Linguistic Frameworks And Ontology

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The book highlights the concept of ontology, relationship between language and ontology, the distinction between ontology and reality, the role of linguistic philosophers in dealing with ontology etc. Apart from these, the eminent scholars address themselves with the ontology behind the value of valuation, exclusion and discrimination, inter-religious dialogue, Indian theories of language, values in cinema, poetic language etc.

Originally published in 1990, this book centres on a certain way of surveying a variety of theories of language, and on outlining a new proposal of meaning within the framework set by the survey. One of the key features of both survey and proposal is the insistence on the need to locate theories of language within a large framework that includes questions about the nature of thought and about general ontological questions as well. The book deals in an interconnected way with both very general and specific issues. At one end of this spectrum there are discussions of the contrast between realist and nominalist ontologies, while at the other are analyses of specific lexical items of English.

Current progress in linguistic theorizing is more and more informed by cross-linguistic (including cross-modal) investigation. Comparison of languages relies crucially on the concepts that can be coded with similar effort in all languages. These concepts are part of every language user's ontology, the network of cross-connected conceptualizations the mind uses in coping with the world. Assuming that language comparability is rooted in the comparability of user ontologies, the idea of the present volume is to further instigate progress in linguistics by looking behind the interface with the conceptual-intentional system and asking a still underexplored question: How are ontological structures reflected in intra- and cross-linguistic regularities? This question defines the research program of ontology based linguistics or ontolinguistics. Recent advances in the theory of language have been characterized by an emphasis on external explanatory adequacy and thus on relating language to other phenomena. The research program introduced in this volume adds a decisively distinct and fresh aspect to this emerging new contextualization of the field by bringing together insights from different areas, mainly linguistics, but also neuroscience, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. In providing these disciplines with a new common task, the exploration of the impact of ontological structures on linguistic regularities, the ontolinguistic approach promises to develop into a vital branch of cognitive science. Documenting the beginnings, the book aims to instigate future interdisciplinary research in this area. It will be of interest to researchers in linguistics, artificial intelligence, philosophy, and cognitive science in general.

1. Everyday legal ontology as a challenge to normative solipsism 1.1. Normative solipsism – 1.2. Three open questions of Petrażycki’s legal theory – 1.3. The subject-matter of this book – 1.4. The major ontological kinds and the way they are mirrored in naïve language 2. Ethical illusions produced by projective processes 2.1. Introduction – 2.2. What can projections explain? – 2.3. Petrażycki’s projective process – 2.4. The degree of stability of projective qualities and its linguistic consequences – 2.5. Two constituents of the stability of projective qualities – 2.6. The connection of subjective stability and intersubjective diffusion with the psychological development of realism 3. Illusions produced by the features of the super-ego 3.1. The limits of Petrażycki’s projective hypothesis – 3.2. The differentiae specificae of ethical emotions – 3.3. Why the explanation here proposed to the illusions of imperatives and prohibitions is different from Petrażycki’s – 3.4. The illusions of norms and the role of the concept of norm as a basic theoretical concept – 3.5. Ethical emotions, aggressiveness and ethical sadism – 3.6. Shame, guilt, pride, anger and indignation – 3.7. Is the hypothesis of a super-ego falsifiable in Popper’s sense? 4. Illusions produced by the features of legal emotions 4.1. Naïve legal entities – 4.2. Moral vs. legal experience – 4.3. Features associated to moral vs. legal experiences, respectively – 4.4. Kinds of legal relationships – 4.4.1. facere-accipere (obligatedness/obligatoriness) – 4.4.2. nonfacere-nonpati (prohibitedness) – 4.4.3. pati-facere (permittedness) – 4.4.4. pati-nonfacere (omissibility) – 4.4.5. Absence-of-ethical-phenomena and ethical indifference – 4.5. Pure attributive phenomena – 4.6. The degree of cognitive salience of the different kinds of legal relationship and the factors conducive to the detachment of debts – 4.6.1. Bilaterality – 4.6.2. Transferability – 4.6.3. Transitoriness – 4.6.4. Fungibility – 4.6.5. Transformability – 4.7. Duties – 4.8. Rights vs. powers? – 4.9. The factors conducive to the detachment of permittednesses/authoritativenesses into illusions of free-standing entities – 4.9.1. Bilaterality – 4.9.2. Transferability – 4.9.3. Transitoriness – 4.9.4-5. Fungibility and transformability – 4.10. Statutes, commands and the wishes of an autocrat – 4.11. The illusions of the amendment of a command/statute – 4.12. A case of undetachment: ownership Appendix: Moneyness as a naïve non-legal phenomenon References Index of names