Morality And Rational Choice

Public controversies - such as those about the distribution of goods between rich and poor, trade and population policies, allocation of medical resources, and the tradeoff between environment al protection and economic efficiency - often hinge on fundamental views about how we ought to make decisions tImt affect each other, that is, what principles we ought to follow. Efforts to find an acceptable public philosophy, a set of such principles on which people might agree, have foundered because of dis agreement among philosophers and others who are concerned with such issues. One view, which I shall develop and defend here, holds that decisions that affect others should be made according to an overall evaluation of the consequences of each option. This consequentialist view is opposed by a variety of alternatives, but many of the alternatives have in COlllmon a basis in moral intuition. To take a simple example, consequentialism holds that, other things equal, if we have decided that it is better to let a terminally ill patient die than to prolong her agony by keeping her alive, then we ought to kill her.

Is it rational to be moral? How do rationality and morality fit together with being human? These questions are at the heart of David Schmidtz's exploration of the connections between rationality and morality. This inquiry leads into both metaethics and rational choice theory, as Schmidtz develops conceptions of what it is to be moral and what it is to be rational. He defends a fairly expansive conception of rational choice, considering how ends as well as means can be rationally chosen and explaining the role of self-imposed constraints in a rational life plan. His moral theory is dualistic, ranging over social structure as well as personal conduct and building both individual and collective rationality into its rules of recognition for morals. To the "why be moral" question, Schmidtz responds that being moral is rational, but he does not assume we have reasons to be rational. Instead, Schmidtz argues that being moral is rational in a particular way and that beings like us in situations like ours have reasons to be rational in just that way. This approach allows him to identify decisive reasons to be moral; at the same time, it explains why immorality is as prevalent as it is. This book thus offers a set of interesting and realistic conclusions about how morality fits into the lives of humanly rational agents operating in an institutional context like our own.

In this book the author argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. According to the usual view of choice, a rational person selects what is likely to give the greatest expectation of value or utility. But in many situations, if each person chooses in this way, everyone will be worse off than need be. Instead, Professor Gauthier proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of co-operation, rather than according to what would give the individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice did not have that end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, the author establishes morals on the firm foundation of reason.

These essays focus on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of rational choice and evolution. It links questions like ""is it rational to be moral?"" to the evolution of co-operation, and uses models from game theory, evolutionary biology and cognitive science.

The attempt to justify morality comes from our concern about how we should live. It intends to tell us what we should do by showing that there are reasons for doing it. This dissertation examines how we can succeed in justifying morality rationally after investigating what it is to provide a rational basis for 'being moral' and why we seek to do it. We find in the theory of rational choice a framework which is very useful for the justification of morality. However, an examination of projects based on rational choice theory reveals that even if one adopts that framework, he is doomed to failure if he interprets reason only instrumentally. Non-instrumental rationality is primarily concerned with the rationality of ends, which can be construed in terms of Kant's conception of practical reason. With help of the rational choice framework understood non-instrumentally we can make clear how reason motivates us to moral actions and why we should follow reason.

The links between self-interest and morality have been examined in moral philosophy since Plato. Economics is a mostly value-free discipline, having lost its original ethical dimension as described by Adam Smith. Examining moral philosophy through the framework provided by economics offers new insights into both disciplines and the discussion on the origins and nature of morality. The Morality of Economic Behaviour: Economics as Ethics argues that moral behaviour does not need to be exogenously encouraged or enforced because morality is a side effect of interactions between self-interested agents. The argument relies on two important parameters: behaviour in a social environment and the effects of intertemporal choice on rational behaviour. Considering social structures and repeated interactions on rational maximisation allows an argument for the morality of economic behaviour. Amoral agents interacting within society can reach moral outcomes. Thus, economics becomes a synthesis of moral and rational choice theory bypassing the problems of ethics in economic behaviour whilst promoting moral behaviour and ethical outcomes. This approach sheds new light on practical issues such as economic policy, business ethics and social responsibility. This book is of interest primarily to students of politics, economics and philosophy but will also appeal to anyone who is interested in morality and ethics, and their relationship with self-interest.

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (1986) is the most complete and suggestive contractarian theory of morality since the work of Rawls. In this anthology a number of prominent moral and political philosophers offer a critical assessment of Gauthier's theory and its three main projects: developing a contractarian foundation for morality, defending a theory of rational choice, and supporting the claim that rationality requires one to keep one's agreements. An introduction sets out Gauthier's project, while Gauthier himself has the last word, responding to the critiques. This collection will interest moral and political philosophers, social theorists, and specialists in the philosophy and theory of law as well as management sciences.

In this book Joseph Heath brings Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as a specific type. In the second part of the book Heath discusses the more philosophical dimension of Habermas's conception of practical rationality. He criticizes Habermas's attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishing between moral and ethical problems. Heath offers an alternative account of the level of convergence exhibited by moral argumentation, drawing on game-theoretic models to specify the burden of proof that the theory of communicative action and discourse must assume.

Why be moral? Philosophers have wanted to answer this question for well over two thousand years, ever since Plato wrote on the subject. The question turned out to be as frustrating as it is compelling. A proper philosophical answer begins by saying what morality is, and what it means to be moral. A wise philosophical answer also steps back to ask what sort of being wants an answer. Why are we asking? Who wants to know? What do we want, and in what way might being moral serve our purposes? What difference does it make whether we have any reason to be moral? Do we have reason to care whether other people have any reason to be moral? Why? In this book, David Schmidtz presents elements of a theory of humanly rational choice: why we have reason to be rational, why being rational about the big picture seldom involves maximizing our payoff on a day to day basis, how rational agents choose ends, and why rational agents choose to respect and care about other people. Schmidtz also presents elements of a theory of morality: how being moral connects to what is good for oneself and to what is good for others, how it connects to following rules and understanding what the people around us expect from us, and how it connects to the heights of human aspiration and flourishing.