Military Interventions In Sierra Leone Lessons From A Failed State

Analyzes the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1995-2002, and the efforts of outside forces to bring stability to that small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private mercenary armies, through the Economic Community of West African States, to the U.N. and the U.K. In every case, those who intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to be overcome. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique to their own org. and political circumstances. Serving soldiers can often profit vicariously from the mistakes of others as recounted in detailed case studies of historical events. ¿A cautionary tale that political leaders and military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at their peril.¿

This paper is a survey and analysis of the external military interventions in Sierra Leone between 1993 and 2002. It includes a brief history overview of the country and the start of civil war in 1992. Details of the interventions cover the problems encountered with ethnic groups, corrupt and ineffective governments, and neighbor states. Insights and conclusions on these operations and events are included.

Recognizing the importance of the nations residing on the continent of Africa in an interconnected world, the United States established the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in October 2007. That development alone makes it imperative that American military leaders understand the problems facing many African states today and the conflicts that have ravaged them in the recent past. Often rich in resources, both human and economic, yet uneven in development of governmental institutions and infrastructure, the nations of this large continent represent both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge can be as complex as the removal of a sanctuary for terrorists without excessive violence or the marshalling of resources to alleviate a massive humanitarian crisis. The opportunity is that constructive engagement at an early stage can perhaps forestall the expenditure of large sums of blood and treasure to ameliorate a seriously deteriorating situation. In all of these cases, military leaders must have an understanding of Africa's geography, its peoples, and its history. Only through this understanding can the military instrument be applied intelligently and humanely. This study by Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese analyzes the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1995-2002, and the efforts by a variety of outside forces to bring lasting stability to that small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private mercenary armies, through the Economic Community of West African States, to the United Nations and the United Kingdom. In every case, those who intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to be overcome. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique to their own organizations and political circumstances. Serving soldiers can often profit vicariously from the mistakes of others as recounted in detailed case studies of historical events. This cogent analysis of recent interventions in Sierra Leone represents a cautionary tale that political leaders and military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at their peril.~

This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), final peace accords, and brought order to a failed state. The paper will explore the following points: what was the British foreign policy and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene; what was the British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone; did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique; why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn? Beyond the scope of this paper is a comparison of United Kingdom (UK) COIN doctrine and current United States (US) COIN doctrine. The focus will be to analyze the UK’s actions against their doctrine, not the doctrine of the US. There is one major assumption for this case study. The paper categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for the assumption is current day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war torn failed state, Sierra Leone has lasting peace, completed disarmament of insurgent forces, ended the large scale human rights abuse, and democratic elections, not coups, determining the leadership of the country.

This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to the defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and final peace accords, restored order to a failed state, and allowed the democratic restoration of the government of Sierra Leone. The paper will explore the following points: What was British foreign policy at the time and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene?; What was British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine at the time and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone?; Did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique?; and Why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn from it? The author analyzes the United Kingdom's actions against its own doctrine, rather than against the doctrine of the United States or another country. There is one major assumption for this case study. The author categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for this assumption is current-day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war-torn failed state, Sierra Leone now has lasting peace, has disarmed its insurgent forces, has ended the large-scale human rights abuses of the past, and has democratic elections -- not coups -- determining the leadership of the country.

Although democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights are the defining idioms of contemporary state governance and international relations, they are hardly commonplace in Africa. In domestic environments severely degraded by abuse of power and rebellion, what kind of existence do African leaders give to their people? Can they proclaim rights for their citizens in international instruments but behave in ways that are diametrically opposite? What future has democracy when the last election was a rogue one and the incumbent regime the beneficiary? Sierra Leone, whose civil conflict enters its tenth year in March 2001, carries the unenviable status of playing host to the world's largest peacekeeping force. Yet there is still no lasting peace in a conflict that has determined not so much who is right or wrong as who is left.

This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), final peace accords, and brought order to a failed state. The paper will explore the following points: what was the British foreign policy and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene; what was the British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone; did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique; why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn? Beyond the scope of this paper is a comparison of United Kingdom (UK) COIN doctrine and current United States (US) COIN doctrine. The focus will be to analyze the UK actions against their doctrine, not the doctrine of the US. There is one major assumption for this case study. The paper categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for the assumption is current day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war torn failed state, Sierra Leone has lasting peace, completed disarmament of insurgent forces, ended the large scale human rights abuse, and democratic elections, not coups, determining the leadership of the country.

This study set out to examine the interplay of negotiations and military intervention in the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002, and to draw lessons from this process for the resolution of intrastate conflicts in Africa. To achieve this, a more detailed analysis was undertaken on: the evolution and progress of the conflict in Sierra Leone (Chapter two): the various military interventions (Chapter three): and the various peace agreements (Chapter four). What has come to light is that it is important to distinguish between the triggers to the conflict and the drivers of the conflict. In the case of Sierra Leone, the trigger was ECOMOG's entry into Liberia an event that was mistakenly seen as the main cause of the conflict and leading to wrong decisions on how to end the conflict. It is also clear that greed was at the centre of the conflict in Sierra Leone since control of natural resources appear to be the main push factors behind most of the fighting. Control of these resources gave the holders an advantage. Progress in negotiations was determined by demands and concessions by those in control of the resources. An additional dimension that was common to many conflicts in Africa was control of the country's capital city. Possession of this bestowed visible power to the holders. It is because of this that Freetown became the centre of many bouts of conflict. The study highlighted a number of issues that impact on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. The first concerns the risks of sidelining the army that had played a significant role in governing the country. To do so, in favour of a civilian militia, was inviting trouble. This mistake extended the conflict by at least another two years. Also important was the issue of the over-militarisation of society. As the state structures failed, patronage and resources acted as drivers for the formation of other armed factions. The proliferation of armed factions made finding a solution more problematic. Increasing militarisation was further driven by the role of by neighbouring countries. This complicated the search for a political solution, as members of the regional group, ECOWAS, actively supported various sides in the conflict. While it was encouraging to see ECOWAS attempting to resolve the conflict, it could not sustain the role of being both a player and referee at the same time. As a result of this, ECOWAS itself contributed to the prolonging of the conflict. The intervention by the United Kingdom demonstrated that actors with superior force are in a position to make decisive interventions to help end conflicts. At the international level, the question on leaving conflict management to regional bodies is not a panacea for solving intrastate conflicts. The United Nations Security Council initially relied on ECOWAS to manage the conflict, but was later forced to take over the active peacekeeping role. It was also only when the United Nations began reflecting on earlier peacekeeping failures, such as Rwanda and Somalia, that new peacekeeping approaches began to emerge. This reflection also generated the continuing debate on the Responsibility to Protect vulnerable populations in intrastate conflict.

Compared with Kosovo and Iraq, the recent Western intervention in Sierra Leone has been largely forgotten. When the State Fails rectifies this, providing a comprehensive and critical analysis of the intervention. The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 and was declared officially over in 2002 after UK, UN, and regional African military intervention. Some claimed it as a case of successful humanitarian intervention. The authors in this collection provide an informed analysis of the impact of the intervention on democracy, development, and society in Sierra Leone. The authors take a particularly critical view of the imposition of neo-liberalism after the conflict. As NATO intervention in Libya shows the continued use of external force in internal conflicts, When the State Fails is a timely book for all students and scholars interested in Africa and the question of "humanitarian intervention."