Korean Arms Control

This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula), the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other.

In the past 40 years, arms control has become a central activity of international relations, playing a critical role in underpinning the balance of power. This book examines the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the potential for using arms control to reduce tension and enhance confidence between the two Koreas.

This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula), the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other.

This study deals with the Hot issues of the first five Prime Ministers (PM) meetings, which encompassed 15 months of negotiations and have resulted in the completion of the Agreement on South-North Reconciliation/Non-aggression and Cooperation after 46 years of division. After the signing of the agreement, detailed worker level progress has culminated in North Korea signing the nuclear safety treaty of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Acceptance of International Inspection of Nuclear Facilities South-North civil economic progress is on the way and at the 6th meeting, a head of state meeting was discussed. Taking all this into consideration, it is safe to say that an affirmative direction is being taken towards South-North relations. In this arena, a critical element for better South-North relations is arms control. If meetings on arms control between South-North make good progress, the solution for the Korean peninsula's reunification, as well as detente, will be achieved more quickly. Therefore, arms control on the Korean peninsula should be considered as an important point for improvement of the future South-North Korean relationship. The important fact that we should remember is that arms control is a common issue. Arms control should be solved by South-North Korea because a phased arms control can develop prior to conditions for reunification.

This book addresses the issue that is whether the new Eas and West atmosphere of detente and arms reduction can smother the sparks of conflict on the Korean peninsula and perhaps illuminate the path to a Korea reunified as a democratic state.