Justice And Loyalty

As the most forceful biblical proponent of the ideals of justice, loyalty, and kindness, Micah holds special appeal for those who are concerned about the powerlessness of the poor and humble. In this commentary Juan Alfaro examines the prophecies of Micah as they address both the internal and the external crises that faced Judah in the eighth century B.C. Throughout his exposition Alfaro stresses that Micah does not belong to a dead past; rather, Micah's challenging message of judgment and hope calls for change and conversion in our world today.

Interactional Justice explores the accomplishment of loyalty by focusing on defence lawyers' work in the emotionally and interactionally constraining situation of the criminal trial.

At a time when age-old political structures are crumbling, civil strife abounds, and economic uncertainty permeates the air, loyalty offers us security in our relationships with associates, friends, and family. Yet loyalty is a suspect virtue. It is not impartial. It is not blind. It violates the principles of morality that have dominated Western thought for the last two hundred years. Loyalties are also thought to be irrational and contrary to the spirit of Capitalism. In a free market society, we are encouraged to move to the competition when we are not happy. This way of thinking has invaded our personal relationships and undermined our capacities for friendship and loyalty to those who do not serve our immediate interests. As George P. Fletcher writes, it is time for loyal bonds, born of history and experience, to prevail both over impartial morality and the self-interested thinking of the market trader. In this extended essay, George P. Fletcher offers an account of loyalty that illuminates its role in our relationships with family and friends, our ties to country, and the commitment of the religious to God and their community. Fletcher opposes the traditional view of the moral self as detached from context and history. He argues instead that loyalty, not impartial detachment, should be the central feature of our moral and political lives. Writing as a political "liberal," he claims that a commitment to country is necessary to improve the lot of the poor and disadvantaged. This commitment to country may well require greater reliance on patriotic rituals in education and a reconsideration of the Supreme Court's extending the First Amendment to protect flag burning. Given the worldwide currents of parochialism and political decentralization, the task for us, Fletcher argues, is to renew our commitment to a single nation united in its diversity. Bringing to bear his expertise as a law professor, Fletcher reasons that the legal systems should defer to existing relationships of loyalty. Familial, professional, and religious loyalties should be respected as relationships beyond the limits of the law. Thus surrogate mothers should not be forced to surrender and betray their children, spouses should not be required to testify against each other in court, parents should not be prevented from willing their property to their children, and the religiously committed should not be forced to act contrary to conscience. Yet the question remains: Aren't loyalty, and particularly patriotism, dangerously one-sided? Indeed, they are, but no more than are love and friendship. The challenge, Fletcher maintains, is to overcome the distorting effects of impartial morality and to develop a morality of loyalty properly suited to our emotional and spiritual lives. Justice has its sphere, as do loyalties. In this book, Fletcher provides the first step toward a new way of thinking that recognizes the complexity of our moral and political lives.

Deep friendship may express profound loyalty, but so too may virulent nationalism. What can and should we say about this Janus-faced virtue of the will? This volume explores at length the contours of an important and troubling virtue -- its cognates, contrasts, and perversions; its strengths and weaknesses; its awkward relations with universal morality; its oppositional form and limits; as well as the ways in which it functions in various associative connections, such as friendship and familial relations, organizations and professions, nations, countries, and religious tradition.

In 1906 and 1907 I gave, as a part of my regular work at the Summer School of Harvard University, an “Introduction to Ethics, with Special. Reference to the Interests of Teachers” A few lectures, summing up the main principles that lay at the basis of this ethical course as it had been given in the summer of 1906, were delivered in January and February, 1907, before a general academic audience, during a brief visit of mine at the University of Illinois. In several other places, both in the West and in the East, I have also presented portions of my views upon ethics; and in the summer of 1907 four general lectures on the topic were repeated before the Summer School of Theology at Harvard. In November and December of 1907, the lectures that constitute the present book were delivered for the first time before the Lowell Institute in Boston. visiting lecturer, to give to undergraduate students at Yale University in weekly class meetings. The present book, although in this way related to present and past academic tasks, is, nevertheless, not a text-book, and does not mean to be elaborately technical philosophical research. It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals, and who may also be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philosophical spirit. Loyalty is indeed an old word, and to my mind a precious one; and the general idea of loyalty is still far older than the word, and is immeasurably more precious. But this idea has nearly always been confused in men's minds by its chance social and traditional associations. Everybody has heard of loyalty; most prize it; but few perceive it to be what, in its inmost spirit, it really is, —the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all duties. In order to be able to see that this is the true meaning of the idea of loyalty, one has to free this idea from its unessential if somewhat settled associations with this or that special social habit or circumstance. And in order to accomplish this latter end, one has indeed to give to the term a more exact meaning than popular usage defines. It is this freeing of the idea of loyalty from its chance and misleading associations; it is this vindication of the spirit of loyalty as the central spirit of the moral and reasonable life of man, —t is this that I believe to be somewhat new about my “Philosophy of Loyalty” The conception of “Loyalty to Loyalty”, as set forth in my third lecture, constitutes the most significant part of this ethical task. For the rest, if my philosophy is, as a theory, more or less new, I am still only trying to make articulate what I believe to be the true spirit and meaning of all the loyal, whoever they may be, and however they define their fidelity. The result of conceiving duty in terms of the conception of loyalty which is here expounded is, indeed, if I am right, somewhat deep-going and transforming, not only for ethics, but for most men's views of truth and reality, and of religion. My own general philosophical opinions have been set forth in various works some time since (most elaborately in the volumes entitled “The World and the Individual”). I have no change to report in my fundamental metaphysical theses. But I have not published any formulation of my ethical opinions since the brief review of ethical problems in the first part of my “Religious Aspect of Philosophy” (published in 1885). One learns a good deal about ethics as one matures. And I believe that this present statement of mine ought to help at least some readers to see that such philosophical idealism as I have long maintained is not a doctrine remote from life, but is in close touch with the most practical issues; and that religion, as well as daily life, has much to gain from the right union of ethics with a philosophical theory of the real world. At the moment there is much speech, in current philosophical literature, regarding the “nature of truth“ and regarding “pragmatism” An ethical treatise very naturally takes advantage of this situation to discuss the relation between the “practical” and —the Eternal. I have done so in my closing lectures. In order to do so, I have had to engage in a certain polemic regarding the problem of truth, —a polemic directed against certain opinions recently set forth by one of the “dearest of my friends, and by one of the most loyal of men; my teacher for a while in my youth; my honoured colleague for many years, —Professor William James. Such a polemic would be indeed much out of place in a book upon Loyalty, were it not that my friend and myself fully agree that, to both of us, truth indeed “is the greater friend” Had I not very early in my work as a student known Professor James, I doubt whether any poor book of mine would ever have been written, —least of all the present one. What I personally owe him, then, I most heartily and affectionately acknowledge. But if he and I do not see truth in the same light at present, we still do well, I think, as friends, each to speak his mind as we walk by the way, and then to wait until some other light shines for our eyes. I suppose that so to do is loyalty. Meanwhile, I am writing, in this book, not merely and not mainly for philosophers, but for all those who love, as I said, ideals, and also for those who love, as I may now add, their country, —a country so ripe at present for idealism, and so confused, nevertheless, by the vastness and the complication of its social and political problems. To simplify men's moral issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win hearts for loyalty, —this would be, in this land, a peculiarly precious mission, if indeed I could hope that this book could aid, however little, towards such an end. Amongst the numerous friends to whom (whether or no they agree with all my views) I am especially indebted for direct and indirect aid in preparing this book, and for criticisms and other suggestions, I must mention: first, my wife, who has constantly helped me with her counsel, and in the revision of my text; then, my sister, Miss Ruth Royce, of San José, California, with whom I discussed the plan of the work in the summer of 1907; then, Doctor and Mrs. R. C. Cabot of Boston; Doctor J. J. Putnam of Boston; and, finally, my honoured colleague, Professor George H. Palmer....FROM THE BOOKS.

The principle of loyalty requires the EU and its Member States to co-operate sincerely towards the implementation of EU law. Under the principle, the European courts have developed significant public law duties on States to deepen the reach of EU law. This is the first full-length analysis of the loyalty principle and its legal implications.

Drawing on Kant, Rousseau, and Habermas, Stilz argues that we owe civic obligations to the state if it is sufficiently just, and that constitutionally enshrined principles of justice in themselves are grounds for obedience to our particular state and for democratic solidarity with our fellow citizens.

This insightful and brilliant analysis of ethics teaches readers valuable skills in evaluating tough choices and arriving at sound conclusions. “A thought-provoking guide to enlightened and progressive personal behavior.” —Jimmy Carter An essential guide to ethical action updated for our challenging times, How Good People Make Tough Choices by Rushworth M. Kidder offers practical tools for dealing with the difficult moral dilemmas we face in our everyday lives. The founder and president of the Institute for Global Ethics, Dr. Kidder provides guidelines for making the important decisions in situations that may not be that clear cut—from most private and personal to the most public and global. Former U.S. senator and NBA legend Bill Bradley calls How Good People Make Tough Choices “a valuable guide to more informed and self-conscious moral judgments.”