Multiple Equilibria Contagion And The Emerging Market Crises

The paper surveys the types of models producing multiple equilibria in financial markets. It argues that such models are consistent with observed phenomena, such as the greater volatility of financial asset prices than of macroeconomic fundamentals. Alternative explanations are compared with the stylized facts concerning capital flows, portfolio shifts, and exchange rate crises. Implications for crisis prediction and prevention are then discussed.

Several concepts of contagion are distinguished. It is argued that only models that admit of multiple equilibria are capable of producing true contagion. A simple balance of payments model is presented to illustrate that phenomenon, and some back-of-the-envelope calculations assess its relevance to the coincidence of emerging market crises in 1994–95 and in 1997.

The essays in this volume analyze causes of financial crises in emerging markets and different policy responses.

Several concepts of contagion are distinguished. It is argued that only models that admit of multiple equilibria are capable of producing true contagion. A simple balance of payments model is presented to illustrate that phenomenon, and some back-of-the-envelope calculations assess its relevance to the coincidence of emerging market crises in 1994-1995 and in 1997.

The entire difference between a mild downturn and a devastating crisis is the occurrence of sharp fire sales of domestic assets and possibly foreign exchange and the ensuing collapse in the balance sheets of both the financial and nonfinancial sector. Why and how do such crises materialize? And why doesn’t the private sector take appropriate precautions to avoid the consequences of crises? In this paper we argue that the combination of weak international financial links and underdeveloped domestic financial markets offers a parsimonious account of these and related phenomena present in emerging markets.

Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, prepared by Warsaw-based Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), discusses various aspects of currency crises in emerging-market economies: The definitions and theoretical models of currency crises, the causes, management and propagation (contagion effect) of crises, their economic, social and policy consequences, the role of international financial institutions, and crisis prevention. In addition, five case studies of currency crises in Central and Eastern Europe are presented.

This book aims to integrate the notions of contagion in epidemiology and contagion in financial market crises to discover why emerging markets are so susceptible to financial crises. The author first provides a brief introduction of the contagious spill-over of recent financial market crises and models the pattern of these crises. He finds that the contagion between crises in emerging markets, such as that of the crises in Russia and Brazil in 1998-1999, is explicable, despite the fact that at first sight they appear to have little in common. Finally, Friedrich Sell integrates these findings to outline a proposal for a 'new international financial architecture'.

The recent global financial crisis was the first in recent history that was triggered by problems in the financial system of the mature economies. Existing work on financial crisis in emerging market countries, however, almost exclusively focus on the role of financial frictions in the domestic economy. In contrast, we propose a two-country DSGE model to investigate the transmission of a global financial crisis that originates from financial frictions in the rest of the world. We find that the scale of financial spillovers from the global to the domestic economy and trade openness are key determinants of the severity of the financial crisis for the domestic economy. Our results also suggest that the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy regimes is determined by the degree of financial contagion, the degree of trade openness as well as the scale of foreign currency denominated debt in the domestic economy.