Ockham And Ockhamism

Against the background of changing assessments of Nominalism and its meanings before Ockham, this book examines the reception of Ockham’s thought at Oxford and Paris, the crisis over Ockhamism at Paris around 1340, and the legacy of Ockhamist thought into the sixteenth century.

Against the background of changing assessments of Nominalism and its meanings before Ockham, this book examines the reception of Ockhama (TM)s thought at Oxford and Paris, the crisis over Ockhamism at Paris around 1340, and the legacy of Ockhamist thought into the sixteenth century.

When William of Ockham lectured on Lombard’s Sentences in 1317-1319, he articulated a new theory of knowledge. Its reception by fourteenth-century scholars was, however, largely negative, for it conflicted with technical accounts of vision and with their interprations of Duns Scotus. This study begins with Roger Bacon, a major source for later scholastics’ efforts to tie a complex of semantic and optical explanations together into an account of concept formation, truth and the acquisition of certitude. After considering the challenges of Peter Olivi and Henry of Ghent, Part I concludes with a discussion of Scotus’s epistemology. Part II explores the alternative theories of Peter Aureol and William of Ockham. Part III traces the impact of Scotus, and then of Aureol, on Oxford thought in the years of Ockham’s early audience, culminating with the views of Adam Wodeham. Part IV concerns Aureol’s intellectual legacy at Paris, the introduction of Wodeham’s thought there, and Autrecourt’s controversies.

This book discusses fundamental topics on contemporary Ockhamism. The collected essays show how contemporary Ockhamism can impact areas of research such as semantics, metaphysics and also the philosophy of science. In addition, the volume hosts one historian of Medieval philosophy who investigates the way in which William of Ockham “in flesh and bone” construed time and, more generally, future contingency. The essays explore the different meanings of this theory. They cover three main topics, in particular. The first examines the thesis that sentences and propositions about the future have a definite truth value, without any ensuing commitment to determinism or fatalism. The second topic looks at the problem whether the branching-time model needs to countenance a privileged branch (the so-called Thin Red Line). Finally, the third topic considers the idea that there are so-called soft facts. These would be the subject matter of sentences and propositions verbally about the present or the past, but metaphysically about a later time, and which might change in the future. Overall, the book provides an updated and rigorous idea of the debate about Ockhamism. It gives readers a deeper understanding into this philosophical approach influenced by William of Ockham, characterized by the rejection of the Aristotelian idea that, in order to preserve the contingency of the future, future contingents must be deemed neither true nor false.

William of Ockham's (ca. 1288-1347) Opus nonaginta dierum has long been of interest to historians for his theory of rights. Yet the results of this interest has been uneven because most studies do not take sufficient account of the defences of Franciscan poverty already articulated by his fellow Franciscans, Bonagratia of Bergamo, Michael of Cesena, and Francis of Marchia. This book therefore presents and analyzes Ockham's account of property rights alongside those of his confreres. This contextualization of Ockham’s theory corrects many misconceptions about his theory of property, natural law, and natural rights, and therefore also provides a new foundation for studies of his political oeuvre, intellectual development, and significance as a political theorist.

This book analyzes William of Ockham's early theory of property rights alongside those of his fellow dissident Franciscans, paying careful attention to each friar's use of Roman and civil law, which provided the conceptual building blocks of the poverty controversy.

Our Fate collects John Martin Fischer's previously published articles on the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. The book includes a substantial new introductory essay that puts all of the chapters into a cohesive framework, and presents a bold new account of God's foreknowledge of free actions in a causally indeterministic world.

This volume collects twelve chapters that present the multifaceted responses to the works of the William of Ockham in Oxford, Paris, Italy, and at the papal court in Avignon in the 14th century, and it assembles contributions on philosophers and theologians who all have criticized Ockham’s works at different points. In individual case studies it gives an exemplary overview over the reactions the Venerable Inceptor has provoked and also serves to better understand Ockham’s thought in its historical context. The topics range from ontology, psychology, theory of cognition, epistemology, and natural science to ethics and political philosophy. This volume demonstrates that the reactions to Ockham’s philosophy and theology were manifold, but one particular kind of reception is missing: unanimous approval. Contributors include Fabrizio Amerini, Stephen F. Brown, Nathaniel Bulthuis, Stefano Caroti, Laurent Cesalli, Alessandro D. Conti, Thomas Dewender, Isabel Iribarren, Isabelle Mandrella, Aurélien Robert, Christian Rode, and Sonja Schierbaum