Laws Virtues

Can the law promote moral values even in pluralistic societies such as the United States? Drawing upon important federal legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, legal scholar and moral theologian Cathleen Kaveny argues that it can. In conversation with thinkers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II, and Joseph Raz, she argues that the law rightly promotes the values of autonomy and solidarity. At the same time, she cautions that wise lawmakers will not enact mandates that are too far out of step with the lived moral values of the actual community. According to Kaveny, the law is best understood as a moral teacher encouraging people to act virtuously, rather than a police officer requiring them to do so. In Law’s Virtues Kaveny expertly applies this theoretical framework to the controversial moral-legal issues of abortion, genetics, and euthanasia. In addition, she proposes a moral analysis of the act of voting, in dialogue with the election guides issued by the US bishops. Moving beyond the culture wars, this bold and provocative volume proposes a vision of the relationship of law and morality that is realistic without being relativistic and optimistic without being utopian.

Can the law promote moral values even in pluralistic societies such as the United States? Drawing upon important federal legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, legal scholar and moral theologian Cathleen Kaveny argues that it can. In conversation with thinkers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II, and Joseph Raz, she argues that the law rightly promotes the values of autonomy and solidarity. At the same time, she cautions that wise lawmakers will not enact mandates that are too far out of step with the lived moral values of the actual community. According to Kaveny, the law is best understood as a moral teacher encouraging people to act virtuously, rather than a police officer requiring them to do so. In Law’s Virtues Kaveny expertly applies this theoretical framework to the controversial moral-legal issues of abortion, genetics, and euthanasia. In addition, she proposes a moral analysis of the act of voting, in dialogue with the election guides issued by the US bishops. Moving beyond the culture wars, this bold and provocative volume proposes a vision of the relationship of law and morality that is realistic without being relativistic and optimistic without being utopian.

In The Priority of Prudence, Daniel Mark Nelson proposes a reappropriation of a moral perspective that focuses on the cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, justice, and prudence. The study aims to recover and rehabilitate the virtue of prudence as a way of resuming a moral conversation that has been stalemated for too long. Nelson's main source for reviving the virtue of prudence is St. Thomas Aquinas's account of the cardinal virtues in the Summa Theologica. A primary problem with using Aquinas as a source for reviving an ethics of virtue centered on prudence is that he is commonly perceived as the most prominent figure in the conflicting natural-law tradition. According to Nelson's reinterpretation, however, Aquinas teaches that moral understanding depends first and foremost on prudence working in accord with other cardinal virtues and that natural law functions to explain moral reasoning rather than to guide it. This study serves to advance the debate about the contemporary relevance of an ethics of virtue by way of its significantly more detailed explication of prudence. Nelson makes important connections between influential reinterpretations of the ethical theory of Aquinas that have been published during the last thirty years and widespread interest in an ethics of virtue that has been expressed by Alasdair Maclntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, William Sullivan, Robert Bellah, and others. The Priority of Prudence represents a significant contribution to the scholarly literature both in the study of Aquinas and in the debate on the ethics of virtue.

It’s long been known that Japanese file fewer lawsuits per capita than Americans do. Yet explanations for the difference have tended to be partial and unconvincing, ranging from circular arguments about Japanese culture to suggestions that the slow-moving Japanese court system acts as a deterrent. With Second-Best Justice, J. Mark Ramseyer offers a more compelling, better-grounded explanation: the low rate of lawsuits in Japan results not from distrust of a dysfunctional system but from trust in a system that works—that sorts and resolves disputes in such an overwhelmingly predictable pattern that opposing parties rarely find it worthwhile to push their dispute to trial. Using evidence from tort claims across many domains, Ramseyer reveals a court system designed not to find perfect justice, but to “make do”—to adopt strategies that are mostly right and that thereby resolve disputes quickly and economically. An eye-opening study of comparative law, Second-Best Justice will force a wholesale rethinking of the differences among alternative legal systems and their broader consequences for social welfare.

Julia Annas presents a study of Plato's account of the relation of virtue to law: how it developed from the Republic to the Laws, and how his ideas were taken up by Cicero and by Philo of Alexandria. Annas shows that, rather than rejecting the approach to an ideal society in the Republic (as generally thought), Plato is in both dialogues concerned with the relation of virtue to law, and obedience to law, and presents, in the Laws, a more careful and sophisticated account of that relation. His approach in the Laws differs from his earlier one, because he now tries to build from the political cultures of actual societies (and their histories) instead of producing a theoretical thought-experiment. Plato develops an original project in which obedience to law is linked with education to promote understanding of the laws and of the virtues which obedience to them promote. Annas also explores how this project appeals independently to the very different later writers Cicero and Philo of Alexandria.

An ancient Roman history text, translated by Charles Yonge, and written by the Greek philosopher Philo of Alexandria. The Embassy to Gaius was a meeting between Gaius Caligula, the then Roman Emperor, and a large contingent of Jews. They wished to overturn Gaius' plans to have a huge statue of Zeus installed in the temple. Gaius' hatred of the Jews is legendary. This book is important because it helps to understand the relations between Jews and Romans in the first century A.D.

This book gathers together leading voices in virtue theory—an increasingly influential aspect of legal theory in the 21st century—to take stock of virtue jurisprudence’s evolution and suggest ways in which this approach can be further developed. The contributions address the three main axes along which virtue jurisprudence has unfolded in the past decades: the quest to provide a suitable virtue-based foundation for the law (in general) or for some aspects of it (in particular, but not exclusively, criminal law); the investigation of the role played by character traits in legal decision-making; and the investigation of how the law can be part of a virtuous life. As will become apparent for readers of this volume, those lines are converging and, as they do so, a general virtue-based approach to the study of law is starting to emerge. Crucial in addressing problems with legal experience for which the resources of traditional legal theory are insufficient, this book’s investigation of virtue theory and virtue jurisprudence will be of interest to all of those studying legal decision-making and the philosophy of law, as well as those studying virtue ethics more widely. It was originally published as a special issue of Jurisprudence.

Value-added tax (VAT) is a mainstay of revenue systems in more than 160 countries. Because consumption is a more stable revenue base than other tax bases, VAT is less distorting and hence more likely to encourage investment, savings, optimum labor supply decisions, and growth. VAT is not without criticism however, and faces its own specific technical and policy challenges. This book, the first to thoroughly evaluate VAT from a global policy perspective after over 50 years of experience with its intricacies, offers authoritative perspectives on VAT's full spectrum--from its signal successes to the subtle ways its application can undermine revenue performance and economic neutrality. The contributors--leading tax practitioners and academics--examine the key policy issues and topics that are crucially relevant for measuring the success of the tax in the first part of the book, including: revenue generation and revenue efficiency; single rate versus multiple rates; susceptibility to fraud; exemptions and exceptions; compliance cost for businesses; policy and compliance gaps in revenue collection; adjustment rules caused by the transactional nature of the tax; transfer pricing issues; treatment of vouchers; permanent establishments and holding companies; payment of refunds; cross-border digital transactions; and supplies for free or below cost price. The second part offers six country reports--on New Zealand, Japan, China, Colombia, Ethiopia, and India--to demonstrate the different ways in which VAT operates in a variety of national economies. Whether a government is contemplating the imposition of a general consumption tax for the first time or new rules for applying an existing one, it is important for policymakers to keep central the aim to design a tax that realizes optimal efficiency and causes minimal distortions. This invaluable book serves as an expert guide to VAT policy development in this area. It will be welcomed not only by concerned government officials but also by tax professionals (both lawyers and accountants) and academics in tax law.

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.

Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action. As Law’s Abnegation makes clear, the state did not shove law out of the way. The judiciary voluntarily relegated itself to the margins of power. The last and greatest triumph of legalism was to depose itself.