Law Justice Democracy And The Clash Of Cultures

The Cold War ideological battle with universal aspirations has given way to a clash of cultures as the world concurrently moves toward globalization of economies and communications and balkanization through a clash of ethnic and cultural identities. Traditional liberal theory has confronted daunting challenges in coping with these changes and with recent developments such as the spread of postmodern thought, religious fundamentalism and global terrorism. This book argues that a political and legal philosophy based on pluralism is best suited to confront the problems of the twenty-first century. Pointing out that monist theories such as liberalism have become inadequate and that relativism is dangerous, the book makes the case for pluralism from the standpoint of both theory and its applications. The book engages with thinkers, such as Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Rawls, Berlin, Dworkin, Habermas and Derrida and with several subjects that are at the center of current controversies.

Argues that a political and legal philosophy based on pluralism confronts the problems of the twenty-first century.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Societally penetrated judiciaries and the democratic rule of law; 2. The evolution of judicial regimes; 3. Costa Rica: a liberal judicial regime; 4. Government control regimes in Central America versus the rule of law; 5. Clandestine control in Guatemala; 6. Partisan systems; Conclusion

Offers an alternative approach to liberalism and to communitarianism, with an empirical focus on Israel

In most countries, it is the norm for state courts to operate alongside powerful non-state justice systems, whose roots lie in custom, religion, or tradition. Indeed, non-state justice is frequently the dominant form of legal order. In the developing world, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of disputes are handled outside the state justice system, and nearly all post-conflict states feature extensive legal pluralism because of the weak institutions and contested authority endemic to conflict and post-conflict states. Yet the role of legal pluralism is frequently misunderstood and when different justice systems clash, prolonged, potentially even violent conflict, can result. In Contending Orders, Geoffrey Swenson proposes a new way to understand how state and non-state authorities interact by exploring the full range of legally pluralist environments-combative, competitive, cooperative, and complementary. Drawing upon insights from Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, two countries with extensive legal pluralism, he identifies and critically examines commonly used strategies in legally pluralistic environments. Swenson also illustrates how national and international actors can better engage non-state justice systems. Further, Swenson shows how multiple justice systems can not only co-exist but work together to contribute to the development of a democratic state bound by the rule of law. It is not enough to merely recognize that legal pluralism exists; scholars and policymakers must understand how legal pluralism actually functions. Contending Orders both analyzes the forces that are shaping the relationship between the state and non-state justice worldwide and offers policy strategies to promote the rule of law and good governance wherever legal pluralism thrives.

Whether examining election outcomes, the legal status of terrorism suspects, or if (or how) people can be sentenced to death, a judge in a modern democracy assumes a role that raises some of the most contentious political issues of our day. But do judges even have a role beyond deciding the disputes before them under law? What are the criteria for judging the justices who write opinions for the United States Supreme Court or constitutional courts in other democracies? These are the questions that one of the world's foremost judges and legal theorists, Aharon Barak, poses in this book. In fluent prose, Barak sets forth a powerful vision of the role of the judge. He argues that this role comprises two central elements beyond dispute resolution: bridging the gap between the law and society, and protecting the constitution and democracy. The former involves balancing the need to adapt the law to social change against the need for stability; the latter, judges' ultimate accountability, not to public opinion or to politicians, but to the "internal morality" of democracy. Barak's vigorous support of "purposive interpretation" (interpreting legal texts--for example, statutes and constitutions--in light of their purpose) contrasts sharply with the influential "originalism" advocated by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. As he explores these questions, Barak also traces how supreme courts in major democracies have evolved since World War II, and he guides us through many of his own decisions to show how he has tried to put these principles into action, even under the burden of judging on terrorism.

When it comes to race and racial issues these are strange times for all Americans. More than forty years after Brown v. Board of Education put an end to segregation of the races by law, current debates about affirmative action, multiculturalism, and racial hate speech reveal persistent uncertainty about the place and meaning of race in American culture and the role of law in guaranteeing racial equality. Moreover, all sides in those debates claim to be the true heirs to Brown, even as they disagree vehemently about its meaning. Race, Law and Culture takes the continuing controversy about race in law and culture as an invitation to revisit Brown, using this case as a lens through which to view that controversy and the issues involved in it. The essays collected here describe the contested legacy of Brown as well as the way it is implicated in America's persistent uncertainties about race. In so doing they confront crucial questions about race, law and culture in contemporary America: What were the legal and cultural visions contained in Brown? How have those visions been articulated in other legal struggles? Why does the subject of race continue to haunt the American imagination? With original essays from contributors such as David Garrow, Lawrence Friedman, and Hazel Carby, this work will be an important perspective from which to view questions of race in modern America.

Law is an increasingly pervasive force in our society. At the same time, however, the obstacles to law’s effectiveness are also growing. In The limits of Law, Yale law professor Peter H, Schuck draws on law, social science, and history to explore this momentous clash between law’s compelling promise of ordered liberty and the realistic limits of its capacity to deliver on this promise. Schuck first discusses the constraints within which law must work–law’s own complexity, the cultural chasms it must bridge, and the social diversity it must accommodate–and proceeds to consider the ways law uses regulatory, legislative, and adjudicatory processes to influence social behavior. He shows how politics shapes regulation, how regulation might incorporate individualized equity, and how it can best be reformed. Turning to legislation, he justifies a strong role for special interest groups, dissects purely symbolic statutes, and defends broad delegations of legislative power to regulatory agencies. Concerning adjudication, Schuck analyzes the courts’ efforts to advance social justice by controlling federal agencies, constitutionalizing politics, managing mass toxic tort disputes, and reforming public services and institutions. His concluding chapter draws together some general lessons about law’s limits and possibilities for improving democratic governance.

"This volume ... arose out of the papers and commentaries presented at the annual meeting of the American Society for Legal and Political Philosophy in conjunction with the American Political Science Association meetings in Washington, D.C., in September 2005"--Preface.