Kant And The Liberal Democratic Peace Theory The Cases Of Kosovo Iraq And Afghanistan

Essay from the year 2010 in the subject Politics - Political Theory and the History of Ideas Journal, grade: 1.7, Royal Holloway, University of London, language: English, abstract: Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan being the wars discussed most controversial in the last decade are also an important subject matter for the political theory (Kugler et al., 2004; Mearsheimer/Walt, 2003). Especially their use as falsifying cases against the liberal notion of democratic peace theory is prominent - though questionable (Panke/Risse, 2007). Kant and his successors in the tradition of the liberal democratic peace theory can to a certain extent be defended even considering the recent wars - at east on the surface; these were fought between despotic states and democracies and therefore do not stand in opposition to the liberal peace theory in its 'narrow form'. Nevertheless, closer analysis reveals that the recent conflicts can be used as examples of severe violations of part of Kant's predictions and arguments. These arguments will be exposed within the first part of the essay formulated by Immanuel Kant already in 1795 (Kant, 2007). Afterwards the theoretical discussion will be expanded towards contemporary followers, such as Doyle (1983). They form what is often stated as the liberal democratic peace theory. Subsequently, the cases of Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan as possible points of falsifications against the trustworthiness of the theoretical arguments presented beforehand will be analysed.

Under which conditions do democracies participate in war, and when do they abstain? Providing a unique theoretical framework, Mello identifies pathways of war involvement and abstention across thirty democracies, investigating the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Peacebuilding is explained by combining interpretive frameworks (paradigms) that have evolved from the subfields of international relations and comparative politics.

‘The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development’ approaches the subject of the security-development nexus from a variety of different perspectives. Chapters within this study address the nexus specifically, as well as investigate its related issues, particularly those linked to studies of conflict and peace. These expositions are supported by a strong geographical focus, with case studies from Africa, Asia and Europe being included. Overall, the text’s collected essays provide a detailed and comprehensive view of conflict, security and development.

How Woodrow Wilson's vision of making the world safe for democracy has been betrayed—and how America can fulfill it again The liberal internationalist tradition is credited with America's greatest triumphs as a world power—and also its biggest failures. Beginning in the 1940s, imbued with the spirit of Woodrow Wilson’s efforts at the League of Nations to "make the world safe for democracy," the United States steered a course in world affairs that would eventually win the Cold War. Yet in the 1990s, Wilsonianism turned imperialist, contributing directly to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the continued failures of American foreign policy. Why Wilson Matters explains how the liberal internationalist community can regain a sense of identity and purpose following the betrayal of Wilson’s vision by the brash “neo-Wilsonianism” being pursued today. Drawing on Wilson’s original writings and speeches, Tony Smith traces how his thinking about America’s role in the world evolved in the years leading up to and during his presidency, and how the Wilsonian tradition went on to influence American foreign policy in the decades that followed—for good and for ill. He traces the tradition’s evolution from its “classic” era with Wilson, to its “hegemonic” stage during the Cold War, to its “imperialist” phase today. Smith calls for an end to reckless forms of U.S. foreign intervention, and a return to the prudence and “eternal vigilance” of Wilson’s own time. Why Wilson Matters renews hope that the United States might again become effectively liberal by returning to the sense of realism that Wilson espoused, one where the promotion of democracy around the world is balanced by the understanding that such efforts are not likely to come quickly and without costs.

The book turns the 'democratic peace' theme on its head: rather than investigating the reasons for the supposed pacifism of democracies, it looks for the causes of their militancy. In order to solve this puzzle, the authors look across International Relations, political theory, political philosophy and sociology.

Conventional wisdom in international relations maintains that democracies are only peaceful when encountering other democracies. Using a variety of social scientific methods of investigation ranging from statistical studies and laboratory experiments to case studies and computer simulations, Rousseau challenges this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that democracies are less likely to initiate violence at early stages of a dispute. Using multiple methods allows Rousseau to demonstrate that institutional constraints, rather than peaceful norms of conflict resolution, are responsible for inhibiting the quick resort to violence in democratic polities. Rousseau finds that conflicts evolve through successive stages and that the constraining power of participatory institutions can vary across these stages. Finally, he demonstrates how constraint within states encourages the rise of clusters of democratic states that resemble "zones of peace" within the anarchic international structure.

Africa; Sierra Leone; Afghanistan; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Timor-Leste; Sri Lanka; Palestine; Israel; United Nations; Lebanon; Cambodia; Central America.

Must we fight terrorism with terror, match assassination with assassination, and torture with torture? Must we sacrifice civil liberty to protect public safety? In the age of terrorism, the temptations of ruthlessness can be overwhelming. But we are pulled in the other direction too by the anxiety that a violent response to violence makes us morally indistinguishable from our enemies. There is perhaps no greater political challenge today than trying to win the war against terror without losing our democratic souls. Michael Ignatieff confronts this challenge head-on, with the combination of hard-headed idealism, historical sensitivity, and political judgment that has made him one of the most influential voices in international affairs today. Ignatieff argues that we must not shrink from the use of violence--that far from undermining liberal democracy, force can be necessary for its survival. But its use must be measured, not a program of torture and revenge. And we must not fool ourselves that whatever we do in the name of freedom and democracy is good. We may need to kill to fight the greater evil of terrorism, but we must never pretend that doing so is anything better than a lesser evil. In making this case, Ignatieff traces the modern history of terrorism and counter-terrorism, from the nihilists of Czarist Russia and the militias of Weimar Germany to the IRA and the unprecedented menace of Al Qaeda, with its suicidal agents bent on mass destruction. He shows how the most potent response to terror has been force, decisive and direct, but--just as important--restrained. The public scrutiny and political ethics that motivate restraint also give democracy its strongest weapon: the moral power to endure when the furies of vengeance and hatred are spent. The book is based on the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 2003.

Shifts the often naïve focus of democratic peace theory towards liberal-democratic militancy and highlights the role of national identities.