Military Transformation Actions Needed To Better Manage Dods Joint Experimentation Program

The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation1 of the U.S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change for this transformation. The U.S. Joint Forces Command, the executive agent of the program, carries out experiments-with support from the military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations-to explore and analyze new joint operational and organizational concepts. The experiments can include studies and analyses, conferences, workshops, seminars, war games, and simulated or live field experiments. On the basis of these experiments, the Joint Forces Command recommends changes aimed at achieving significant improvements in joint capabilities. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council2 reviews the Command's recommendations, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for approving them. The Council also oversees the implementation of approved recommendations. The cumulative changes are expected to contribute to the way U.S. military forces are transformed. In November 2001, DOD also created an Office of Force Transformation to foster innovation and experimentation and assist the Secretary of Defense to develop guidance and identify strategies and policies for transformation. Because of the central role DOD's joint experimentation program plays in military transformation, we reviewed related activities to determine whether changes are needed to improve the program's ability to focus on future joint operations, military transformation, and the rapid integration of results.

The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation of the U.S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change for this transformation. In the nearly 4 years since becoming the executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has increased in participation of key DOD stakeholders--the military services, the combatant commands, and other organizations and agencies--in its experimentation activities. The Command has also expanded the participation of federal agencies and departments, academia, the private sector, and some foreign allies. No recommendations flowing from joint experimentation have been approved or implemented. Although the Joint Forces Command issued three recommendations nearly a year ago, they were not approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council because of confusion among the Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command about a proposed change in guidance that required additional data be included when submitting these recommendations. Although DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance for joint experimentation, DOD and the Joint Forces Command are missing some key management elements that are generally considered necessary for successful program management.

Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint Experimentation Program

The Department of Defense (DOD) is implementing a plan designed to meet the critical security challenges of the future by transforming the Armed Forces into a joint force capable of meeting the requirements of 21st century operations. A key element of achieving this transformation the conduct of joint warfighting experimentation, which involves assess; joint warfighting concepts that could lead to changes to doctrine, organization, training and education, materiel, leadership, and personnel (DOTMLP). As agreed with your office, this letter responds to the Senate Committee on Armed Services' report on the fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization Act and (1) describes the status of DOD's efforts to implement its joint experimentation program, (2) identifies some of the factors that we believe contribute to the success of a joint experimental program, and (3) provides answers to the issues posed in the report regarding the extent of DOD's support for future warfighting.