Opdec Planning A Commanders Imperative

Successive generations of military commanders universally recognize as a principle of war that if surprise can be attained over the enemy, it may contribute to victory. To achieve surprise requires a stratagem, a means or tool to achieve ends. That tool is deception, recognized by commanders as a 'force multiplier' they must add to their operational art toolbox. The U.S. commander tasked to orchestrate joint and combined military operations and campaigns at the operational level of war must possess a solid understanding of what deception is and is not and can and cannot do for his campaign. This paper examines U.S. Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception (OPDEC), reviews and analyzes eight OPDEC planning considerations, provides historical analysis of OPDEC planning in conjunction with two Allied campaigns in World War II and the Persian Gulf War and reviews insights into the deception planning process from the commander's perspectives provided by General Eisenhower and General Schwarzkopf in their memoirs. It offers three conclusions which support vigorous attention to OPDEC planning by the operational commander.

Sections 1-2. Keyword Index.--Section 3. Personal author index.--Section 4. Corporate author index.-- Section 5. Contract/grant number index, NTIS order/report number index 1-E.--Section 6. NTIS order/report number index F-Z.

Published in 1989, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.

"The Official US Army Ranger Handbook, as used in Fort Benning" -- Amazon website.

This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The 5th Edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy¿s core courses: ¿Theory of War and Strategy¿ and ¿National Security Policy and Strategy.¿ Like previous editions, this one is based on its predecessor but contains both updates and new scholarship. Over a third of the chapters are new or have undergone significant rewrites. Many chapters, some of which appeared for years in this work, have been removed. Nevertheless, the book remains unchanged in intent and purpose. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America¿s future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus, the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition continues the effort begun in the 4th Edition to include several short case studies to illustrate the primary material in the volume.