Kants Theory Of A Priori Knowledge

The prevailing interpretation of Kant’s First Critique in Anglo-American philosophy views his theory of a priori knowledge as basically a theory about the possibility of empirical knowledge (or experience), or the a priori conditions for that possibility (the representations of space and time and the categories). Instead, Robert Greenberg argues that Kant is more fundamentally concerned with the possibility of a priori knowledge—the very possibility of the possibility of empirical knowledge in the first place. Greenberg advances four central theses:(1) the Critique is primarily concerned about the possibility, or relation to objects, of a priori, not empirical knowledge, and Kant’s theory of that possibility is defensible; (2) Kant’s transcendental ontology must be distinct from the conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge; (3) the functions of judgment, in Kant’s discussion of the Table of Judgments, should be seen according to his transcendental logic as having content, not as being just logical forms of judgment making; (4) Kant’s distinction between and connection of ordering relations (Verhaltnisse) and reference relations (Beziehungen) have to be kept in mind to avoid misunderstanding the Critique. At every step of the way Greenberg contrasts his view with the major interpretations of Kant by commentators like Henry Allison, Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. Not only does this new approach to Kant present a strong challenge to these dominant interpretations, but by being more true to Kant’s own intent it holds promise for making better sense out of what have been seen as the First Critique’s discordant themes.

The papers in this volume are offered in celebration of the 200th anni versary of the pub 1 i cat i on of Inmanue 1 Kant's The MetaphysicaL Foundations of NatupaL Science. All of the es says (including the Introduction) save two were written espe ci ally for thi s volume. Gernot Bohme' s paper is an amended and enlarged version of one originally read in the series of lectures and colloquia in philosophy of science offered by Boston University. My own paper is a revised and enlarged version (with an appendix containing completely new material) of one read at the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Sci ence Association held in Chicago in 1984. Why is it important to devote this attention to Kant's last published work in the philosophy of physics? The excellent essays in the volume will answer the question. I will provide some schematic com ments designed to provide an image leading from the general question to its very specific answers. Kant is best known for hi s monumental Croitique of Pure Reason and for his writings in ethical theory. His "critical" philosophy requires an initial sharp division of knowledge into its theoretical and practical parts. Moral perfection of attempts to act out of duty is the aim of practical reason. The aim of theoretical reason is to know the truth about ma terial and spiritual nature.

Immanuel Kant famously said that he was awoken from his "dogmatic slumbers," and led to question the possibility of metaphysics, by David Hume's doubts about causation. Because of this, many philosophers have viewed Hume's influence on Kant as limited to metaphysics. More recently, some philosophers have questioned whether even Kant's metaphysics was really motivated by Hume. In Knowledge, Reason, and Taste, renowned Kant scholar Paul Guyer challenges both of these views. He argues that Kant's entire philosophy--including his moral philosophy, aesthetics, and teleology, as well as his metaphysics--can fruitfully be read as an engagement with Hume. In this book, the first to describe and assess Hume's influence throughout Kant's philosophy, Guyer shows where Kant agrees or disagrees with Hume, and where Kant does or doesn't appear to resolve Hume's doubts. In doing so, Guyer examines the progress both Kant and Hume made on enduring questions about causes, objects, selves, taste, moral principles and motivations, and purpose and design in nature. Finally, Guyer looks at questions Kant and Hume left open to their successors.

Past interpreters of Kant’s thought seldom viewed his writings on politics as having much importance, especially in comparison with his writings on ethics, which (along with his major works, such as the Critique of Pure Reason) received the lion’s share of attention. But in recent years a new generation of scholars has revived interest in what Kant had to say about politics. From a position of engagement with today’s most pressing questions, this volume of essays offers a comprehensive introduction to Kant’s often misunderstood political thought. Covering the full range of sources of Kant’s political theory—including not only the Doctrine of Right, the Critiques, and the political essays but also Kant’s lectures and minor writings—the volume’s distinguished contributors demonstrate that Kant’s philosophy offers compelling positions that continue to inspire the best thinking on politics today. Aside from the editor, the contributors are Michaele Ferguson, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Ian Hunter, John Christian Laursen, Mika LaVaque-Manty, Onora O’Neill, Thomas W. Pogge, Arthur Ripstein, and Robert S. Taylor.

The Third International Kant Congress met in Rochester, New York, March 30 to April 4, 1970. The Proceedings, published by D. Reidel Publishing Company in 1972, contained 76 complete papers and 30 ab stracts in three languages. Since this large volume covered many phases of Kant's philosophy from a wide variety of standpoints, it is unlikely that the entire contents of it will be of interest to anyone philosopher. I have therefore selected from that volume the 20 papers that seem to me to be most likely to be of interest to English-speaking philosophers who are, to use a fairly vague description, in the 'analytical tradition'. The topics treated here are those which are most relevant to current philosoph ical debate in the theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. The division of papers under the seven principal topics, however, is in some respects a little arbitrary. I hope this little volume, published 250 years after Kant's birth, will show philosophers who are not already convinced that Kant is one of the most contemporary of the great philosophers of the past. I believe that the efforts of the authors of the papers will show that there can be genuine Kantian contributions towards the solution of problems that have fre quently been handled in opposition to, or obliviousness of, the eighteenth century philosopher who did more than anyone else to formulate the problems which still worry philosophers in the analytic tradition.

A reprint of the Macmillan edition of 1968. While most interpretive studies of the Critique of Pure Reason are either too scholarly or too superficial to be of practical use to students, Hartnack has achieved a concise comprehensive analysis of the work in a lucid style that communicates the essence of extraordinarily complex arguments in the simplest possible way. An ideal companion to the First Critique, especially for those grappling with the work for the first time.

First published in 1962. Kant’s philosophical works, and especially the Critique of Pure Reason, have had some influence on recent British philosophy. But the complexities of Kant’s arguments, and the unfamiliarity of his vocabulary, inhibit understanding of his point of view. In Kant’s Theory of Knowledge an attempt is made to relate Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason to contemporary issues by expressing them in a more modern idiom. The selection of issues discussed is intended to present a continuous argument, of an epistemological kind, which runs centrally through the Critique. The argument deals with essentially with the problems, raised in the Transcendental Analytic, about the status of categories. It deals with certain preliminary assumptions made in setting these problems, and discusses the way in which the various sections of the Analytic contribute to their solution. It also deals with Kant’s criticisms of traditional metaphysics, and ends with an account of his effort in the Third Antinomy to resolve the conflict between freedom and causality, and so to effect a transition of knowledge to moral philosophy.