Normalization Policies With Cuba

Description For more than 50 years the United States has attempted to destabilize and isolate the Castro regime in Cuba with the use of trade and financial sanctions, a policy that has fallen short of its objective. In this Policy Analysis, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Barbara Kotschwar suggest that the sands of time may accomplish what economic pressure did not. Raúl Castro, president of Cuba since 2008, plans to step down at the end of 2018, implying a new regime in five years. Various forces are starting to emerge favoring economic normalization if Cuba appears ready to change its policies as well as its leadership. The authors caution, however, that a unilateral dismantling of US sanctions without insuring that proper institutions are in place in Cuba could squander a golden opportunity for US companies. They argue that a new US-Cuba relationship must entail a lifting of Cuba's barriers to trade and investment, liberalization of its economy, and the adoption of democratic institutions. They offer a roadmap for a future US-Cuba rapprochement.

This book examines the evolution of Cuba's foreign relations since the demise of the USSR. It is divided into three sections: the first examines the nature of economic and political change that has taken place in Cuba in the last three years; the second analyzes the evolution of Cuban international relations, which have flourished in recent years; the final section examines the nature of the impasse in bilateral relations with the USA and offers some suggestions to resolve the difficulties.

History is being made in U.S.-Cuban relations. Now in paperback and updated to tell the real story behind the stunning December 17, 2014, announcement by President Obama and President Castro of their move to restore full diplomatic relations, this powerful book is essential to understanding ongoing efforts toward normalization in a new era of engagement. Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual conflict and aggression between the United States and Cuba since 1959, Back Channel to Cuba chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh here present a remarkably new and relevant account, describing how, despite the intense political clamor surrounding efforts to improve relations with Havana, negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a new approach, LeoGrande and Kornbluh uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. They reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, that provides the historical foundation for the dramatic breakthrough in U.S.-Cuba ties.

Ban-US Relations

"What explains normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and Cuba? The purpose of this thesis is to outline and analyze the causes of normalization between the United States government and the Cuban government. The aim is to find the key actors and factors which contributed to the normalization process to move forward at this point in history and provided the ability to progress. Three separate levels of analysis will be addressed: whether they fell under individual, nation-state, or international system influence on the normalization process. In conjunction with the three levels of analysis, three overarching issues played an extensive role in how each level of analysis would unfold. The key issues surrounded the topics of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, the reforms of President Raúl Castro, and the establishment of democratically elected democracies throughout Latin America. As the research revealed, individual factors showed to have the weakest influence on the process, while both nation-state and international factors displayed a much greater degree of influence. Some influences played a more positive role, attempting to anastomose the relations of the U.S. and Cuba back to a diplomatic state. Other influences were resolved in assuring the U.S.-Cuba relationship would remain bifurcated. Those against a U.S.-Cuba reconciliation appeared to be overabundantly standing on the wrong side of the discussion."--

U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba date back to the early 1960s when the Cuban government under Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and aligned with the Soviet Union. The trade embargo was first imposed in 1962 under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trading with the Enemy Act and soon broadened to include a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba. In 1963, the Department of the Treasury issued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR); they remain the main body of embargo regulations today, and have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. In addition, since Cuba is an embargoed country, all exports to Cuba must be authorized by the Department of Commerce as implemented through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Over the years, Congress enacted additional laws that strengthened the embargo on Cuba, including the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (which codified the embargo regulations), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. Congress also has enacted numerous other provisions of law that impose sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support from the international financial institutions. In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from the long-standing sanctions-based policy toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The shift included three major components: the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In order to implement the third policy component, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations (CACR and EAR) five times, most recently in October 2016, in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services. When the President announced his policy change on Cuba, he acknowledged that he did not have authority to lift the embargo because it is codified in legislation. Moreover, the LIBERTAD Act ties the lifting of the embargo to conditions in Cuba, including that the country has a democratically elected government. Lifting the overall economic embargo would require amending or repealing the LIBERTAD Act as well as other statutes that have provisions impeding normal economic relations with Cuba. President Trump announced his Administration's policy on Cuba on June 16, 2017, which partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration's effort to normalize relations with Cuba. Although the President leaves most Obama-era policy changes in place, two significant changes include restrictions on financial transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel; and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. These changes require the Treasury and Commerce Departments to amend the CACR and EAR. This report provides information on legislative provisions restricting relations with Cuba. It lists the various provisions of law comprising economic sanctions on Cuba, including key laws that are the statutory basis of the embargo, and provides information on the authority to lift or waive the restrictions.

At the end of President Barack Obama's second term, it seemed that the U.S. and Cuba might be on track to normalize relations after five decades of cold war animus. These hopes appeared dashed, however, by the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which brought to power a candidate that campaigned on undoing Obama's signature policies, including the rapprochement with Cuba. Several years into the Trump administration there are still several pathways that these two neighboring countries could take to either continue the rapprochement, extend the status quo, or drift further apart. Although it is not entirely clear which direction the bilateral relationship will take, given the varied and divergent political pressures that drive each of the two nations, it is clear that several key opportunities and challenges await them. Drawing insight from the political, economic, and legal spheres, this book examines possible pathways for the two cold war adversaries. Key among the issues that demand attention are unresolved property claims dating back to the 1959 revolution, establishing regularized bilateral economic relationships in multiple sectors of the economy, as well as addressing a variety of legal and political constraints in both Cuba and the United States. This volume tackles these issues by drawing on the expertise of scholars in three distinct fields--political science, economics, and law--while positing viable policy choices and the opportunities and challenges found therein.

Cuba's economy has not only survived the end of Soviet-era subsidies but has thrived in the era of globalization. This thesis documents the adjustments the Cuban government has made to the economy and the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) that has occurred as a result. The thesis also shows how China, Venezuela and Iran continue to invest more money in the island and subsequently threaten to wield more influence over Cuba. The U.S. has the opportunity to mitigate the threats posed by Venezuela and Iran vis-à-vis Cuba. However, the policy espoused by current policy makers is logically flawed. The Helms-Burton Act contains unrealistic benchmarks for ending the embargo that provide little incentive for Cuban leaders to liberalize. Neither presidential candidate advocates a change in this legislation. In contrast, this thesis argues that the normalization of relations with Cuba can diminish the influence Iran and Venezuela have on Cuba and keep potential threats from coming ninety miles off the coast of the U.S. The next president should call for Congress to repeal the Helms-Burton Act so that executive discretion can be exercised with respect to Cuban foreign policy.