Observers And Macroeconomic Systems

Observers and Macroeconomic Systems is concerned with the computational aspects of using a control-theoretic approach to the analysis of dynamic macroeconomic systems. The focus is on using a separate model for the development of the control policies. In particular, it uses the observer-based approach whereby the separate model learns to behave in a similar manner to the economic system through output-injections. The book shows how this approach can be used to learn the forward-looking behaviour of economic actors which is a distinguishing feature of dynamic macroeconomic models. It also shows how it can be used in conjunction with low-order models to undertake policy analysis with a large practical econometric model. This overcomes some of the computational problems arising from using just the large econometric models to compute optimal policy trajectories. The work also develops visual simulation software tools that can be used for policy analysis with dynamic macroeconomic systems.

As our title reveals, we focus on optimal control methods and applications relevant to linear dynamic economic systems in discrete-time variables. We deal only with discrete cases simply because economic data are available in discrete forms, hence realistic economic policies should be established in discrete-time structures. Though many books have been written on optimal control in engineering, we see few on discrete-type optimal control. More over, since economic models take slightly different forms than do engineer ing ones, we need a comprehensive, self-contained treatment of linear optimal control applicable to discrete-time economic systems. The present work is intended to fill this need from the standpoint of contemporary macroeconomic stabilization. The work is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 we demonstrate instru ment instability in an economic stabilization problem and thereby establish the motivation for our departure into the optimal control world. Chapter 2 provides fundamental concepts and propositions for controlling linear deterministic discrete-time systems, together with some economic applica tions and numerical methods. Our optimal control rules are in the form of feedback from known state variables of the preceding period. When state variables are not observable or are accessible only with observation errors, we must obtain appropriate proxies for these variables, which are called "observers" in deterministic cases or "filters" in stochastic circumstances. In Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, Luenberger observers and Kalman filters are discussed, developed, and applied in various directions. Noticing that a separation principle lies between observer (or filter) and controller (cf.

Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.

Demand for decentralization is strong in most parts of the world. This close look at the negative side effects of improperly appled decentralization is not an attack on decentralization but an effort to prevent its misapplication -- and to promote fuller understanding and wiser use of this potentially desirable policy.

Again and again, Latin America has seen the populist scenario played to an unfortunate end. Upon gaining power, populist governments attempt to revive the economy through massive spending. After an initial recovery, inflation reemerges and the government responds with wage an price controls. Shortages, overvaluation, burgeoning deficits, and capital flight soon precipitate economic crisis, with a subsequent collapse of the populist regime. The lessons of this experience are especially valuable for countries in Eastern Europe, as they face major political and economic decisions. Economists and political scientists from the United States and Latin America detail in this volume how and why such programs go wrong and what leads policymakers to repeatedly adopt these policies despite a history of failure. Authors examine this pattern in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru—and show how Colombia managed to avoid it. Despite differences in how each country implemented its policies, the macroeconomic consequences were remarkably similar. Scholars of Latin America will find this work a valuable resource, offering a distinctive macroeconomic perspective on the continuing controversy over the dynamics of populism.

This book collects selected articles addressing several currently debated issues in the field of international macroeconomics. They focus on the role of the central banks in the debate on how to come to terms with the long-term decline in productivity growth, insufficient aggregate demand, high economic uncertainty and growing inequalities following the global financial crisis. Central banks are of considerable importance in this debate since understanding the sluggishness of the recovery process as well as its implications for the natural interest rate are key to assessing output gaps and the monetary policy stance. The authors argue that a more dynamic domestic and external aggregate demand helps to raise the inflation rate, easing the constraint deriving from the zero lower bound and allowing monetary policy to depart from its current ultra-accommodative position. Beyond macroeconomic factors, the book also discusses a supportive financial environment as a precondition for the rebound of global economic activity, stressing that understanding capital flows is a prerequisite for economic-policy decisions.

This book provides an innovative framework to analyze the process of industrial upgrading and diversification, a key feature of economic development. Based on this framework, it provides concrete advice to development practitioners and policy makers on how to unleash a country's growth potential.

As our title reveals, we focus on optimal control methods and applications relevant to linear dynamic economic systems in discrete-time variables. We deal only with discrete cases simply because economic data are available in discrete forms, hence realistic economic policies should be established in discrete-time structures. Though many books have been written on optimal control in engineering, we see few on discrete-type optimal control. More over, since economic models take slightly different forms than do engineer ing ones, we need a comprehensive, self-contained treatment of linear optimal control applicable to discrete-time economic systems. The present work is intended to fill this need from the standpoint of contemporary macroeconomic stabilization. The work is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 we demonstrate instru ment instability in an economic stabilization problem and thereby establish the motivation for our departure into the optimal control world. Chapter 2 provides fundamental concepts and propositions for controlling linear deterministic discrete-time systems, together with some economic applica tions and numerical methods. Our optimal control rules are in the form of feedback from known state variables of the preceding period. When state variables are not observable or are accessible only with observation errors, we must obtain appropriate proxies for these variables, which are called "observers" in deterministic cases or "filters" in stochastic circumstances. In Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, Luenberger observers and Kalman filters are discussed, developed, and applied in various directions. Noticing that a separation principle lies between observer (or filter) and controller (cf.

This book examines macroeconomic theory from an analytical framework provided by theories of complex systems, in contrast to conventional theories founded on aggregation. The resulting difference in analytical perspectives is huge: the macro level of society is not pursued through aggregation over micro entities. To the contrary, the micro-macro relation is treated as one of parts-to-whole, and this relation is approached from within an ecological scheme of thought. A society is a complex ecology of plans. That ecology, however, is not reducible to a single plan. Conventional macro theory presents a national economy as a collection of such aggregate variables as output, employment, investment, and a price level, and seeks to develop theoretical relationships among those variables. In contrast, the social-theoretic approach to macro or social theory in this book treats the standard macro variables as having been shaped through social institutions, conventions, and processes that in turn are generated through interaction among economizing persons. The object denoted as macro is thus of a higher order of complexity than the object denoted as micro.