Monetary Hegemony

This book is a comprehensive study of cooperation among the advanced capitalist countries. Can cooperation persist without the dominance of a single power, such as the United States after World War II? To answer this pressing question, Robert Keohane analyzes the institutions, or "international regimes," through which cooperation has taken place in the world political economy and describes the evolution of these regimes as American hegemony has eroded. Refuting the idea that the decline of hegemony makes cooperation impossible, he views international regimes not as weak substitutes for world government but as devices for facilitating decentralized cooperation among egoistic actors. In the preface the author addresses the issue of cooperation after the end of the Soviet empire and with the renewed dominance of the United States, in security matters, as well as recent scholarship on cooperation.

With American leadership facing increased competition from China and India, the question of how hegemons emerge—and are able to create conditions for lasting stability—is of utmost importance in international relations. The generally accepted wisdom is that liberal superpowers, with economies based on capitalist principles, are best able to develop systems conducive to the health of the global economy. In Birth of Hegemony, Andrew C. Sobel draws attention to the critical role played by finance in the emergence of these liberal hegemons. He argues that a hegemon must have both the capacity and the willingness to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of providing key collective goods that are the basis of international cooperation and exchange. Through this, the hegemon helps maintain stability and limits the risk to productive international interactions. However, prudent planning can account for only part of a hegemon’s ability to provide public goods, while some of the necessary conditions must be developed simply through the processes of economic growth and political development. Sobel supports these claims by examining the economic trajectories that led to the successive leadership of the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. Stability in international affairs has long been a topic of great interest to our understanding of global politics, and Sobel’s nuanced and theoretically sophisticated account sets the stage for a consideration of recent developments affecting the United States.

This book investigates why the convergence of Japan’s bank-centered financial system to an American-style capital market-based model has lost steam since the mid-2000s, despite financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. Examining the ideational conflict within Japanese elites between the market liberalization and anti-free market camps, it scrutinizes the American and Japanese credit rating agencies operating in Tokyo and explores the differences between the two major industrial associations, Keidanren and Doyukai, which have played a key role as "ideational platforms" for Japanese corporate society. The book emphasizes the concept of "systemic support", whose broadened definition incorporates dominant elites’ support and protection of subordinates in exchange for the latter’s obedience and loyalty. It argues that Japanese society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market norms centered on systemic support are a form of counter-hegemony, and this has resisted American financial hegemony, promoting international capital mobility and capital markets, and prevented capitalist dominance from severing long-term social ties such as management-labor cooperation and corporate group alliances. Yet this resistance has generated growing problems for Japan. With a focus on social norms, bureaucracy, credit rating agencies, industrial associations and corporate governance, this book will provide useful insights for scholars and students of international political economy, sociology, cultural studies, and business studies.

Dollar hegemony is a defining structural feature of the modern international financial order, and it confers significant economic and political privileges on the US. This book explores the political economic foundations of and prospects for dollar hegemony.

This book showcases written dialogue from Brendan Brown and Philippe Simonnot on the subject of European monetary turmoil past and present and what hope there could be for future reform. Starting with the collapse of the gold standard in 1914, proceeding to the brief gold-dollar standard of the mid inter-war years, on to the collapse of Bretton Woods and the heyday of the Deutsche mark and ultimately discussing the euro, this book looks at a broad range of financial history alongside many new and provoking hypotheses about the devastating monetary turbulence of the successive eras, always with a focus on the US monetary hegemon. A highlight of the dialogue is an exploration of how past and future crises could combine to give birth to sound money in Europe – the launch, in effect, of a new euro. In the questions and answers within these pages, the authors draw on global examples and the challenges for Europe in deciding how to adapt to successive monetary shocks from the US, crafting a book that would be of interest to general finance and economics readers alongside students, researchers, and policymakers.

In A Political Economy of American Hegemony, Thomas Oatley explores how America's military buildups have produced postwar economic booms that have culminated in monetary and financial crises. The 2008 subprime crisis - as well as the housing bubble that produced it - was the most recent manifestation of this buildup, boom, and bust cycle, developing as a consequence of the decision to deficit-finance the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Earlier instances of financial crises were generated by deficit-financed buildups in the 1980s and the late 1960s. The buildup, boom, and bust pattern results from the way political institutions and financial power shape America's response to military challenges: political institutions transform increased military spending into budget deficits, and financial power enables the United States to finance these deficits by borrowing cheaply from the rest of the world. Oatley examines how this cycle has had a powerful impact on American and global economic and financial performance.

The book traces the origins of US hegemony from the planning conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in the late 1930s to the implementation of strategies for US dominance at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, where the US dollar was installed as the world's reserve currency. The book demonstrates how the US dollar's reserve currency status underpinned the economic primacy and power of the United States in the post-war period. It highlights the importance of the 1974 deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia to exchange US dollars for Saudi oil. It also examines the debate about the future of the US dollar's status within the global financial system.

Between 1973 and 1980, the cost of crude oil rose suddenly and dramatically, precipitating convulsions in international politics. Conventional wisdom holds that international capital markets adjusted automatically and remarkably well: enormous amounts of money flowed into oil-rich states, and efficient markets then placed that new money in cash-poor Third World economies. David Spiro has followed the money trail, and the story he tells contradicts the accepted beliefs. Most of the sudden flush of new oil wealth didn't go to poor oil-importing countries around the globe. Instead, the United States made a deal with Saudi Arabia to sell it U.S. securities in secret, a deal resulting in a substantial portion of Saudi assets being held by the U.S. government. With this arrangement, the U.S. government violated its agreements with allies in the developed world. Spiro argues that American policymakers took this action to prop up otherwise intolerable levels of U.S. public debt. In effect, recycled OPEC wealth subsidized the debt-happy policies of the U.S. government as well as the debt-happy consumption of its citizenry.