Normalizing Japan

'Normalizing Japan' discusses the future direction Japan's military policies are likely to take by considering how policy has evolved since the Second World War, and what factors shaped this evolution.

This book assesses the Sino-Japanese strategic competition in the context of the South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes. The South China Sea territorial disputes are quickly becoming the most significant security problem in East and Southeast Asia. Two major powers, China and Japan, have interests in the region and are pursuing different strategies that can significantly impact the outcome of the disputes. Utilizing Securitization Theory, this study evaluates the Sino-Japanese strategic competition through political narratives that galvanize the military and economic policies that are transforming the region. It highlights how these narratives, so closely bounded to the political legitimacy of current governments and supported by provocative policies, have resulted in a co-constitutive pattern of enmity and securitization, thus making it increasingly difficult to resolve the disputes.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has not sought to remilitarize, and its postwar constitution commits to renouncing aggressive warfare. Yet many inside and outside Japan have asked whether the country should or will return to commanding armed forces amid an increasingly challenging regional and global context and as domestic politics have shifted in favor of demonstrations of national strength. Tom Phuong Le offers a novel explanation of Japan’s reluctance to remilitarize that foregrounds the relationship between demographics and security. Japan’s Aging Peace demonstrates how changing perceptions of security across generations have culminated in a culture of antimilitarism that constrains the government’s efforts to pursue a more martial foreign policy. Le challenges a simple opposition between militarism and pacifism, arguing that Japanese security discourse should be understood in terms of “multiple militarisms,” which can legitimate choices such as the mobilization of the Japan Self-Defense Forces for peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions. Le highlights how factors that are not typically linked to security policy, such as aging and declining populations and gender inequality, have played crucial roles. He contends that the case of Japan challenges the presumption in international relations scholarship that states must pursue the use of force or be punished, showing how widespread normative beliefs have restrained Japanese policy makers. Drawing on interviews with policy makers, military personnel, atomic bomb survivors, museum coordinators, grassroots activists, and other stakeholders, as well as analysis of peace museums and social movements, Japan’s Aging Peace provides new insights for scholars of Asian politics, international relations, and Japanese foreign policy.

For decades after World War II, Japan chose to focus on soft power and economic diplomacy alongside a close alliance with the United States, eschewing a potential leadership role in regional and global security. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the rise of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's military capabilities have resurged. In this analysis of Japan's changing military policy, Andrew L. Oros shows how a gradual awakening to new security challenges has culminated in the multifaceted "security renaissance" of the past decade. Despite openness to new approaches, however, three historical legacies—contested memories of the Pacific War and Imperial Japan, postwar anti-militarist convictions, and an unequal relationship with the United States—play an outsized role. In Japan's Security Renaissance Oros argues that Japan's future security policies will continue to be shaped by these legacies, which Japanese leaders have struggled to address. He argues that claims of rising nationalism in Japan are overstated, but there has been a discernable shift favoring the conservative Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party. Bringing together Japanese domestic politics with the broader geopolitical landscape of East Asia and the world, Japan's Security Renaissance provides guidance on this century's emerging international dynamics.

In this thesis, I address two puzzles regarding Japan's security policy: (1) its minimalist military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the recent shift from this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of its international security role and military. I argue that although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state's rational response to external conditions in the international security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal contestation among "identity groups" with different visions of Japan's national identity and interest.

For decades, Japan's foreign policy has been seen by both internal and external observers as abnormal in relation to its size and level of sophistication. Japan as a 'Normal Country'? is a thematic and geographically comparative discussion of the unique limitations of Japanese foreign and defence policy. The contributors reappraise the definition of normality and ask whether Japan is indeed abnormal, what it would mean to become normal, and whether the country can—or should—become so. Identifying constraints such as an inflexible constitution, inherent antimilitarism, and its position as a U.S. security client, Japan as a 'Normal Country'? goes on to analyse factors that could make Japan a more effective regional and global player. These essays ultimately consider how Japan could leverage its considerable human, cultural, technological, and financial capital to benefit both its citizens and the world.

Incisive insights into the distinctive nature of Japanese foreign intelligence and grand strategy, its underlying norms, and how they have changed over time Japanese foreign intelligence is an outlier in many ways. Unlike many states, Japan does not possess a centralized foreign intelligence agency that dispatches agents abroad to engage in espionage. Japan is also notable for civilian control over key capabilities in human and signals intelligence. Japanese Foreign Intelligence and Grand Strategy probes the unique makeup of Japan's foreign intelligence institutions, practices, and capabilities across the economic, political, and military domains and shows how they have changed over time. Brad Williams begins by exploring how Japan’s experiences of the Second World War and its new role as a major US ally influenced its adoption of bilateralism, developmentalism, technonationalism, and antimilitarism as key norms. As a result, Japanese intelligence-gathering resources centered primarily around improving its position in the global economy throughout the Cold War. Williams then brings his analysis up to the Abe Era, examining how shifts in the international, regional, and domestic policy environments in the twenty-first century have caused a gradual reassessment of national security strategy under former prime minister Shinzo Abe. As Japan reevaluates its old norms in light of regional security challenges, the book concludes by detailing how the country is beginning to rethink the size, shape, and purpose of its intelligence community. Anyone interested in Japanese intelligence, security, or international relations will welcome this important contribution to our understanding of the country's intelligence capabilities and strategy.

This open access book assesses the profound impact of Japan’s aspirations to become a great power on Japanese security, democracy and foreign relations. Rather than viewing the process of normalization and rejuvenation as two decades of remilitarization in face of rapidly changing strategic environment and domestic political circumstances, this volume contextualizes Japan’s contemporary international relations against the longer grain of Japanese historical interactions. It demonstrates that policies and statecraft in the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s era are a continuation of a long, unbroken and arduous effort by successive generations of leaders to preserve Japanese autonomy, enhance security and advance Japanese national interests. Arguing against the notion that Japan cannot work with China as long as the US-Japan alliance is in place, the book suggests that Tokyo could forge constructive relations with Beijing by engaging China in joint projects in and outside of the Asia-Pacific in issue areas such as infrastructure development or in the provision of international public goods. It also submits that an improvement in Japan-China relations would enhance rather than detract Japan-US relations and that Tokyo will find that her new found autonomy in the US-Japan alliance would not only accord her more political respect and strategic latitude, but also allow her to ameliorate the excesses of American foreign policy adventurism, paving for her to become a truly normal great power.

This book analyzes Ohira's ideology, philosophy, and actions as a politician and a minister, based on primary sources from Japan and the USA, and makes a significant contribution to the field of Japanese political and diplomatic history. This book is the first critical biography to chart Masayoshi Ohira’s life and work, with a focus on his political philosophy, and how he sought to create a new order in the Asia-Pacific region, framing a plan for solidarity across the Pacific Rim. If a statesman is a politician who has made diplomacy their life's work, then Ohira can be regarded as the first Japanese statesman of the modern era. While this ambition remained unfulfilled, Ohira's involvement in foreign policy was long and intensive—and highly influential—on the region. One of only two postwar prime ministers to have served as foreign minister for two terms, he attempted to balance the pursuit of a new order in the Pacific Rim with Asian diplomacy and focused on cooperation with the USA without becoming overly reliant on it. With the new availability of original documents decades after his death, this book has become possible, enabling the author to systematically follow and record Ohira's diplomatic vision. Combining history, political philosophy, political science, and international relations, this book is of appeal to history scholars and students of Japan, as well as of the foreign relations of countries such as the USA, China, and Korea.