize as a principle of war that if surprise can be attained over the enemy, it may contribute to victory. To achieve surprise requires a stratagem, a means or tool to achieve ends. That tool is deception, recognized by commanders as a 'force multiplier' they must add to their operational art toolbox. The U.S. commander tasked to orchestrate joint and combined military operations and campaigns at the operational level of war must possess a solid understanding of what deception is and is not and can and cannot do for his campaign. This paper examines U.S. Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception (OPDEC), reviews and analyzes eight OPDEC planning considerations, provides historical analysis of OPDEC planning in conjunction with two Allied campaigns in World War II and the Persian Gulf War and reviews insights into the deception planning process from the commander's perspectives provided by General Eisenhower and General Schwarzkopf in their memoirs. It offers three conclusions which support vigorous attention to OPDEC planning by the operational commander.