Large Devaluations And The Real Exchange Rate

"In this paper we argue that the primary force behind the large drop in real exchange rates that occurs after large devaluations is the slow adjustment in the price of nontradable goods and services. Our empirical analysis uses data from five large devaluation episodes: Argentina (2001), Brazil (1999), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994), and Thailand (1997). We conduct a detailed analysis of the Argentina case using disaggregated CPI data, data from our own survey of prices in Buenos Aires, and scanner data from supermarkets. We assess the robustness of our findings by studying large real-exchange-rate appreciations, medium devaluations, and small exchange-rate movements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

"Large devaluations are generally associated with large declines in real exchange rates. We develop a model which embodies two complementary forces that account for the large declines in the real exchange rate that occur in the aftermath of large devaluations. The first force is sticky nontradable-goods prices. The second force is the impact of real shocks that often accompany large devaluations. We argue that sticky nontradable goods prices generally play an important role in explaining post-devaluation movements in real exchange rates. However, real shocks can sometimes be primary drivers of real exchange-rate movements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment provides a unified theoretical and empirical investigation of exchange rate policy and performance in scores of developing countries. It develops a theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium real exchange rates, takes up the question of why devaluations are the most controversial policy measures in poorer nations, and discusses what determines their success or failure. In a lucid fashion, Edwards organizes vast amounts of data on exchange rates - both real and nominal - and discusses their effect on net trade balances, net asset positions, output growth, real wages, and rates of price inflation, analyzed both in time series and through cross country comparisons. Edwards's investigation singles out 39 major devaluation episodes for before and after comparative analyses while simultaneously isolating the separate effects of other important explanatory variables, such as bank credit expansion and changes in the terms of trade. The first part of the book focuses on theoretical models of devaluation and real exchange rate behavior in less developed countries. Special attention is paid to intertemporal channels in the transmission of disturbances. The second part uses a large cross country data set to analyze the way the real exchange rate has behaved in these nations. The data are also used to test the implications of several theories of real exchange rate determination. The third part analyzes actual devaluation experiences between 1962 and 1982. These chapters examine the events leading to a balance of payments crisis and to a devaluation, exploring the relation between macroeconomic disequilibrium, and the imposition of trade and exchange controls. They also investigate the effect of nominal devaluation on key variables such as the balance of payments, the current account, the real exchange rate, real output real wages, and income distribution.

This paper deals with the anatomy of devaluation in Latin America. In an effort to understand the economics surrounding the causes and consequences of exchange rate crises, eighteen devaluation episodes that took place between 1962 and 1982 are investigated in detail. The paper focuses on: (1) the relation between (inconsistent) macroeconomics policies and exchange rate crises; (2) the role of real exchange rate overvaluation in the precipitation of balance of payment crises under pre-determined nominal exchange rates; (3) the role of exchange controls, multiple exchange rates and black markets in the period preceding devaluations; and (4) the effectiveness of nominal devaluations as a way to restore real exchange rate equilibrium. A distinction is made between stepwise devaluations and crawling peg regime. It was found that historically most stepwise devaluations have had difficulty in sustaining a real devaluation over the medium term. Countries that adopted a crawling peg have generally been able to maintain a higher real exchange rate. In many cases, however, this has been achieved at the cost of substantial inflation

In 2002 Uruguay faced a sudden stop of international capital flows, inducing a deep financial crisis and a large devaluation of the peso. The real exchange rate depreciated and exports expanded. Paradoxically, export shares and real exchange rates negatively correlate among Uruguayan exporters around 2002. To unravel this paradox, we develop a small open economy model of heterogeneous firms. Domestic firms are price takers in the international market, operate under monopolistic competition in the domestic market, and face financial constraints when exporting. Confronted to a large nominal devaluation, financial constraints deepen. Financially constrained exporters cannot optimally expand in the export market and react by passing-through the devaluation to the domestic price only partially, expanding domestic sales. As a consequence, the more financially constrained exporters are, the less their export shares expand and the more their firm specific real exchange rates depreciate. As a result, export shares and real exchange rates of exporters are negatively correlated as in the data.

"Lessons from world experience about the consequences of exchange rate overvaluation (the frequent cause of trade crises), the consequences of trying to defend an overvalued exchange rate, and the most appropriate policies for resolving an overvaluation"--Cover.

Exchange rate policy has profound consequences for economic development, financial crises, and international political conflict. Some governments in the developing world maintain excessively weak and "undervalued" exchange rates, a policy that promotes export-led development but often heightens tensions with foreign governments. Many other developing countries "overvalue" their exchange rates, which increases consumers’ purchasing power but often reduces economic growth. In Demanding Devaluation, David Steinberg argues that the demands of powerful interest groups often dictate government decisions about the level of the exchange rate. Combining rich qualitative case studies of China, Argentina, South Korea, Mexico, and Iran with cross-national statistical analyses, Steinberg reveals that exchange rate policy is heavily influenced by a country’s domestic political arrangements. Interest group demands influence exchange rate policy, and national institutional structures shape whether interest groups lobby for an undervalued or an overvalued rate. A country’s domestic political system helps determine whether it undervalues its exchange rate and experiences explosive economic growth or if it overvalues its exchange rate and sees its economy stagnate as a result.

The historical evolution of the real exchange rate in most LDCs, with periods of gradual appreciation followed by massive depreciations, implies that the standard variability measures are not valid for comparing real exchange rate uncertainty across countries.