Operation Alpha And The Failure Of Anglo American Coercive Diplomacy In The Arab Israeli Conflict 1954 1956 The United Nations The Great Powers And Middle East Peacemaking 1948 1954

This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed – unsuccessfully – at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

These four volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between 1913 and 1956. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources ...

These four volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between 1913 and 1956. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources ...

This book focuses on the bilateral and multilateral relations between Britain, the 'former proprietor' and Israel, the 'successor state', during the period following their armed clash in January 1949, to Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza and the Sinai in March 1957. It highlights the formulation of foreign policy decisions in Britain and Israel; Britain's special responsibility and influence, which affected Israel's relations with neighbouring Arab states; Israel's complex policy towards Britain; Anglo-Jewry's attitude towards Israel and the distinctive relationship between Israel's embassy in London and the Jewish community.

This book, first published in 1997, provides a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of this volume comprises both an in-depth analysis of the period and events, and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.

This book analyses three major themes: decolonization, sovereignty, and peacekeeping. Their interaction during the national liberation struggle during the Cold War, culminating in the 1956 Suez War, addresses the principle of national sovereignty after World War II in the framework of the UN Charter. The new peacekeeping operations were used in many conflicts, during which the Charter’s theory and application were tested. The rise of the USA as the key Western power and Israel’s special role in the Middle East have created a new confrontational dynamic for the entire region. The interaction between the book’s main themes in the field has led to the principles of peacekeeping in international and national conflicts being reviewed in light of the discredited ‘Capstone Doctrine’. The author argues that state sovereignty is sacrosanct, but humanitarian interventions are equally imperative in his view. Striking the right balance is crucial for managing conflicts. The author: · offers a well-informed historical account and an authoritative political analysis · was exposed to UNEF deployments and termination and knows key peacekeeping actors · draws on original documents, memoirs, and interviews · includes unpublished photos and previously unavailable documentary material · has experience in government and academia

"In an innovative study, two historians of the Arab-Israeli conflict reflect on what their craft can contribute to peacemaking." -- Middle East Quarterly "A fine overview of the troubled Arab-Israeli negotiations since Camp David, filled with sound analysis and a wealth of documentary material. Students and diplomats alike will benefit from this thoughtful study." -- William B. Quandt, Byrd Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia "This timely book... will be invaluable for students of Middle East international relations and for policy makers who seek a mutually acceptable resolution of this protracted conflict." -- Michael Brecher, McGill University "No matter where one stands on the issues, this valuable work commends itself to students, peace makers, and anyone concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its peaceful resolution." -- Philip Mattar, Institute for Palestine Studies "... Eisenberg and Caplan offer the reader lessons of the past and sound guidance for the present and the future.... a well-researched and well-written book." -- Itamar Rabinovich, Tel-Aviv University What must change before the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved diplomatically? By illuminating recurring factors that seem to doom peacemaking, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace offers a fresh interpretation of how, when, and why the process does and does not work and points to diplomatic strategies that may produce an enduring peace.