Military Transformation

In Buying Military Transformation, Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz analyze the United States military's ongoing effort to capitalize on information technology. New ideas about military doctrine derived from comparisons to Internet Age business practices can be implemented only if the military buys technologically innovative weapons systems. Buying Military Transformation examines how political and military leaders work with the defense industry to develop the small ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, advanced communications equipment, and systems-of-systems integration that will enable the new military format. Dombrowski and Gholz's analysis integrates the political relationship between the defense industry and Congress, the bureaucratic relationship between the firms and the military services, and the technical capabilities of different types of businesses. Many government officials and analysts believe that only entrepreneurial start-up firms or leaders in commercial information technology markets can produce the new, network-oriented military equipment. But Dombrowski and Gholz find that the existing defense industry will be best able to lead military-technology development, even for equipment modeled on the civilian Internet. The U.S. government is already spending billions of dollars each year on its "military transformation" program-money that could be easily misdirected and wasted if policymakers spend it on the wrong projects or work with the wrong firms. In addition to this practical implication, Buying Military Transformation offers key lessons for the theory of "Revolutions in Military Affairs." A series of military analysts have argued that major social and economic changes, like the shift from the Agricultural Age to the Industrial Age, inherently force related changes in the military. Buying Military Transformation undermines this technologically determinist claim: commercial innovation does not directly determine military innovation; instead, political leadership and military organizations choose the trajectory of defense investment. Militaries should invest in new technology in response to strategic threats and military leaders' professional judgments about the equipment needed to improve military effectiveness. Commercial technological progress by itself does not generate an imperative for military transformation. Clear, cogent, and engaging, Buying Military Transformation is essential reading for journalists, legislators, policymakers, and scholars.

China's military transformation is one of the major geo-strategic developments of the 21st Century. Billions of dollars are being spent modernizing The People's Liberation Army (PLA) as China seeks to upgrade and expand its military capabilities to rival the US. In this cutting-edge analysis, You Ji, a leading expert on China's military affairs, explores the changes taking places within the PLA today, covering its ground, aerospace and maritime forces, its ability to meet asymmetric threats, and the growing role played by the People's Armed Police in quelling dissent in China. He shows how these transformations in personnel, technology and strategic goals are slowly driving a wedge between China's two most powerful institutions. Until recently, relations between the CCP and PLA were harmonious, but as the PLA becomes increasingly professionalized and autonomous so its unconditional loyalty to the ruling Party may weaken. The changing relationship between the CCP and PLA, he argues, is likely to have profound implications for China's own political development and the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Comprehensive and incisive, this timely book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in the nature and consequences of China's military rise.

This book explores the idea of arevolution in military affairs (RMA), which underpins the transformational agenda of the US military, and examines its implications for smaller states.The strategic studies literature on the RMA tends to be American-centric and directed towards the strategic problems of the US military. This volume seeks to fill t

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operation capabilities- on land, sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations, Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping's control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. Xi Jinping's ability to push through reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.

This book provides an authoritative account of how the US, British, and French armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War. All three armies have sought to respond to changes in their strategic and socio-technological environments by developing more expeditionary capable and networked forces. Drawing on extensive archival research, hundreds of interviews, and unprecedented access to official documents, the authors examine both the process and the outcomes of army transformation, and ask how organizational interests, emerging ideas, and key entrepreneurial leaders interact in shaping the direction of military change. They also explore how programs of army transformation change over time, as new technologies moved from research to development, and as lessons from operations were absorbed. In framing these issues, they draw on military innovation scholarship and, in addressing them, produce findings with general relevance for the study of how militaries innovate.

In Finding the Target, Frederick W. Kagan describes the three basic transformations within the U.S. military since Vietnam. First was the move to an all-volunteer force and a new generation of weapons systems in the 1970s. Second was the emergence of stealth technology and precision-guided munitions in the 1980s. Third was the information technology that followed the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. This last could have insured the U.S. continuing military preeminence, but this goal was compromised by Clinton's drawing down of our armed forces in the 1990s and Bush's response to 9/11 and the global war on terror. The issue of transformation leads Kagan to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a ''new ''military; the conduct of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars; and the disconnect between grand strategic visions such as the Bush Doctrine's idea of ''preemption ''and the underfunding of military force structures that are supposed to achieve such goals.

Transformation has become a buzz word in today's military, but what are its historical precursors—those large scale changes that were once called Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)? Who has gotten it right, and who has not? The Department of Defense must learn from history. Most studies of innovation focus on the actions, choices, and problems faced by individuals in a particular organization. Few place these individuals and organizations within the complex context where they operate. Yet, it is this very context that is a powerful determinant of how actions are conceived, examined, and implemented, and of how errors are identified and corrected. The historical cases that Mandeles examines reveal how different military services organized to learn, accumulate, and retrieve knowledge; and how their particular organization affected everything from the equipment they acquired to the quality of doctrine and concepts used in combat. In cases where more than one community of experts was responsible for weighing in on decisionmaking, the service benefited from enhanced application of evidence, sound inference, and logic. These cases demonstrate that, for senior leadership, participating in such a system should be a strategic and deliberate choice. In each of the cases featured in this book, no such deliberate choice was made. The interwar U.S. Navy (USN) aviation community and the U.S. Marine Corps amphibious operation community were lucky that, in a time of rapid technological advance and strategic risk, their decisions in framing and solving technological and operational problems were made within a functioning multi-organizational system. The Army Air Corps and the Royal Marines were unfortunate, with corresponding results. It is characteristic of 20th-century military history that no senior civilian or military leader suggested a policy to handle overlapping responsibilities by multiple departments. Today's policymakers have not learned this lesson. In the present time, while a great deal of thought is devoted to proper organizational design and the numbers of persons required to perform necessary functions, there is still no overarching framework guiding these designs.

Military transformation can be understood as comprising three overlapping and sometimes competing layers—the conventional-force dominated revolution in military affairs, a more recent irregular warfare emphasis, and a wider dimension including homeland defense, space and nuclear policy. The Western world is currently focusing its attention on transformation's middle layer, while China and Russia are focusing on the RMA and transformation's wider aspects. This dynamic indicates the United States and its allies should continue to prepare for the full range of conflicts. This book establishes the meaning of military transformation, assesses the manner in which certain countries are transforming their military forces, discusses the relevancy of transformation efforts to modern conflict and, in drawing out the key areas of emphasis on the part of various countries, provides a window on the future global security environment. It is divided into seven chapters, plus a conclusion. The first chapter focuses on the meaning of military transformation, establishing a framework through which national militaries can be examined. This comprises transformation's revolution in military affairs components, its newer special operations forces, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction aspects, and its wider homeland defense, space and deterrence dimensions. The book devotes two chapters to the United States and one each to China, Russia, and NATO. It also has a chapter that looks individually at each of Australia, Britain, Canada, France and Germany. An assessment of the relevancy of force transformation to modern warfare is integrated into the discussion of what transformation means, how the United States is responding, and the concluding chapter. The book contains a biographical sketch of Andrew Marshall, Andrew Krepinevich, William Owens, Arthur Cebrowski, Donald Rumsfeld, and Thomas Barnett, all of whom have been involved in some aspect of military transformation.

Through extensive primary source analysis and independent analysis, this report seeks to answer a number of important questions regarding the state of China’s armed forces. The authors found that the PLA is keenly aware of its many weaknesses and is vigorously striving to correct them. Although it is only natural to focus on the PLA’s growing capabilities, understanding the PLA’s weaknesses—and its self-assessments—is no less important.