Nl Arms Netherlands Annual Review Of Military Studies 2020

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.

Chapter 1. Introduction.- Part I. Concepts of Deterrence (Evolution, Rediscovery, Conventional, Nuclear, Cross-domain).- Chapter 2. Understanding Deterrence.- Chapter 3. Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia.- Chapter 4. The Continuing Relevance of Conventional Deterrence.- Chapter 5. Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?.- Chapter 6. The US and Extended Deterrence.- Chapter 7. Deterrence by Punishment or Denial: The EFP Case.- Chapter 8. The Essence of Cross-domain Deterrence.- Part II. Non-Western Concepts of Deterrence.- Chapter 9. Deterrence à la Ruse: Its Uniqueness, Sources and Implications.- Chapter 10. An Overview of Chinese Thinking about Characteristics of Deterrence.- Chapter 11. Japanese Concepts of Deterrence.- Chapter 12. Deterrence (In)stability between India and Pakistan.- Chapter 13. Iran's Syria Strategy.- Chapter 14. The Evolution of Deterrence.- Part III. Deterrence of Non-State Actors.- Chapter 15. Deterring Violent Non-State Actors.- Chapter 16. All Deterrence is Local: The Utility and Application of Localised Deterrence in Counterinsurgency.- Chapter 17. "This has triggered a civil war" Russian Deterrence of Democratic Revolts.- Chapter 18. Deterrence in Peace Operations.- Part IV.- New Instruments and Domains of Deterrence.- Chapter 19. Sanctions and Deterrence: Targeted Sanctions.- Chapter 20. Deterrence, Resilience and the Shooting Down of Flight MH17.- Chapter 21. Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, and Future.- Chapter 22. New Technologies and Deterrence: Artificial Intelligence and Adversarial Behaviour.- Part V Rationality, Psychology and Emotions.- Chapter 23. Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age: Game Theory Revisited.- Chapter 24. What's on the Human Mind? Decision Theory and Deterrence.- Chapter 25. Deterrence: A Continuation of Emotional Life with the Admixture of Violent Means.- Chapter 26. The Missing Component in Deterrence Theory: The Legal Framework.- Conclusion: Insights from Theory and Practice.

Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT) Master Programme -- 1.2.1 Focus of the MSc Programme on CIIMT -- 1.2.2 Learning Styles and Structure of the MSc Programme on CIIMT -- 1.3 Outline of NL ARMS 2021 -- References -- 2 Economics of Arms Trade: What Do We Know? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Research Methodology -- 2.2.1 Scope -- 2.2.2 Selection -- 2.2.3 Research Synthesis -- 2.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction -- 2.3.1 Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements -- 2.3.2 Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset -- 2.3.3 Research on Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Do We Know? -- 2.4 Major Weapon Systems -- 2.4.1 The Gravity of Arms -- 2.4.2 Arming the Embargoed -- 2.4.3 Arms Production, National Defence Spending and Arms Trade -- 2.4.4 Trading Arms and the Demand for Military Expenditure -- 2.4.5 Arm Your Friends and Save on Defence? -- 2.4.6 Network Interdependencies and the Evolution of the International Arms Trade -- 2.4.7 Research into Major Weapon Systems: What Do We Know? -- 2.5 Small Arms and Light Weapons -- 2.5.1 Weaponomics, the Economics of Small Arms -- 2.5.2 Research into Small Arms and Light Weapons: What Do We Know? -- 2.6 Dual-Use Goods -- 2.6.1 Exporting Weapons of Mass Destruction? -- 2.6.2 Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civil Nuclear Cooperation -- 2.6.3 Research into Dual-Use Goods: What Do We Know? -- 2.7 Analysis -- 2.8 Conclusion: An Agenda for Research -- References -- 3 Export Control Regimes-Present-Day Challenges and Opportunities -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Export Control Regimes -- 3.2.1 The Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral Export Controls -- 3.2.2 Regimes and Treaties -- 3.2.3 Characteristics Regimes.

For decades, the rational actor model served as the preferred guide for U.S. deterrence policy. It has been a convenient and comforting guide because it requires little detailed knowledge of an opponent’s unique decision-making process and yet typically provides confident generalizations about how deterrence works. The model tends to postulate common decision-making parameters across the globe to reach generalizations about how deterrence will function and the types of forces that will be "stabilizing" or "destabilizing." Yet a broad spectrum of unique factors can influence an opponent’s perceptions and his calculations, and these are not easily captured by the rational actor model. The absence of uniformity means there can be very few deterrence generalizations generated by the use of the rational actor model that are applicable to the entire range of opponents. Understanding Deterrence considers how factors such as psychology, history, religion, ideology, geography, political structure, culture, proliferation and geopolitics can shape a leadership’s decision-making process, in ways that are specific and unique to each opponent. Understanding Deterrence demonstrates how using a multidisciplinary approach to deterrence analysis can better identify and assess factors that influence an opponent’s decision-making process. This identification and assessment process can facilitate the tailoring of deterrence strategies to specific purposes and result in a higher likelihood of success than strategies guided by the generalizations about opponent decision-making typically contained in the rational actor model. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.

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With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.