Naval Accidents 1945 88

Dette er et engelsk værk omhandlende følgende uheldskategorier i de omtalte flåder, nemlig: Brand og eksplosioner, grundstødninger, kollisioner, materiel- og strukturelle nedbrud, skibsvæfts- og doksætningsuheld, beskydning af egne styrker og ukendte årsager. Bogen behandler rigtigt mange, men dog ikke alle dokumenterede større uheld. Således behandles f. eks. ikke minelæggeren FYENs alvorlige grundstødning i Boknafjorden. Til slut behandles overlevelses- og rednings- samt bjærgningsvirksomhed. Et oplysende værk for især skibschefer og teknikofficerer.

Ten years after the close of World War II, the U.S. Navy published a chronology of its operations in the war. Long out of print, the work focused on what were then defined as critical and decisive events. It ignored a multitude of combat actions as well as the loss or damage of many types of U.S. ships and craft—particularly auxiliaries, amphibious ships, and district craft—and entirely omitted the U.S. submarine campaign against Japanese shipping, This greatly expanded and updated study, now available in paperback with an index, goes far beyond the original work, drawing on information from more than forty additional years of historical research and writing. Massive, but well organized, it addresses operational aspects of the U.S. Navy’s war in every theater.

USS Franklin CV-13 ...also known as the ship that would not die. 1-1This is a long report. An effort has been made to present a comprehensive summation of the many design and damage control problems which were disclosed or emphasized by the war experiences of Franklin. In addition, various pertinent war experiences of other large carriers have been considered in this report. 1-2The damage sustained by Franklin as a result of the actions of 13 and 15 October 1944 was superficial and is included in this report only for the purpose of rendering her damage history complete. The major damage sustained in each of the actions of 30 October 1944 and 19 March 1945 demonstrates the effectiveness of bomb hits when received by aircraft carriers during the extremely vulnerable period just prior to and during periods of launching strikes. The damage sustained on 30 October is a reasonably good example of what may be expected from a suicide plane crash and subsequent fire on a carrier having a full complement of planes on board which are gassed but not armed except for small caliber ammunition. Similarly, the damage sustained on 19 March may be considered as about the maximum to be expected from fires and detonations of large numbers of bombs and rockets on the flight and hangar decks when a carrier having heavily armed, fully fueled planes aboard is hit by one or more bombs properly placed. 1-3The latter two cases of damage to Franklin illustrate thoroughly the ability of modern U.S. aircraft carriers to survive extensive damage from plane crashes, fire and heavy bombs. The basic design and construction of this class of carrier, which was developed prior to World War II and therefore without the benefit of war experience, is favorably reflected in the manner in which Franklin absorbed heavy damage. Materiel alterations and improvements in damage control organization and technique during the war further increased the ability of this class carrier to minimize potentially severe damage. At the same time many lessons have been obtained from the experiences of Franklin and other cases of war damage and results of this knowledge have been and will be incorporated in existing ships where feasible and in future design and construction. 1-4This report is based on the references, inspections of Franklin upon her return to this country, and informal interviews with various officers attached to Franklin by representatives of this Bureau.

[Includes 23 maps and 31 illustrations] This volume describes two campaigns that the Germans conducted in their Northern Theater of Operations. The first they launched, on 9 April 1940, against Denmark and Norway. The second they conducted out of Finland in partnership with the Finns against the Soviet Union. The latter campaign began on 22 June 1941 and ended in the winter of 1944-45 after the Finnish Government had sued for peace. The scene of these campaigns by the end of 1941 stretched from the North Sea to the Arctic Ocean and from Bergen on the west coast of Norway, to Petrozavodsk, the former capital of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. It faced east into the Soviet Union on a 700-mile-long front, and west on a 1,300-mile sea frontier. Hitler regarded this theater as the keystone of his empire, and, after 1941, maintained in it two armies totaling over a half million men. In spite of its vast area and the effort and worry which Hitler lavished on it, the Northern Theater throughout most of the war constituted something of a military backwater. The major operations which took place in the theater were overshadowed by events on other fronts, and public attention focused on the theaters in which the strategically decisive operations were expected to take place. Remoteness, German security measures, and the Russians’ well-known penchant for secrecy combined to keep information concerning the Northern Theater down to a mere trickle, much of that inaccurate. Since the war, through official and private publications, a great deal more has become known. The present volume is based in the main on the greatest remaining source of unexploited information, the captured German military and naval records. In addition a number of the participants on the German side have very generously contributed from their personal knowledge and experience.

Military government on Okinawa from the first stages of planning until the transition toward a civil administration.