On The Meaning Of Victory

Examines the problems and possibilities facing the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, from the threat of nuclear war and the military's strategic thinking, to the interplay of politics, personality, and history

Examines the problems and possibilities facing the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, from the threat of nuclear war and the military's strategic thinking, to the interplay of politics, personality, and history.

How has the concept of victory evolved, as the nature of conflict itself has changed across time, circumstance, and culture? And to what end? Robert Mandel addresses these questions, considering the meanings, misperceptions, and challenges associated with military victory in the context of the nontraditional wars of recent decades. Without an understanding of precisely what victory means, Mandel argues, the outcome can involve policy paralysis, loss of public support, escalating postwar violence, and ultimately, foreign policy failure. Grappling with the moral complexities of victory in limited war, he discusses issues of security, war crimes, self-determination, reconstruction, and social transformation. He also identifies common fallacies held by victors. Case studies of recent military actions, including the ongoing war in Iraq, inform a discussion of the usefulness of notions of victory in dealing with contemporary challenges.

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This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

Bringing together leading contributors in the field, this new volume analyzes how victory and defeat in modern war can be understood and explained. It does so by confronting two inter-related research problems: the nature of victory and defeat in modern war and the explanations of victory and defeat. By first questioning the extent to which the concepts of victory and defeat are meaningful to describe the outcomes of modern wars, and whether the contents of these concepts are changing, it then evaluates different theories purporting to explain the outcomes of war and the impact of variables, ranging from technology to culture. The book tackles several key questions: What is the definition of victory in the ‘War on Terror’? What is the meaning of victory and defeat in contemporary insurgencies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan? Are the counterstrategies that were developed in the mid-twentieth century valid in order to deal with present and future conflicts? With case studies ranging from the Malayan Emergency to the current conflict in Iraq, Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War will be of great interest to students of war and conflict studies, security studies, military history and international relations.