Napoleons Cavalry A Key Element To Decisive Victory

Napoleon’s rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon’s army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon’s operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry’s impact on Napoleon’s operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon’s cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Napoleon's rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon's army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon's operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry's impact on Napoleon's operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon's cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Napoleon's rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon's army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon's operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry's impact on Napoleon's operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon's cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Napoleon's rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon's army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon's operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry's impact on Napoleon's operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well- trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon's cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Napoleon's rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon's army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon's operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry's impact on Napoleon's operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon's cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.

Dressed in outrageously romantic uniforms and led by a flamboyant clique of aristocrats and ex-troopers, Napoleon's cavalry fought in Austria, Germany, Egypt, Italy, Poland, Belgium, and Spain. This account of the most remarkable and successful cavalry in history is the culmination of 30 years of research.

Tracing Napoleon's development as both a general and statesman, distinguished historian James Marshall-Cornwall brings to life the career of one of history's greatest military strategists. Focusing on the two decades during which Napoleon achieved his greatest triumphs and suffered his most heartbreaking defeats, this thoroughly researched study keenly analyzes how, like Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon combined strategy and statecraft throughout his career. From his most brilliant campaigns-in particular his conquest of Piedmont and his triumphant invasion of Italy-to the disasters at Trafalgar, in the Iberian Peninsula, in Russia, at Leipzig, and his final downfall at Waterloo, Napoleon as Military Commander tells the story of a general whose defeats were as remarkable as his victories.