Nuclear Nonproliferation And Safety

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the dual role of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear materials under its supervision are not diverted to military purposes (safeguards). Since 1958, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its technical cooperation program, IAEA has provided technical assistance to its member states by supplying equipment, expert services, and training that support the upgrading or establishment of nuclear techniques and facilities. Although the United States does not receive technical assistance, it has been the leading financial donor to IAEA'5 technical cooperation program. In March 1997, we reported to you on IAEA's technical assistance for Cuba, including assistance for the partially completed Cuban nuclear power reactors whose construction is suspended. As requested, this report examines (1) the purpose and effectiveness of IAEA's technical cooperation program, (2) the cost of U.S. participation in IAEA'5 technical cooperation program, and (3) whether the United States ensures that the activities of IAEA's technical cooperation program do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals.

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs asked the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the safeguards and nuclear power plant safety programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report examines (1) the effectiveness of IAEA's safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) the management of U.S. technical assistance to the IAEA's safeguards program, and (3) the effectiveness of IAEA's program for advising United Nations (UN) member states about nuclear power plant safety and the adequacy of program funding. Under its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA is mandated to administer safeguards to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses. Because of limits on budget growth and unpaid contributions, IAEA has had difficulty funding the safeguards program. IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities or locations containing declared nuclear material, and manages a program for reviewing the operational safety of designated nuclear power plants. The U.S. technical assistance program for IAEA safeguards, overseen by an interagency coordinating committee, has enhanced the agency's inspection capabilities, however, some weaknesses still exist. Despite financial limitations, IAEA is meeting its basic safety advisory responsibilities for advising UN member states on nuclear safety and providing requested safety services. However, IAEA's program for reviewing the operational safety of nuclear power plants has not been fully effective because the program is voluntary and UN member states have not requested IAEA's review of all nuclear reactors with serious problems. GAO believes that IAEA should have more discretion in selecting reactors for review.

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Challenges Facing the International Atomic Energy Agency

The end of the Cold War left the U.S. with a surplus of weapons-grade plutonium, which poses proliferation and safety risks. Much of this material is found in a key nuclear weapon component known as a pit. The DoE plans to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for domestic nuclear reactors. To do so, two facilities are being constructed -- a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and a Waste Solidification Building. This report assessed the: (1) cost and schedule status of the construction projects; (2) status of NNSA's plans for pit disassembly and conversion; (3) status of NNSA's plans to obtain customers for MOX fuel; and (4) actions to provide independent nuclear safety oversight. Charts and tables.

This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements, considering scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities.