Nuclear Weapons Arms Control And The Future Of Deterrence

This book contains papers presented at a conference held at the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in 1991. The papers reflect the spectrum of thought in the expert community that is likely to frame the policy debate over the future of nuclear deterrence. .

Are NATO’s mutual security commitments strong enough today to deter all adversaries? Is the nuclear umbrella as credible as it was during the Cold War? Backed by the full range of US and allied military capabilities, NATO’s mutual defense treaty has been enormously successful, but today’s commitments are strained by military budget cuts and antinuclear sentiment. The United States has also shifted its focus away from European security during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently with the Asia rebalance. Will a resurgent Russia change this? The Future of Extended Deterrence brings together experts and scholars from the policy and academic worlds to provide a theoretically rich and detailed analysis of post–Cold War nuclear weapons policy, nuclear deterrence, alliance commitments, nonproliferation, and missile defense in NATO but with implications far beyond. The contributors analyze not only American policy and ideas but also the ways NATO members interpret their own continued political and strategic role in the alliance. In-depth and multifaceted, The Future of Extended Deterrence is an essential resource for policy practitioners and scholars of nuclear deterrence, arms control, missile defense, and the NATO alliance.

This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges. Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War, the debate has entered a new phase, propelled by the post-Cold War transformations of the international political landscape. This volume--based on an exhaustive reexamination of issues addressed in The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (NRC, 1991)--describes the state to which U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The book evaluates a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy that includes further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it examines the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.

Rethinking the Unthinkable examines the future direction of nuclear arms control in the post-Cold War security environment. Believing that the new environment requires a radical rethinking of the purpose and role of nuclear weapons in international politics, the contributors address many fundamental issues influencing further US, Russian and European nuclear arms reductions. This volume is a product of the Project on Rethinking Arms Control, sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland.

Examining the future of nuclear deterrence in the 1990s and beyond, this book outlines aspects of the evolving strategic environment. It also projects the likely future of deterrence strategies and strategic force postures. Other topics, such as the Soviet nuclear doctrine are also covered.

The editors would like to express their thanks to a number of colleagues whose insights and comments contributed to the development of the book. Among those who were particularly helpful were Robert Nurick, Vic Utgoff, Mike Clarke, Jorg Baldouf, Jean Chabaud, John Roper, Edwina Moreton, Lawrence Freedman, Francois Heisbourg, and Harley Balzer. We are particularly grateful to General William Y. Smith, President of the Institute for Defense Analyses, for his intellectual encouragement.

This volume opens with an analysis of public opinion data which reveals that several common beliefs about public attitudes toward defense are myths. The public has not repudiated nuclear deterrence; public attitudes are quite stable, not volatile; and public opinion is not contradictory. Despite the politicization of nuclear weapons policy, this report explains, three key elements can be combined to form a national security strategy which could be supported by a consensus of experts and publics among the Western alliance. First, in terms of nuclear weapons, the focus of arms control negotiation should be redirected to enhancing stability at substantially lower numbers. In terms of conventional weapons, several initiatives should be undertaken. Also, civilian political leaders should begin a major, NATO based study on warning and decision-making. Furthermore, a consensus defense and arms control strategy should include restrictions on anti-satellite weapons and SDI. This volume is divided into five parts: Introduction; Stability and Change in Public Opinions about Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1987; Four Alternative National Security Futures; Lessons Learned from Examining Radical Changes; and Building Towards a Consensus. Co-published with the Aspen Strategy Group.