Nuclear Desire

Since its enactment in 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has become one node of a massive, sprawling, multibillion-dollar regime that is considered essential to slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. However, according to Shampa Biswas, these well-intentioned efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons deflect attention from a hierarchical global nuclear order dominated by powerful states and capitalist interests that benefit from the status quo. In Nuclear Desire, Biswas proposes that pursuit and production of nuclear power is sustained by this unequal global order whose persistent and daily harmful effects are experienced by some of the most vulnerable bodies around the world. Making a compelling case for nuclear abolition, she shows that the path to nuclear zero is more successfully traversed through the perspective of postcolonialism and the political economy of injustice?rather than through the prism of “security.” In the end, the nonproliferation regime maintains a hierarchy of haves and have-nots, one that reinforces inequalities that run counter to the NPT’s broader goal. Innovative, forcefully argued, and long overdue, Nuclear Desire moves beyond conventional critiques to give scholars and students of international relations new insights into how a more secure world might simultaneously be more peaceful and just.

Nuclear power is not clean, cheap, or safe. With Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, the nuclear industry's record of catastrophic failures now averages one major disaster every decade. After three US-designed plants exploded in Japan, many countries moved to abandon reactors for renewables. In the United States, however, powerful corporations and a compliant government still defend nuclear power-while promising billion-dollar bailouts to operators. Each new disaster demonstrates that the nuclear industry and governments lie to "avoid panic," to preserve the myth of "safe, clean" nuclear power, and to sustain government subsidies. Tokyo and Washington both covered up Fukushima's radiation risks and-when confronted with damning evidence-simply raised the levels of "acceptable" risk to match the greater levels of exposure. Nuclear Roulette dismantles the core arguments behind the nuclear-industrial complex's "Nuclear Renaissance." While some critiques are familiar-nuclear power is too costly, too dangerous, and too unstable-others are surprising: Nuclear Roulette exposes historic links to nuclear weapons, impacts on Indigenous lands and lives, and the ways in which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission too often takes its lead from industry, rewriting rules to keep failing plants in compliance. Nuclear Roulette cites NRC records showing how corporations routinely defer maintenance and lists resulting "near-misses" in the US, which average more than one per month. Nuclear Roulette chronicles the problems of aging reactors, uncovers the costly challenge of decommissioning, explores the industry's greatest seismic risks-not on California's quake-prone coast but in the Midwest and Southeast-and explains how solar flares could black out power grids, causing the world's 400-plus reactors to self-destruct. This powerful exposé concludes with a roundup of proven and potential energy solutions that can replace nuclear technology with a "Renewable Renaissance," combined with conservation programs that can cleanse the air, and cool the planet.

Too often, our focus on the relative handful of countries with nuclear weapons keeps us from asking an important question: Why do so many more states not have such weapons? More important, what can we learn from these examples of nuclear restraint? Maria Rost Rublee argues that in addition to understanding a state's security environment, we must appreciate the social forces that influence how states conceptualize the value of nuclear weapons. Much of what Rublee says also applies to other weapons of mass destruction, as well as national security decision making in general. The nuclear nonproliferation movement has created an international social environment that exerts a variety of normative pressures on how state elites and policymakers think about nuclear weapons. Within a social psychology framework, Rublee examines decision making about nuclear weapons in five case studies: Japan, Egypt, Libya, Sweden, and Germany. In each case, Rublee considers the extent to which nuclear forbearance resulted from persuasion (genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (the desire to maximize social benefits and/or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), or identification (the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). The book offers bold policy prescriptions based on a sharpened knowledge of the many ways we transmit and process nonproliferation norms. The social mechanisms that encourage nonproliferation-and the regime that created them-must be preserved and strengthened, Rublee argues, for without them states that have exercised nuclear restraint may rethink their choices.

"Nuclear weapons, since their conception, have been the subject of secrecy. In the months after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the American scientific establishment, the American government, and the American public all wrestled with what was called the "problem of secrecy," wondering not only whether secrecy was appropriate and effective as a means of controlling this new technology but also whether it was compatible with the country's core values. Out of a messy context of propaganda, confusion, spy scares, and the grave counsel of competing groups of scientists, what historian Alex Wellerstein calls a "new regime of secrecy" was put into place. It was unlike any other previous or since. Nuclear secrets were given their own unique legal designation in American law ("restricted data"), one that operates differently than all other forms of national security classification and exists to this day. Drawing on massive amounts of declassified files, including records released by the government for the first time at the author's request, Restricted Data is a narrative account of nuclear secrecy and the tensions and uncertainty that built as the Cold War continued. In the US, both science and democracy are pitted against nuclear secrecy, and this makes its history uniquely compelling and timely"--

A Fitting And Timely Contribution& To The Debate On Nuclear Proliferation&. At A Time When Worries About Energy Security And Nuclear Terrorism Are On Center Stage, This Book Provides A Helpful Look Back And A Thoughtful Examination Of What'S Ahead. The Honorable John Glenn, Former U. S. Senator A Scrupulously Balanced And Fair Collection Of Essays By World-Class Experts. In A World Threatened By Both Terrorism And Global Warming, This Book Will Deepen The Understanding Of Policymakers And Serious Students Alike On The Tough Choices Ahead. Bill Richardson, Former U.S. Secretary Of Energy, U. S. Representative To The United Nations, And Member Of Congress This Book Presents A Wide Range Of Expert Views And Is The Nuclear Control Institute'S Latest Contribution Toward Improving Safeguards For Our Nuclear Facilities And Preventing The Spread Of Nuclear Weapons. It Should Be Read By Those Who Desire To Evaluate Nuclear Power'S Proliferation Risks And Energy Benefits. Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee On Armed Services.(Published In Collaboration With Potomac Books, Inc. - Formerly Brassey S Inc.)

Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."

This book while comprehending the contemporary global security environment, offers a new roadmap for nuclear disarmament by creating a balance between deterrence supporters and disarmament advocators. The author identifies the divide between competing approaches such as traditional security-centric aspects and humanity-centered disarmament perspectives, tackling the complex question of how to balance some states’ requirements for effective nuclear deterrence with other states’ long-term desire for a nuclear-free world. The book explores how new technologies such as cyber and Artificial Intelligence advances are available to more countries than nuclear technology, and could level the playing field for weaker nuclear weapons states. It also looks into the issues which continue to be obstacles in the way of convincing the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament presented in this volume. The author argues that the gap between states' security needs and disarmament aspirations can be bridged by building a new roadmap and creating new security environment. This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars, researchers, policymakers, NGOs and members of the diplomatic community, in the fields of security studies, strategic studies and nuclear policy.

Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties. This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R.H. Burn) and has received much praise, including: “As advances in technology usher in a new age of weaponry, future negotiators would benefit from reading Rose Gottemoeller’s memoir of the process leading to the most significant arms control agreement of recent decades.” —Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State “Rose Gottemoeller’s book on the New START negotiations is the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia. These treaties played a key role in keeping the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union from breaking out into a civilization-ending war. But her story of the New START negotiation is no dry academic treatise. She tells with wit and charm the human story of the negotiators, as well as the critical issues involved. Rose’s book is an important and well-told story about the last nuclear treaty negotiated between the US and Russia.” —William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense “This book is important, but not just because it tells you about a very significant past, but also because it helps you understand the future.” — George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State

An informed look at the myths and fears surrounding nuclear energy, and a practical, politically realistic solution to global warming and our energy needs. Faced by the world's oil shortages and curious about alternative energy sources, Gwyneth Cravens skeptically sets out to find the truth about nuclear energy. Her conclusion: it is a totally viable and practical solution to global warming. In the end, we see that if we are to care for subsequent generations, embracing nuclear energy is an ethical imperative.