Lincoln And His Generals

Since it was first published in 1952, Lincoln and His Generals has remained one of the definitive accounts of Lincoln’s wartime leadership. In it T. Harry Williams dramatizes Lincoln’s long and frustrating search for an effective leader of the Union Army and traces his transformation from a politician with little military knowledge into a master strategist of the Civil War. Explored in depth are Lincoln’s often fraught relationships with generals such as McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Fremont, and of course, Ulysses S. Grant. In this superbly written narrative, Williams demonstrates how Lincoln’s persistent “meddling” into military affairs was crucial to the Northern war effort and utterly transformed the president’s role as commander-in-chief.

Evaluates Lincoln's ability as a director of war and his influence on the development of a modern command system.

Chapter 24: "Is this my destiny?"--Chapter 25: "secesh wives with their own little slaves"--Chapter 26: "Do stop digging at this old canal" -- Chapter 27: Lieutenant General's Wife -- Chapter 28: "I did not want to go to the theater" -- Chapter 29: "the sunlight of his loyal love

In this book, David Work examines Lincoln's policy of appointing political generals to build a national coalition to fight and win the Civil War. Work follows the careers of sixteen generals through the war to assess their contributions and to ascertain how Lincoln assessed them as commander-in-chief. Eight of the generals began the war as Republicans and eight as Democrats. Some commanded armies, some regiments. Among them were some of the most famous generals of the Union--such as Francis P. Blair Jr., John A. Dix, John A. Logan, James S. Wadsworth--and others whose importance has been obscured by more dramatic personalities. As the war proceeded, the value of the political generals became a matter of serious dispute. Could politicians make the shift from a political campaign to a military one? Could they be trusted to fight? Could they avoid destructive jealousies and the temptations of corruption? And with several of the generals being Irish or German immigrants, what effect would ethnic prejudices have on their success or failure? Work finds that Lincoln's policy was ultimately successful, as these generals provided effective political support and made important contributions in military administration and on the battlefield. Although several of them proved to be poor commanders, others were effective in exercising influence on military administration and recruitment, slavery policy, and national politics.

While numerous accounts exist of President Abraham Lincoln's often-troubled dealings with either his cabinet or his generals, Chester G. Hearn's illuminating history provides the first broad synthesis of Lincoln's complex relationship with both groups. As such, it casts new light on much of the behind-the-scenes interplay, intrigue, and sparring between the president and his advisors and military commanders during the most precarious years of the Civil War. Turning first to Lincoln's cabinet, Hearn explains that Lincoln exercised a unique decision-making process: he reached a firm conclusion on an issue, but then he debated it endlessly with his cabinet or generals as if still undecided. To ensure the liveliest discourse, Lincoln appointed as his advisors men with widely differing political motivations. The Republican Lincoln spent four years attempting to bring together his cabinet of former Whigs and Democrats in the spirit of cooperation, but he never completely achieved his purpose. Hearn explores the president's relationship with this cabinet, the problems he encountered selecting it, and the difficulties he experienced attempting to maintain ideological balance while trying to maneuver around those who disagreed with him. Lincoln never broached a subject that did not create some level of dissent within the cabinet, and differences in political philosophy and personal rivalries led to great debate over the running of the administration, the selection of generals, foreign relations and military mobilization, emancipation, freedom of the press, civil rights, and other issues. Still, Hearn asserts, Lincoln's ability to navigate internal scuffles and external turmoil helped to define his presidency. Hearn next demonstrates convincingly that even with these difficulties, Lincoln manipulated his cabinet far more adroitly than he did his generals. Many of Lincoln's top military commanders had political aspirations or agendas of their own, while others were close friends of his intransigent cabinet members. Having assumed the role as de facto army chief, Lincoln took responsibility for the mishandling of battles fought by his generals, some of whom were incompetent and unmanageable politicians. Hearn examines the often-disastrous generalship and its impact on Lincoln and the cabinet, as well as the public, the press, and Congress. Based on over a decade of research, Lincoln, the Cabinet, and the Generals offers both a fresh perspective on and a new interpretation of Lincoln's presidency -- one that reveals the leadership genius as well as the imperfections of America's sixteenth president.

Abraham Lincoln began his presidency admitting that he knew "but little of ships," but he quickly came to preside over the largest national armada to that time, not eclipsed until World War I. Written by naval historian Craig L. Symonds, Lincoln and His Admirals unveils an aspect of Lincoln's presidency unexamined by historians until now, revealing how he managed the men who ran the naval side of the Civil War, and how the activities of the Union Navy ultimately affected the course of history. Beginning with a gripping account of the attempt to re-supply Fort Sumter--a comedy of errors that shows all too clearly the fledgling president's inexperience--Symonds traces Lincoln's steady growth as a wartime commander-in-chief. Absent a Secretary of Defense, he would eventually become de facto commander of joint operations along the coast and on the rivers. That involved dealing with the men who ran the Navy: the loyal but often cranky Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, the quiet and reliable David G. Farragut, the flamboyant and unpredictable Charles Wilkes, the ambitious ordnance expert John Dahlgren, the well-connected Samuel Phillips Lee, and the self-promoting and gregarious David Dixon Porter. Lincoln was remarkably patient; he often postponed critical decisions until the momentum of events made the consequences of those decisions evident. But Symonds also shows that Lincoln could act decisively. Disappointed by the lethargy of his senior naval officers on the scene, he stepped in and personally directed an amphibious assault on the Virginia coast, a successful operation that led to the capture of Norfolk. The man who knew "but little of ships" had transformed himself into one of the greatest naval strategists of his age. Co-winner of the 2009 Lincoln Prize Winner of the 2009 Barondess/Lincoln Prize by the Civil War Round Table of New York John Lyman Award of the North American Society for Oceanic History Daniel and Marilyn Laney Prize by the Austin Civil War Round Table Nevins-Freeman Prize of the Civil War Round Table of Chicago

"James M. McPherson’s Tried by War is a perfect primer . . . for anyone who wishes to under­stand the evolution of the president’s role as commander in chief. Few histo­rians write as well as McPherson, and none evoke the sound of battle with greater clarity." —The New York Times Book Review The Pulitzer Prize–winning author reveals how Lincoln won the Civil War and invented the role of commander in chief as we know it As we celebrate the bicentennial of Lincoln's birth, this study by preeminent, bestselling Civil War historian James M. McPherson provides a rare, fresh take on one of the most enigmatic figures in American history. Tried by War offers a revelatory (and timely) portrait of leadership during the greatest crisis our nation has ever endured. Suspenseful and inspiring, this is the story of how Lincoln, with almost no previous military experience before entering the White House, assumed the powers associated with the role of commander in chief, and through his strategic insight and will to fight changed the course of the war and saved the Union.

An award-winning presidential biographer and military historian explains that in choosing to fight un-winnable wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, Presidents Truman, Johnson, and George W. Bush collectively sought to establish a presidency so powerful that they have created a permanent threat to the Constitution.