Norm Compliance In An Uncertain World

In many situations, social norms govern behavior. While the existence of a norm may be clear to someone entering the situation, it is often less clear precisely what behavior is required in order to comply with the norm. We investigate how people react to uncertainty about the prevailing norm using a modified version of the dictator game. Since the behavioral effects of social norms are tightly linked to the degree of anonymity in a situation, we also vary the extent to which subjects' behavior is observable. We find that when behavior is anonymous, uncertainty about which norm guides partners reduces aggregate norm compliance. However, when others can observe behavior, introducing a small degree of norm uncertainty increases aggregate norm compliance. This implies that norm uncertainty may actually facilitate interaction as long as behavior is observable and uncertainty is sufficiently small. We also document that reactions to norm uncertainty are heterogeneous with one group of people reacting to norm uncertainty by increasing compliance (over-compliers), while another group reacts by reducing compliance (under-compliers). The main effect of increased observability operates through the intensive margin of the under-compliers; they reduce their negative reaction to norm uncertainty when their actions become more visible.

This book examines the implementation of, the spread of, and compliance with emerging global norms. Based on empirical country studies on the implementation of transparency norms defined by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) – a multi-stakeholder process seeking to promote global standards for the transparent and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources –, it investigates the various factors and motivations affecting actors with regard to norm compliance. The book demonstrates that compliance with global norms depends on a combination of various factors, including motivations and conditions for introducing norms into the domestic political space; local actors’ level of commitment to the norm; and their capacity for norm compliance. Given its scope, the book will appeal to all international relations scholars interested in processes of norm localisation, compliance, and contestation.

The studies in this book concern the nature of international law, how it is and is not constituted, and whether commitments that are legally binding can change the behaviour of states as well as or better than non-binding legal norms do.

Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance produces an in-depth analysis of the functioning of various labor market institutions in both the USA and Germany. Particular emphasis is given to the substantial differences between the US and Germany in the ways important areas are regulated. The authors show that the impact of institutions on economic performance is ambivalent. They argue that in this sense, the decision is not one between regulation and deregulation but rather one between different degrees and forms of regulation.

This Brief uses the theory of norm contestation as a model for understanding variation in norm-related behavior in international relations. While most typical approaches to understanding norms view norms as stable structures and actor responses to them as unquestioned, in a global political climate where departures from expected behavior may occur, a more nuanced model is needed. By using a norm contestation framework that highlights norm fluidity and actor agency, this book expands the discussion, providing insight into divergent interpretations of norm violation and compliance and the dynamic nature of norms. The first two chapters introduce the norm contestation model, explain how it contributes to the literature on norm violations, and discuss the reasons for the cases discussed. Chapters Three and Four provide detailed case studies of the mechanisms of norm contestation as they apply to the civilian immunity and non-intervention norms. Chapter Five concludes by reconnecting the norm contestation model to the case studies and describing how it can be applied to norms other than those regulating armed conflict. It also discusses policy implications and avenues for future research. As such, this book will appeal to students and researchers working broadly on issues related to international relations theory, armed conflict, security studies, humanitarianism, human rights, international law, and global governance. It will also be of interest to policy-makers and practitioners interested in influencing the normative behavior of actors in diverse arenas.

Applying a social-constructivist approach to her richly detailed case history, Audie Jeanne Klotz demonstrates that normative standards such as racial equality can serve as much more than a weak constraint on fundamental strategic concerns. Norms can play a crucial role in the formation of global policy. After forty years of protest against apartheid, the world celebrated Nelson Mandela's inauguration as South Africa's first democratically elected president. Klotz considers why racial discrimination in South Africa became a global concern and why—in a remarkable change of practice—nations and international organizations adopted sanctions against the Pretoria regime. By explaining how the world community actively came to condemn apartheid, Norms in International Relations contributes to broader debates on the role of norms in global politics. Klotz rehearses a fascinating history, combining the power politics of economic sanctions and the normative politics of racial equality. She reenacts the events that resulted in the United Nations decision to oppose apartheid. The author also analyzes anti-apartheid activism in the British Commonwealth and in the Organization of African Unity, and she documents changing attitudes toward South African racial separateness in the United States, Britain, and Zimbabwe.

Initially, introducing compliance functions within the financial industry had been forced by regulatory scrutiny. Later, it started to spread to other regulated companies, in particular those publicly listed. Now, compliance has become an asset of corporates that want to build their reliability among clients, shareholders, employees and business partners. This book looks at the efficiency of the compliance measures introduced and the best practices of building compliance norms. This recently observed practice of compliance was triggered by the expectation of regulators, shareholders, clients, business partners and the public for robust compliance mechanisms. This book looks at the vast interest in this topic among business people who strive to introduce the systems and the mechanisms of non-compliance risk management in their companies and at the uncountable difficulties and obstacles they meet. The book fills the gap of thorough analysis of this subject by pointing out the solutions successfully introduced in global financial organizations, and would be of interest to academics, researchers and practitioners in corporate finance, corporate governance and risk management.

What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and nonlegal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But he also argues that the proper regulation of social norms is a delicate and complex task, and that current understanding of social norms is inadequate for guiding judges and lawmakers. What is needed, and what this book offers, is a model of the relationship between law and social norms. The model shows that people's concern with establishing cooperative relationships leads them to engage in certain kinds of imitative behavior. The resulting behavioral patterns are called social norms. Posner applies the model to several areas of law that involve the regulation of social norms, including laws governing gift-giving and nonprofit organizations; family law; criminal law; laws governing speech, voting, and discrimination; and contract law. Among the engaging questions posed are: Would the legalization of gay marriage harm traditional married couples? Is it beneficial to shame criminals? Why should the law reward those who make charitable contributions? Would people vote more if non-voters were penalized? The author approaches these questions using the tools of game theory, but his arguments are simply stated and make no technical demands on the reader.

Influential writers on international law and international relations explore the making, interpretation and enforcement of international law.